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The maritime shipments of nuclear matenals and radioactive wastes have incited 
a chorus of protests fkom some members of the international community, in partïcular 
Coastal States and non-govenimental organizations. Their disapproval stems f?om the 
risks of harmful radiation fiom the shipments passing through their maritime zones near 
their coastal comxnunities. The States engaged in the shipments counter that they observe 
international safety regdations and standards and that they have contingency plans and 
liability schemes to answer for h m  that might occur. 
A review of the legal regime goveming the shipments of radioactive materials 
reveals an array of preventive and ernergency measures as well as liability and 
compensation measures. The legal regime, however, does not provide any voice to all 
potentially affected entities, particularly developing Coastal States and the marine 
environment. The legal regime m u t  be transformed in order to take the above interests 
into consideration. 
Any refom in the legal system must start with an evaluation of the ethics and 
philosophy underlying the system. Ethics and philosophy do not provide al1 the answers 
to resolve the dilemma However, ethics and philosophy contribute to the definition of 
the parameters of the existing legal regime and explain why the controversy regarding 
shipments of radioactive materials continue. Understanding the ethical and philosophical 
basis of the legal regime contributes to the formulation of recomrnendations for reforms. 
This thesis asserts that the principal reason why the uiterests of d l  potentially 
affected entities and the marine environment are overlooked is because the legal regime 
is principally anthropocentxic. Under the anthropocentric fhmework, hazardous human 
activities which are economically beneficial are given primacy. The environment is 
protected to the extent that its degradation affects the beneficial outcomes of the activity. 
In the non-anthropocentric approach to the greening of international law, the interests of 
al1 potentially afTected entities, including the marine environment would be covered in 
the legal system. 
The non-anthropocentric greening of international law on shipments of 
radioactive materials ensures that any reform in the legal system considers and includes 
the interests of al1 potentidy affected entities, including the marine environment. The 
following measures are proposed in the non-anthropocentric greening of the legal regime 
goveming the shipments of radioactive materïals: mandatory codes: participation of non- 
governmental organizations; collaboration of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
and the International Maritime Organization; regional arrangements, and 
internationalization of the nuclear issue. 
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Introduction 
Spent nuclear fuel fiom civilian nuclear reactors is starting to pile up on a world 
wide scale. For closed cycle States or those States engaged in reprocessing spent nuclear 
fuel, the increase of spent nuclear fuel is not a problem. Spent nuclear fuel can be 
reprocessed and may be used again as fuel in nuclear reactors. Out of the 32 couatnes 
that are engaged in commercial nuclear energy generation, only a few are capable of 
reprocessing their own spent nuclear fuel. Rather than establishing their own nuclear 
reprocessing facilities, other countries sign cooperation agreements with countries that 
have the technology and experience to undertake reprocessing for them. One of these 
countries, France, for example, undertakes reprocessing activities for 10 Japanese nuclear 
cornpanies. Japan delivers spent nuclear fuel to France for reprocessing. France returns 
the reprocessed nuclear fiel, usually in mixed oxide [hereinafter MOX] ' fom, as well as 
the remaining high-level radioactive wastes, in vitrified or solidified form, to the State of 
origin, Japan. From the points of view of the States engaged in nuclear energy generation, 
this arrangement is ideal and beneficial to them both. 
However, spent fuel, reprocessed nuclear fuel and highly radioactive wastes are 
highly radioactive substances. Their shipments across international jurisdictions pose 
radiation risks to human populations and the environment. Because of the risks posed, 
this activity is one of the most highly regulated activities in international law. The 
international and national regulations have been able to keep the risks of any accident 




pertaining to nuclear activities, including the maritime shipments of radioactive 
materials, low. However, when accidents do happen, the consequences of radiation 
exposure may be grave and far-reaching, Secting many countries, their populations and 
the environment. The potential for a widespread excessive exposure to radiation from the 
maritime carriage of radioactive materials has made many Coastal States anxiouç and 
concerned. Excessive exposure to radiation has caused deaths and long-terni diseases in 
humans as well is contaminated ecosystems. 
n ie  hdings of this thesis revealed a regime that has preventive and contingency 
measures, as well as a civil liability scheme should harm occur. Despite the 
cornprehensive nature of the legal Wework, the controversy surroundhg the shipments 
has not been resolved and has become Iike a never-ending cycle of protests and new 
regulations. 
A review of the legal regime and the nature of the activity and its nsks indicated 
senous gaps. The problem is that the risks fiom the shipments of radioactive materials are 
imposed upon entities that have nothing to do with the activity at all. The benefits, 
however, accrue only to the States of origin and destination. There may be residual 
benefits to other States, in the form of cleaner air on a global level as a result of using 
nuclear energy instead of oil. The direct risks to these third States and to the marine 
environrnents are higher than the residual benefits. Despite the potential risks, the present 
legal regime does not allow the participation of these potentialiy affected third States and 
other stakeholders in the decision-makùig process at a stage before any harrn has 
occurred. Nor does the legal regime provide any protection to the marine environment, 
per se, other than being a residual beneficiary of the protection accorded to humans. 
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1s there a way that the interests of ail potentially affected States and the interests 
of the marine environment might be rneaningfilly represented and considered in the 
decision-making processes of the legal regime governing the maritime carriage of 
radioactive matenals? This study argues that the legal regime governing the maritime 
carriage of radioactive matenals is based on anthropocentric ethics and philosophy.2 The 
anthropocentric tendency is a fundamental factor why the controversy regarding the 
shipments has not been resolved. The anthropocentric h e w o r k  prioritizes economic 
concems and overlooks non-economic interests of other potentially afEected entities: 
States, non-States and the marine environment. A shifi to non-antbropocentric ethics and 
philosophy as the underlying rationale of the legal fiamework is necessary before reforms 
in the legal regime c m  be pursued. 
In Chapter 2,1 wi1l present the two general ethical and philosophical views of the 
relationship of humanity and the rest of the biotic community: anthropocentrism and non- 
anthropocentrism. Anthropocentric ethics and phiIosophy are human-centered. Hurnan 
economic concerm and interests are considered paramourit. Non-anthropocentrïsm, on 
the other hand, while not denying the importance of human-centered concerns, 
recognizes the need to consider the interests of both humans and non-humans species. 
Humans are not considered superiors but are members, thus, they have the obligation to 
become responsible and judicious members of the community. 
2 Philosophy is broader than ethics. "Ethics does not come into existence without a social, 
intellectual and general philosophical context." Kence, environmental ethics necessarily 
include a philosophical base. Together, both tems denote a certain worldview or 
perspective of the relationship of the human community with the natural environment. A. 
Gunn, "Cm Environmental Ethics Save the World?", in F. Férre and P. Hartel, (eds.) 
Ethics and Environmental Philosophy. Theory Meets Pructice (Athens and London: n i e  
University of Georgia Press, 1994) at 197. 
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Chapter 3 provides the parameters of the issues surrounding the maritime 
shipments of radioactive materids. The controversial shipments and the concems raised 
by potentially affected States and non-govermnental organizations will h t  be described. 
The validity and reasonableness of the concems raised by potentially affected 
States wiU then be placed in a more objective perspective by a discussion of the nuclear 
bel  cycle, the effects of radioactivity on humans and the environment, and the risks 
attached to maritime transport as a whole. The purpose of this Chapter is to provide a 
basis for taking the position that the risks posed to other potentially affected States and to 
the marine environment necessitates a re-examination of the underlying ethics and 
philosophy of legal regime. When the risks posed by an activity are high, the tendency of 
an anthropocentric-based legal system is to impose more stringent laws or regula60ns. 
n i e  stringency of regdations does not guarantee the non-occurrence of h m .  Non- 
anthropocentric ethics and philosophy also do not guarantee the non-occurrence of harm. 
However, they empower al1 potentially af5ected entities in activities that present risks to 
them and to the environment. 
The legal regime goveming the maritime shipment of radioactive materials will 
be presented in Chapter 4. The legal regime, partly comprised of nuclear law and 
maritime safety laws, is mostly made up of safety standards and requirements for modal 
and non-modal aspects of transportation. The anthropocentric bias of the legal regime is 
obvious. The nghts of States to undertake nuclear activities and to pursue shipping 
interests are prioritized in this regime. Separate protection of the marine environment and 
participation of other potentiaily affected States and non-State entities are secondas. 
objectives. 
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The fina1 Chapter summarizes the challenges facing the non-anthropocentric 
greening of the legal regime regulating the shiprnents of radioactive materials. The non- 
anthropocentnc greening of international law does not look overly optirnistic. The social 
system is anthropocentric. The international legal system is but a reflection of the 
anthropocentric ethics and philosophy that fuels the modem system. However, a strategy 
that can work around the principal obstacles to the non-anthropocentric greening of 
international Iaw already exists: fiagmented incrementalism. Fragmented incrementalism 
is a rnulti and inter-level approach to making changes in international law. This approach 
recognizes that transformation has to be gradud, incremental. 
The foUowhg proposals for action are offered to continue the process of non- 
anthropocentric refoms in the legal regime: broaden the collaborative efforts of the 
IAEA and the IMO; continue the effort to transfomi recommendatory codes into 
mandatory instruments; establish regional arrangements; and intemationalize the nuclear 
issue. These proposals may provide avenues for the participation of all affected entities 
and for the consideration of the marine environment. 
This thesis does not assert that a change in the ethics and philosophy will ensure 
that no h m  to the enviromnent and to people fiom any human activity will occur. 
CCr]niversal dependence on the use of environmental resources for 
even the most basic needs renders it impossible to r e h h  fiom a l t e ~ g  the 
environment. As a result, environmental conflicts are ineradicable and 
environmental protection is always a matter of degree, inescapably 
requiring choices as to the appropnate level of environment al protection 
and the risks which are to be reguiated. 
'F. Du Bois, "Social Justice and the Judicial Enforcement of Environmental Rights and 
Duties", in A. E. Boyle and M. R Anderson (eds.), Human Rights Approaches to 
Environmental Protection (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) at 174. 
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The contemporary system will aiways involve the utilization of the environment 
for human purposes and impairment at some level will resuIt. Confiicts wiIi arke not only 
between and among states; between and among states and non-states; and ultimately, 
between and among non-states. Ultimately in any environmental conflict situation, injury 
to persons and degradation of the environment are inevitable. 
The role of ethics and philosophy is to provide guidance in determining the 
ratioaal and sustainable level or degree of interference and reliance on the environment. 
The highly anthropocentric approach understands environmental protection in the 
language of assimilative capacity. As long as the envimunent seems to be able to 
assimilate, then any human interference is perrnissible. The word 'limit' in the 
anthropocentric framework applies only when the capacity to assimilate reaches its 
maximum level. The non-anthropocentric framework, however, speaks the language of 
ecosystem unity and ecosystem health. The word 'limit' is applied even before any human 
activity is undertaken. The non-anthropocentric ethics and philosophy do not wait for 
degradation to occur, they anticipate and prevent h m  frorn actually taking place. 
4 Conflicts concerning water resources, for example, are a source of political tensions 
between and arnong Middle Eastern states. See A. Hurrell and B. KUigsbury (eds), The 
International Politics of the Environment, Actors, In  terests and Institutions, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1992) at 36. 
Chapter 2 
An ethical and philosophical framework to greening international law 
In this IweZ of our analyses, this question would Zead us to the discovery that society 
itselfis guilty - and we know this a1ready.' 
1. In trodnction 
The phenomenon of the greening of international law, or the increasingly 
environmental slant of international law, as adverted to by one scholar, is by no means 
new? According to Philippe Sands, States entered in agreements for the protection of 
fisheries as early as 1867.~ Many of these agreements are bilateral andlor regional. 
Protection of the environment then was not in a global context. The greening of 
international law in a global context is a recent phenomenon that started in 1972 duMg 
the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment bereinafler Stockholm 
Conference]. It was in the Stockholm Conference where the relationship between 
environment and developrnent was articulated in an integrated and international context- 
Human industrial activities have been elevated to an increasingly international context 
with increasingly wide transboundary consequences. International shipping of dangerous 
or hazardous cargoes is an example. A vesse1 carrying dangerous cargoes firom State C, 
'N. Luhmann, Ecological Communication, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1989) at 10. 
!P. Sands, Principles of international environmental law, Volume I Frarnavorks, 
standards and implementation, (Manchester and New ~ 6 r k :  Manchester University 
Press, 1995) at 3. 
716id. at 26. Sands cited the following conventions: Convention between France and 
Great Britain relative to Fisheries, Paris, 1 1 November 1867, XXZ I.P. E. 1 ; North Sea 
Fisheries (Overfishing Convention), 1882, UN doc. STLEGISER.BI6, 1957,695. 
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flying the flag of State A but may be owned by a Company registered in State B, meets 
a .  accident in the temtorial waters of State D and subsequently spiIIs its hazardous 
cargoes. The vesse1 poliutes the marine environments and coastal cornmunities of States 
D and adjohhg States E and F. The pollution that started in States D, E, and F rnay also 
have contaminated environment of the entire region. The number of States involved in 
the activity and affected by the subsequent accidental pollution manifests the 
interconnectedness of environmental issues. Philippe Sands identifies the element of 
interconnectedness as the principal reason which contributed to the greening of 
international law: 
environmental issues are accompanied by a recognition that ecological 
interdependence do es not respect national boundaries and that issues 
previously considered to be matters of domestic, sovereign concem have 
international implications. The implications, which may be bilateral, sub- 
regional, regional or global, can fiequently only be addressed by 
intemationai law and regulation. 
International law, the primary means or tool in implementing green considerations 
into industrial activities, has undergone a considerable amount of greening through the 
years. Under the present intemational legal k e w o r k ,  the process of greening the Law 
can only go so far. This is because the underlying ethical and philosophical bases of the 
legal kamework - anthropocentrkm - are also the very same ethics and philosophy that 
cause environmental degradation and species depletion and extinction. Anthropocentric 
ethics and philosophy are human-centered and prioritize human activities fist before the 
environment. In reaction to the environmental degradation and species depletion and 
extinction brought about by anthropocentric ethics, non-anthropocentric ethics and 
philosophy were developed. 
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In greenhg the law, there has been no conscious effort to evaluate its ethical and 
philosophical foundations. This thesis argues that any greening must start and m u t  be 
guided by ethics and philosophy as these two constitute the foundation of any social 
system, including the legal system. 
This Chapter will outline the anthropocentnc etfiics and philosophy and contrast it 
fiom the non-anthropocentric views. There are two purposes of this Chapter. First, it is to 
formulate a non-anthropocentric fhmework of international law for environmental 
protection. The second purpose, which will be expanded in Chapter 5, is to use the 
ethical and philosophicai fkamework to analyze why the international Iegai regime that 
governs the maritime cmiage of radioactive materials has not greened in a way that is 
responsive to the concems and interests of al1 potentially affected entities, including the 
marine environment. 
II. Rationale behind the ethical and philosophicai approach to greening 
Do ethics and philosophy play a role in the legai system? Some environmental 
hilosophers9 criticize the idea of an ethical and philosop hical justification behind 
policies, laws and actions to protect the environment. Their main contention is that 
philosophy and action/policy exist in separate continuums. Philosophy does not induce 
human societal behavior. 
In no case does the reasoning of an ethical theorist actually cause a 
norm to be socially instituted or cause a norm once in force to lose status. 
Whether a moral norm is actually in effect within a given community 
'fiid. at 9. 
'J. B. Callicott, "Environmentai Philosophy 1s Environmental Activism: The Most 
Radical and Effective Kind", in D. E. Marietta, Jr. and L. Embree, (eds.) Environmental 
Philosophy and Environmental Activism (United States of Amenca: Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1995) at 20. Callico t describes them as anti-philosop hers. 
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depends not at ail on ethical theorizing.. . If noms encouraging conservation 
and proscribing pollution were actually in force in industriai society, it 
would not be the result of ethical theory; and the fact that currently they 
are not in force is not alleviated by any amount of adroit ethical 
reasoning.'O 
Systems theorist Luhmann agrees and cautions against over-simplistic 
prescriptions, ethical or othenvise, for the present environmental dilemma" 
Transformation of society is not a factory-like process of inputs and outputs.'* The input 
of new ethics and philosophy in the legal system does not automatically result in a 
transformed society as its output. The danger, according to Luhmann, of the entry of 
ethics in the discussion of the environmental dilemma is that the 
intention to demonstrate good intention determines the formulation of the 
problem. So, by accident, as it were, a new environmental ethics enters the 
discussion without ever analysing the ail-important system str~ctures.'~ 
However, one cannot dismiss completely the influential role of ethics and 
philosophy in the legal system. Law and policies do not and cannot exist in a vacuum. 
"Reasons corne k t ,  policies second, not the other way aro~nd."'~ Law is an articulation 
of the ethical and philosophical views of society. 
The danger is not that ethics and philosophy will mislead the quest for a 
resolution of the environmental dilemma Rather, the peril lies in grasping upon ethics 
and philosophy as if they provide the only way to resolve the environmental dilemma. 
Ethics and philosophy have their h c t i o n  to play in the system. Ethics and 
philosophy serve a very important role in the legal system: either they reflect the 
"1. B. Callicott, "An Alternative View of Environmental Ethics," 13 Environmental 
Ethics (1991) at 200. Callicott quoted Kenneth M. Sayre. 
''~uhmann, supra note 5 at 11. 
121bid. at 15. 
13fiid. at 5.  
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worldview that supports the legai system or they articulate and push for a new 
worldview that c m  transforrn the legal ~ ~ s t e r n . ' ~  Ethics and philosophy thus serve as 
catalysts for change. They h c t i o n  as maps to guide human society; they ou the  the 
options that society may take. 
Cognizant of the limitations of ethics and philosophy, this thesis argues that the 
most fimdamental approach to greening the legal system shodd start with an examination 
of the underlying ethics and philosophy and the role they play in the systern. The next 
two sections wiIl discuss the two general worldviews or ethics that have a profound 
impact on the way we view the environment and non-huma. members in it. 
III. Anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism 
There are bvo general ethical and philosophical views that £Ûel the human or 
social system today: anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism. The locus of 
anthropocentrism is human concerns. Non-anthropocentrism, on the other hand, puts 
humans on equal footing with the other members of the biotic comnunity. The dominant 
ethicai and philosophical view is anthropocentrism. 
A. Anthropocentric approach 
The main consideration of the anthropocentric or human-centered view is the weU 
being of humans.16 Nature and everything in it exist for the "support and cornfort" of 
' 4 ~ .  B. Callicott, stpra note 9 at 23. 
''fiici 
I6p. W. Taylor, "The Ethics of Respect for Nature", in M .Zimmerman (Gen. Ed.), 
Environmental Philosophy, From Animal Rights to Radical Ecology, (New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1993) at 66. 
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humans." For nature to acquire value according to the human perspective, it must be 
put to use by or consumed by hum an^.'^ Accordhg John Locke, one of the f o r e m e r s  
of the anthropocentric worldview, a cultivated land is more valuable than a non- 
cultivated one.Ig Materiais fiom nature and the Earth are useless d l  manufactured for 
use by h u r n a ~ s . ~ ~  The mthropocentrics see the oceans and the marine organisms in 
accordance to their use and value to humans, e.g. shipping, commerce, source of resource 
and as sink for wastes. 
The anthropocentric view of Locke is reflected in the philosophy of 
utilitarianism? This philosophy advocates the rnaximization of good, pleasure and 
happiness to the greatest number of h~mans.~' Hence, under the 
anthropocentnc/utilitarian view, the standard upon which any activity, policy, or law is 
evaluated depends on how well it promotes the human interest and ~ e l f a r e . ~ ~  The legal 
implication of a human-centered or anthropocentric view is that 'lit is to humans and only 
to humans that ali duties are ultirnately owed."" In carrying out the duties and 
obligations for humans, there may be residual benefits to non-human species and the 
environment, but there is no separate "obligation to promote or protect the good of non- 
human living things.. . d s  
"E. Katz, Nature as Subiect. Human Obligation and Natural Cmrnunity, (Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997) Katz quoted J. Locke, The Second Treatise 
o Governrnent, at 22 1. 
'&id. 
"fiid. at 229. 
' 'fiid. 
2'fiid. at 230. 
'tibid. at 23 1. 




~ o r n ~ l e m e ~ k n ~  the anthropocentric ethics is the ethics of consumerism. 
Modem human society is now synonymous with the consumer s ~ c i e t ~ . * ~  The ethics of 
contemporary consumerism traces its origins in the United States of Arnenca after the 
World War II. Consumensm was seen as the new Amencan ideology. One retail analyst 
explains why the American system must embrace consumerism. 
Our enormously productive economy . . .deman& that we make 
consumption our way of Me, that we convert the buying of goods into 
rÏtuals, that we seek our spintual satisfaction, our ego satisfaction, ïu 
consumption.. .We need things consumed, burned up, worn out, replaced, 
and discarded at an ever increasing rates2' 
The source of fiilfiUment of the consumenst society is the rnaterial thing. In the 
consurnerist sociev, the maximization of happiness, pleasure and good is in the 
consumption of the rnaterial. 
The neoclassical economic theory that complements the maximization of materiai 
satisfaction is another anthropocentric based school of thought. This economic approach 
focuses on the market exchange processes and uses the natural environment in two ways: 
as a source of materials for goods and s e ~ c e s  (or hurnan satisfaction in a matenal sense) 
and as sink for the waste generated by the production or manufacture of goods and 
Under a neoclassical economic theory, there are two main actors: the consumer 
and the producer. The consumer's main motivation is maximization of material 
26 A. Dumùig, How Much 1s Enough? The Consumer Society and the Future of the Earth, 
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1992) at 274. 
2716id. Duming quoting retailing analyst Victor Lebow. 
"J. Gowdy and S. O'Hara, Economic Theory for Environrnentalists, (Boca Raton: St .  
Lucie Press, 1995) at 9. 
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satisfaction through goods and services;29 the producer, on the other hand, is motivated 
to maximize profit?0 
Critics to the neoclassical economic theory state that the major problem to this 
theory is that the consequences to the natuai environment of the interests of the 
consumer and the producer are beyond its scope and are thus not taken into 
consideration." The notion of scarcity of resources in this approach is relative and does 
not refer to the biophysical notion of finite resources, which is absolute." For example, 
when tropical timber in the Philippines had been used up for internationai commercial 
purposes, many multi-national companies shply  transferred operations in Indonesia 
where tropical timber was still abundant. As well, this economic theory does not consider 
the pressure imposed upon the environment of the wastes generated by the production 
processes.33 It rests on the notion that the environment can assimilate the wastes 
generated by the manflacturing and consumption processes. Again, there is no notion of 
a fhite na- world, or a limitai assimilative capacity of the environment. 
B. Non-anthropocentric approach 
The increasing envkonmental problems such as global warming, air pollution, 
climate change, loss of biodiversiîy, conftonting the global cornmu& necessitated a 
reassessment of the anthropocentric worldview. The root of al1 these issues can be traced 
to the way the environment and everything in it are treated by the hurnan society. 
Anthropocentrism allowed the environment to be used as resource as well as sink of the 
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waste of the consumerist industrial society, The duai roles that the environment pIays 
led to environmental degradation and species depletion and extinction. 
The non-anthropocentric approach is princip ally a reac tion to the anthropocentric 
worldview and condemns anthropocentrisrn as the source of the present environmental 
dilemma According to the non-anthropocentric ethics and philosophy, there is a need to 
assess human-centered ideologies and to review what it means to be a human being. 
There are several variants to the non-anthropocentnc world view. The following 
will be covered here: land ethics, deep ecology, We-centered, ethics of attunement, social 
ecology and ecofeminism. The last two are distinctive because they address the "social 
root of the ecological cri si^."^^ 
Non-anthropocentrïsm sees nature as "a community of interacting, but 
interdependent individ~als."~~ The individual members of the ecosystem include both 
humans and non-humans. Aldo Leopoldts Land ethics subscribes to this ~ i e w . ) ~  Humans 
are members of the natural environment - the Iand - and thus are part of the biotic 
c ~ m r n u n i ~ . ' ~  The integrity of the individual member of the biotic community as well as 
of the whole is important.38 Ultimately, however, when a choice has to be made between 
the individual member and the community, the ecocentric approach would choose the 
biotic community. The more significant element is the whole biota, not the individual 
33fiid. 
3 4 ~ .  Bookchin, " P m ]  Defending the Earth", in D. Jarnieson and L. Gruen (eds.), 
Alternative Perspectives on Environmental Philosophy (New York: Oxford University 
Press, Toronto, 1994) at 122. 
351hid. 
16The land ethic was developed by L. Aldo, A Sand County Almanac and Sketches Hme 
and ïïiere (London: Oxford University Press, 1949). 
3 7 ~ .  B. Callicott, "The Conceptual Foundations of the Land Ethic", in M. Zimrnerman, 
Environmental Philosophy, supra note 16 at 1 1 7. 
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members. "A t h g  is nght when it tends to preserve the integriîy, stability, and beauty 
of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends othe~wïse."~~ 
Deep ecology agrees. on the importance. of both human and the non-human 
mernbers of the biotic comm~ni ty .~~ Naess and Sessions, two of the main proponents of 
deep ecology identify the eight (8) principal points of deep ecology. 
(1) The weU-being and flourishg of human and non-human 
life on Earth have value in themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value, 
inherent worth). These values are independent of the usefblness of 
the non-human world for human purposes. 
(2) Richness and diversity of life fonns conhibute to the 
realization of these values and are also values in themsefves. 
(3) Humans have no right to reduce this nchness and diversity 
except to satisw vital needs. 
(4) The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible 
with a substantially smaller human population. The flourishing of 
non-human life requires a smaller human population. 
( 5 )  Present human interference with the non-human world is 
excessive, and the situation is rapidly worsening. 
(6) Policies m u t  therefore be changed. These policies affect 
basic economic, technological, and ideological structures. The 
resulting state of affairç will be deeply different f?om the present. 
(7) The ideological change will be mainly that of appreciating 
life quality (dwelling in situation of inherent value) rather than 
adhering to an increasingly higher standard of living. There will be 
a profound awareness of the difference between bigness and 
greatness. 
38fiid. at 118. 
39~ id .  
4%. Devall, '' From ] Deep Ecology and Radical Environmentalism", Society and Natural 
Resources 4(1):247 at 1 16. 
17 
(8) Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation 
directly or indirectly to try to implement the necessary changes.41 
Life, under the deep ecology perspective, has an expansive meaning and refers not 
only to the "living entities" but also to the non-living parts of the eco-systern like rivers, 
and sead2  The so-cailed lower life forms have intrinsic as well as instrumental worth to 
the biodiversity of the e c o ~ ~ s t e r n . ~ ~  Non-human species may be taken but only when they 
are vital to humans." "Vital needs" depend on variable factors such as the climate and 
other social 
The principal rationale that allows for this perspective is the abandonment of the 
notion of human superiority. Humans are not superiors but are rnembers of the "web of 
Life"; they are integral parts of the whole? The notion of ecocentric identification, said to 
be the most distinctive characteristic of deep ecology, is possible only when humans 
become truly a part of the ~ h o l e ~ ~  and not supenor. The deep ecologist, thus says, "1 am 
the rainfore~t."~~ 
Deep ecology has been criticized as environmental imperialism because of its 
position in point (4). To advocate for a smaller population is to imply that large 
population, as a cause of environmental degradation, is equivalent to over-consumption 
and waste generation of deveioped countries. Many developing corntries, whose 
"A. Naess, "The Deep Ecological Movement: Some Philosophical Aspects," in M. 
Zimrnerman (ed.), Environmental Philosophy, supra note 16 at 197. 
42fiid. at 197 - 198. 
431bid. 
%id. 
4 %aess, supra note 41 at 31. 




populations are bigger than that of developed States, protest against this imp(icationP9 
While developing countries have bigger populations, they consume and produce much 
less waste than the populations and industries of developed statesSM 
When humans and non-humans are considered on an equal footing, the 
implication is that obligations are owed not just to humans but aIso to non-humans and 
the entire biotic comunity. Taylor's life-centered approach works and elaborates on this 
implication.5' The human community has an obligation to ensure that its activities respect 
and consider the integrity and well-being of the natural c o m ~ n u n i t ~ . ~ ~  The obligation 
towards the biotic community is thus separate fiom the obligation to advance human 
interests. The independent and separate consideration of non-humans has tremendous 
implications upon environmental policies and iaws. It means that the well-being of the 
non-human members of the natural community shail be considered in conjunction with, 
and not as an afterthought or appendage to, the welfare and good of the human 
cornm~nity .~~ 
But what is the good of the non-human community that the life-centered 
perspective must respect and observe? Accordhg to P. W. Taylor, the good or welfare 
that must be aimed for the non-human, biotic community is to be able to maintain its 
39 G. Sessions, "Introduction", in M. Zimmerman, Environmental Philosophy, supra note 
16at 168. 
''fiid. 
'P. W- Taylor, supra note 16 at 67-68. Taylor limits the membership of the biotic 
community to wild plants and animals, excluding animals and plants whose genetic 
makeup are artificial, controlled or manipulated by humans for human or anthropocentric 
purposes. However, he concedes that artificid or controlled a . &  and plants may have 
an impact on the environment and it is only when this happens that the life-centered 
ethics may apply. 
5 2 ~  id. 
531bia. 
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biological and ecological health." The nght to health of members of the biotic 
cornmunity is based on their possessing intrinsic worth. The idea of intrinsic worth of 
each species, human and non-human, is similar to the basic points embraced by deep 
ecology as mentioned earlier. 55 
The life-centered perspective has four main elements: 
Humans are thought of as members of the Earth's 
community of life, holding that membership on the same terms as 
apply to all the non-human members; 
The Earth's natural ecosystems as a totality are seen as a 
complex web of interconnected elements, with the sound 
biological fhctioning of each being dependent on the sound 
biological fiuictioning of the others; 
Each individual organism is conceived of as a teleological 
center of life, pursuing its own good in its own way; and 
Whether we are concerned with standards of merit or with 
the concept of inherent worth, the claim that humans by their very 
nature are superior to other species is a groundless c l a h  and, in 
light of elements (l), (2), and (3) above, must be rejected as 
nothing more than an irrational bias in our own favor? 
To deciare that humans are members of the biotic community is not to deny their 
differences from wild plants and  animal^.^' From a biological point of view, however, 
humans are but one of the species of the biotic c o m m ~ n i t ~ ; ~ ~  humans are not even the 
essential rnember~ .~~  The integrity and well-being of other members of the biotic 
cormnunity do not depend largely on the health of humans. But human health and 
54L5id. 
"A. Naess, supra note 41 at 197. 
56~aylor, supra note 16 at 70. 
S8fiid 
591bid. at 71. 
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integrity are highly dependent on the health of the entire biotic cornmu~zity.~~ The 
human and non-human species both have the same terms of membership in the biotic 
community in the life-centered perspective. 
The interconnectedness of the various ecosystems and members - humans and 
non-humans - of the biotic community has now been established as a 'biological ~eality'.~' 
The immediate implication, therefore, is to set standards and noms for the realization of 
the well-being of the various ecologicai units and rnembers, and not just for the well- 
being of its human membed2 
Non-human species have their own teleological centers. According to Taylor, the 
emphasis that the non-human members of the biotic community pursue their own way of 
life iç not anthropomorphizing, or assigning human traits .63 Research has eçtablished that 
plants and animds have their own teleological centers, their own world or life-cycles, 
separate and apart fiom human cycles." 
Human superiority, as mentioned earlier, is the foundation of the anthropocentric 
view. The fourth element of the life-centered perspective rejects the notion of human 
superiority. The underlying reason why human traits such as "rational thought, aesthetic 
creativity, autonomy and self-determination, and moral freed~rn"~* are judged to have 
6ofiid. 
%id. at 73. See also I. E. Lovelock, "The e d  as a living organisrn", in Biodiversity, 
(Washington , D.C.: National Academy Press, 1988); L. Margulis and J.E. Lovelock, 
"Gaia and geognosy", in Global Ecology Towards a Science of the Biosphere, (London: 
Academic Press Inc., 1989). 
62Zbid. 
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superior value is because they are evaluated fkom the human point of view? These 
traits, as far as other species are concemed, are not valuable because they are not 
essential to their own well-being and integrity. There is no rational or logical basis for the 
claim of human superïority over other members of the biotic c o m m ~ n i t y . ~ ~  This element 
is the most important aspect of the life-centered perspective.68 "Once we reject the daim 
that humans are superior either in ment or in worth to other living things, we are ready to 
adopt the attitude of respect."69 
The abandonment of  the notion of human superiority leads one to discover the 
many lessons that the human society c m  l e m  f?om the non-human community. One 
ethic that recognizes how much human society can leam from the naturai biological 
community is the ethic of aminement." The ethic of aminement invites one to learn fkom 
the biological processes. The biological process is efficient because its production, 
consurnption and decomposition stages follow a cyclical pattern7' that does not leave nor 
generate waste. The industriai cycle, on the other hand, follows a linear pattern that 
leaves waste and other industrial left-overs at the end of the production process.72 The 
ethic of attunement thus c d s  for the redesigning of industrial processes and technologies 
so that these are in accord with the biological cyclical f a b r i ~ . ~ ~  An environmentally 
attuned technology and process is 
%id. 
671bid. at 80. 
681bid. at 81. 
691bid. 
7 0 ~ .  Dodson Gray, "Corne Inside the Circle of Creation, The Ethic of Attunement," F. 




like a hand in a glove. ft must be designed and used with such sensitivity 
and attunement that it fits within the bio heral system just as a hand fits T4 into a glove without destroying that glove. 
It is technology that is 
motivated not o d y  by profiî but by a profound appreciation of  our 
true place within the living earth system and marked by a cornmitment to 
stop using any technology if it proves hamifu1.75 
The idea of an appropriate technology is what the ethic of amuiement is 
advocating. Appropriate technology has been demonstrated to be feasible. For example, 
chlorofluorocarbon propellants in spray cans were replaced by non-ozone-threatening 
substitutes, and polychlorinated biphenyls in electncal machinery are being replaced by 
less toxic lubricant~?~ 
Another example of an environmentally attuned application of a technological 
process was the construction of the Alaskan oil pipeline fiorn Prudhoe Bay on the Arctic 
Ocean to the southem coastal port of valdez7' The environmental condition involved in 
the project was the permafkost of the Arctic. Permafirost looks and feels like rock when 
solid fkozen but it can melt when w a ~ m e d . ~ ~  The specific condition of the permafkost, 
however, was initially not considered in the design and location of the pipeline. A portion 
of the pipeline was sihiated at the bottom of the permafiost.79 The crude oil that was to 
run through the pipeline was to be pumped out very hot. After one winter of use, the 
engineers of the project discovered that the pipeline "had been twisted and curled like 
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copper ~ i r i n ~ . " ~ ~  The pipeline was redesigned and was elevated to about six to eight 
feet off the permafkost.81 
The problem of environmental degradation and species depletion and extinction 
does not merely rest on a general anthropocentric basis. Ecofeminists and social 
ecologists argue that integral to the present environmental dilemma are issues of 
patriarchy, racism, gender and imperialism.82 
Bookchin, a proponent of social ecology describes the environmental dilemma in 
this manner. 
Our present society has a dehite hierarchical character. It is a 
propertied society that concentrates economic power in corporate elites. It 
is a bureaucratie and militaristic society that concentrates political and 
military power in centralized state institutions. It is a patriarchal society 
that allocates authority to men in v-g degrees. And it is a racist society 
that places a minority of whites in a self-deceptive sovereignty over a vast 
worldwide majority of peoples of color. While it is theoretically possible 
that a hierarchicai society can biologically sustain itself, it is absolutely 
inconceivable that present-day hierarchicd and particularly capitalist 
society could establish a non-domineering and ethically symbiotic 
relationship between itself and the natural world. As long as hierarchy 
persists, as long as domination organizes humanity around a system of 
elites, the project of dominating nature wiU remain a predominant 
ideology and inevitably lead our planet to the brink, if not into the abyss, 
of ecological e~tinction.'~ 
The source of the environmental dilemma, which Bookchin calls the ecological 
crisis, is domination of humans by other humans. The culture and ethics of domination 
spilled into the environmental sphere, hence, humans also dominate the natural 
cornm~nity .~~ Bookchin's chief recommendations in order to halt the path to destruction 
''fi id. 
* 'fiid. 
82~ookchin, supra note 34 at 1 12. 
83fiid. at 123. 
84fiid. 
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are decenîralization and alternative t e c h n ~ l o ~ ~ . ~ ~  Decentralization O f the human 
systems, for example fiom nation-State to manageable cities or towns Es central to the 
ethics of social ecologf16 These cities or towns are envisioned to be eccologically self- 
sufncient, living only within the carrying capacity of its natural environment." 
Technology must also be transformed into ffsmali-scale, muiti-use facilities with 
production processes that reduce arduous toil, recycle raw rnaterials, elirninate pollution 
and toxic w a ~ t e s . " ~ ~  Bookchin, however, admits, that decentralization and alternative 
technology, by themselves, will not resolve the environmental dilemma According to 
him, "a genuine ecological vision ultimately needs to directly answezr such nagging 
questions as "who owns what?" and "who runs ~ h a t ? " ~ ~  
Ecofeminists also focus on the politicd and social institutions that perpetuate 
domination and./ or patriarchy as vital to the resolution of the environmental dilemmago 
Central to the ecofeminist view is the wornan-nature connection and parallelism. The 
ecological crisis is seen not as a consequence of anthropocentrism pet se but of 
andocentrism or male-centered worldvie~.~' At the top of the patriarchal pyramid is 
GOD (male) and mang2 Al1 others - womeo, children, animals, plants, and rock - are 
viewed as resources for man.93 The domination and subordination b e w o r k  that 
851bid. at 126. 
86fiid. 
87 fiid. 
88fiid. at 127. 
89fiid. 
'W. Fox, "The Deep Ecology - Ecofeminism Debate and Its Parallels", in M. 
Zimmerman, Environmental Philosophy, supra note 16 at 2 16. 
9'fiid. 
921aid. A. Salleh, "Working with Nature: Reciprocity or Control?", at 3 15- 
93fiid. 
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explains the oppression of women also explains the domination and subordination of 
man over nature.94 
These non-anthropocentric views have one common position: human-centered 
interests permit the environment to be used as resource as well as sink of the waste of the 
consumerist industrial society. They have one fundamentai proposal: there is a need to 
shtp the way the natural worïd is seen and treated. Humans are not on top of a pyramidal 
structure. Rather, they are members of the natural environment and therefore, must start 
to act responsïbly and morally in order to deserve and continue such membership. 
IV, Emplications of non-anthropocentric ethics and philosophy 
Non-anthropocentric ethics and philosophy have several implications. First, they 
cal1 for a shift in the ethical and philosophicd mindset of the human comunity, fkom 
human-centered to Iife-centered. The iife-centered perspective covers both human and the 
non-human members of the biotic community. Humans are members, not superiors, in 
the natural community. In the legal system, using non-anthropocentric ethics and 
philosophy as the policy or spirit of the law can manifest the ethical and philosophical 
shift. 
Second, the non-human members of the biotic community must be regarded 
independent of their value to humans. From biological and ecological perspectives, non- 
humans have different teleological objectives and centers. The good of the human 
comrnunity is not the good of the non-human memben of the biotic community. 
Protection of the human community fiom hazardous activities, for example, should not be 
equated as adequate protection of the non-human environment. Any regulatory measure, 
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thus, must provide for separate protection measures for the environment. Separate 
protection measures do not necessarily advocate for the gant of separate right of the 
natural and non-human en~ironrnent.~~ Legal harm must comprise of both human 
(econornic h m )  and non-human, ecologicai h m .  As well, the long-term consequences 
must be considered in determining the scope and type of harms that should be legaiiy 
compensated. 
Third, technology or any application of science under the holistic approach must 
be sensitive to the environment and to human communities. Technology should be 
applied only when it is environmentally attuned. Science has two simultaneous attributes: 
it c m  destroy and it can provide solutions. Thus, the faith placed in science and 
technology must be an enlightened one, not b l h ~ d . ~ ~  
Fourth, the hierarchy of human activities and endeavors based on purely 
economic valuation is abandoned. The ixiterests and concerns of States that are not 
economic or have low economic value should not be ignored merely on these grounds. 
The environment and non-human species cannot be reduced in neoclassical econornic 
tenns. 
-- - - - - -- pp - 
94 fiid. K. Warren, "The Power and the Promise of Ecological Ferninism", at 32 1. 
9 s ~ u t  C. D. Stone, "Should Trees Have Standing? - Toward Legal Rights for Naiural 
Objects", 45 S. Cal. L. Rev. 450 (1972). 
9 6 ~ .  M. Talbot and World Resources Institute, "Man's Role in Managing the 
Environment", in D. Botkin, M. F. Caswell, J. E. Estes, and A. A. Orio (eds.), Changing 
the Global Environment, Perspectives on Human Involvement, (San Diego, California: 
Acadernic Press, hc., 1989) at 28. 
V- A framework of international environmentai law based on non- 
anthropocentric ethics and phiïosophy 
Based on the above implications, a mode1 legal non-anthropocentric regime can 
be formulated. This fi-amework follows the existing fiamework of international law for 
environmental protection and does not abandon the foundations of international 
environmental law, which are the duty not to cause significant transboundary harm and 
the duty to cooperate?' The difference is that the suggested fuarnework will be given a 
non-anthropocentric slant. Non-human concerns are integrated in the legal system. As 
well, al1 potentidy affected entities, States and non-States would be allowed to 
participate in the decision-making and implementation processes of environmental 
protection. 
The prïnciples that will be especialIy mentioned here are the precautionary 
approach, generational equity, and participatory processes. The protection measures 
outlined here correspond to Iwo circumstances: nomal conditions and emergency 
situations. Ln normal conditions, the folbwing protection measures must be undertaken: 
establishment of safety standards, the conduct of environmental impact assessrnent, prior 
notification and consultation with al1 potentially affected entities - States and non-States. 
In emergency situations, notification and assistance between and among affected States 
and States responsible for the harm must be undertaken. The liability scheme that should 
support the non-anthropocentric legal fiamework is one that recognizes and compensates 
for environmental damages, not just property damages and uijury or loss of life. 
97 See P. Bimie and A. Boyle, International Law and the Environment, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1992). 
1. Precautionary p ~ c i p l e  
The precautionary principle98 has emerged as one of the major principles of 
contemporary international environmental law. Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration 
provides: 
In order to protect the environment, the precautionq approach 
s h d  be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where 
there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific 
certainty shall not be used as a reason for ostponing cost-effective 
measures to prevent environmental degradation 8 
The precautionary approach was first applied in the context of marine 
environment. Chapter 17, Paragraph 17.21 of Agenda 21 elucidates why precaution has 
been considered essential in the context of marine environmental protection. 
A precautionary and anticipatory rather than a reactive approach is 
necessary to prevent degradation of the marine environment. This 
requires, inter alia, the adoption of precautionary measures, environmental 
impact assessments, clean production techniques. 'Oo 
Further, paragraph 17.22 of Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 calls States to commit 
themselves, in accordance with their policies, priorities and resources, to prevent, reduce 
9 8 ~ h e  use of the term 'precautionary approach' has been interchanged with the term 
'precautionary principle'. Many scholars use either tem. The tem precautionary 
approach, however, may refer more to the procedural aspects of precaution. The term 
precautionary principle may refer to the strategy of creating an atmosphere where 
various environmental policies use precaution as a guide or rationale. See J. Cameron and 
J. Abouchar, "The Status of the Precautionary Principle in International Law," in D. 
Freestone and E. Hey, The Precautionary Principle and International Law, The 
Challenge of Implementotion, (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996) at 5 1. 
9 9 ~ i o  Declaration, Report of the United Nations Confeence on Environment and 
Development, Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992 (United Nations publication, Sales No. 
E.93 -1.8 and comgenda), vol. 1, Dereinder Rio Declaration] . 
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and control degradation of the marine environment so as to maintain and improve its 
life-support and productive capacities. To this end, it is necessary to: 
Apply preventive, precautionary and anticipatory approac hes to as 
to avoid degradation of the marine environment, as well as to reduce the 
risk of long-tenn irreversible adverse impacts upon the marine 
environment; 
Ensure prior assessrnent of activities that may have significant 
adverse impacts upon the marine environment. 
The concept of precautionary approach is distinctive because it does not rely on 
science as a matter of policy before protection and preventive rneasures are 
undertaken.lol Its underlying assumption is that science "does not always provide the 
insights needed to protect the environment e f f ec t i~e l~ . " '~~  Its non-reliance on science 
distinguishes the precautionary principle fÏom the ordinary preventive measures. The 
traditional notion of preventive measures requires action only when there is clear and 
convincing proof of nsks. The precautionary approach, however, only requires a pnina 
facie case that risks exist. 
Several environrnental instruments now contain or allude to the principle of 
precaution.103 The principle of precaution, however, has been applied differently by 
States. Measures such as zero discharge of toxic or dangerous substances, reverse listing, 
to mere recitation of the principle in the preamble of several instruments, have al1 been 
' OO~~enda 2 1, United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil, 3-14 June 1992, Report:A/CONF.lS1/26/Rev.l (3 vols.) + vol.UCorr.1, 
voll.m/Corr. 1 (Sales No.% .I.8), bereinafter Agenda 2 11. 
''ID. Freestone and E. Hey, suprn note 98 at 12. 
'021bid. 
'03~ontreul  Protocol on Substances Thar Deplete the Ozone Layer, 16 September 1987, 
26 I.L.M. 1541 at 155 1 (1987); Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May 1992, 
3 1 I.L.M. 849 (1992); Biodiversity Convention, 5 h n e  1992,3 1 I.L.M. 8 18 (1 992). 
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cited as  examples of State practice of the precautionary principle.104 A non- 
anthropocentric reading of the precautionary princip Ie, however, would encourage 
preventive and precautionary measures such as zero discharge of toxic and dangerous 
substances and reverse listing. Mere allusion of the prhciple in preambles does not 
actualize the essence of precautionary principle, which is to actually prevent nsks to the 
environment even without sufncient scientific proof. 
2. Generational equity 
The notion of equity is not a new concept under international law.lo5 There has 
been no uniform application and dennition of equity. Three notions of applying equity 
under international law have been advanced. First, equity is the process of selecting 
diEerent laws, al1 applicable and appropriate under the circumstances of the case.'" 
Considerations of justice contribute to the process of deciding among applicable laws. 
The International Court of Justice bereinafter ICJ] in one case held that equity is not 
1 O4 Paragraph 72, Final Report of the Experts Group on Environmental Law on Legal 
Principles for Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development, Experts Group on 
Environmental Law of the World Commission on Environment and Development 
@rundtland Commission), Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development 29- 
30 (1987). mereinafter Report of Experts Group], as reprinted in E. B. Weiss, 
International Environmental Law and Policy, (New York: Aspen Law & Business, 1998) 
at 357. See also D. VanderZwaag, "The Precautionary Principle in Environmental Law 
and Policy: Elusive Rhetoric and First Embraces", In press, Journal of Environmental 
Law and Practice. 
10S~.rticle 38(2) of the ICYStatute permits a decision ex aequo et bono, upon the request 
of parties. There has been no cases decided based on equity under Article 38(2). 
However, there have been several cases before the ICJ that referred and applied the 
notion of equity. Many of these cases are in the area of resource allocation, e-g. Tunisia- 
Libya Continental Shelf Case, 1.C.J Reports (1982) 18; Libya-Malta Continental SheZf 
Case, ICJ Reports (1985) 29; North Sea Continental SheifCases, 1.C.J Reports (1969) 3. 
See R. Higgins, P roblems and Process, International Law and How We Use It, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1994) at 219 to 228. 
'061bid. Higgins at 21 9. 
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only a "direct emanation of the idea of justice" but dso a "generd p ~ c i p l e  directly 
applicable as law." 'O7 Second, another application of equity is as praetor Cegem - filling 
a lacunae in the Law or constmcting rules that are too general.'08 A third application of 
equlty is the "sofiening of the application of an applicable nom, for extra-legal 
rea~ons ." '~~  This type of equity is corrective equity.'10 
In the environmental field, the notion of equity travels in two time zones - the 
present and the fùture. It involves the application of equity by assessing present rights 
against other present nghts and fùture rights. The h t  type of equity in the environmental 
fiamework is intergenerational equity or those relating to the rights of future generations 
and our obligations to them. The second type is intragenerational equity or those relating 
to members of generations existing today."' These two types are provided under 
Principle 1 of the Stockholm ~eclaration.' '~ The present generatïon bears a solemn 
responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future generations. 
Considerations of equity demand that the present generation must not compromise the 
needs of the future generation. 
Under the principle of intergenerational equity, the rights of the present 
beneficiaries of the planet are intertwined with their obligations to protect and maintain 
the same for future generations.'13 
'071bid. Paragraph 39, Report of Experts Group, supra note 104. 
' O s f i i d  at 220. 
'O92bid. 
' ''fiid. at 22 1. 
"'fiid. Paragraph 41. 
'12~tockholm Declaration, Repo>l of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev. 1, at 3 (1 973), 1 1 I.L.M. 141 6 (1972), 
lhereinafler Stockhoh Declaration] . 
1 3 ~ .  B. Weiss, et al. International Environmental Law and Policy, supra note 104 at 75. 
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The starting proposition is that each generation is both a custodian and a 
user of our common natural and cultural patrimony. As custodians of this 
planet, we have certain moral obligations to hture generations which we 
can traosform into Iegally enforceable noms.' l4 
There are three components of intergenerational equity: quality, options, and 
access to the naturai and cultural en~ironment."~ Equitable quality "requires that each 
generation maintain the quality of life of the planet so that it is passed in no worse 
condition than received." I l 6  Equitable options refer to the conservation of the "diversity 
of the natural and cultural resource base so that it does not unduly restrict the options 
available to hture generations in solving their problems and satisfying their own 
val~es."~" In order to provide equitable options to future generations, Prof. Weiss 
surmises that "actions with hannful and irreversible consequences for our natural and 
cultural heritage"1'8 must be avoided. Nuclear wastes and other hazardous wastes, for 
example, should be disposed without imposing an undue burden on fuhue generations. 
Finally, each generation is required to provide equitable access to the legacy of the past 
and to the natural en~ironment."~ Judge Weeramantry, in the maritime boundary 
delimitation case of Denmark 
l 1 4 ~ .  B. Weiss, In Faimess 
v. ~ o r w a ~ ,  120 opined that 
to Future Generations: 
future generations must have 
rnternational Law, Comrnon 
Dobbs Ferry, 1989) at 21. Patnmony and Intergenerational Equity (New York: 
Dissenthg Opinion of Judge Weeramantry, Request for an Examination of the Situation 
in Accordance with Parugraph 63 of the Court's Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the 
Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case, I.C.J. Reports (1995) 288 at 341. 
[Hereina fier Request for an Examination]. 
15~aragraph 42, Report of Experts Group, supra note 1 04. 
' ''fiid. Paragraph 43, Report of Experts Group. 
" 'fiid. Paragraph 44, Report of Experts Group. 
1 l8fi id. E. Weiss, International Environmental Law and Policy, at 76. 
llglbid. Paragraph 45, Report of Experts Group. 
"O~oncurrin~ opinion of Judge Weeramantry, Denmark v. Nonuay, 1.C.J. Reports 38 
(1 993). 
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access to their rightful inheritance which include the earth, the atmosphere, the Iakes 
and the seas. 12' 
At the international Ievel, the notion of intergenerational equity has not been 
clearly defined in State practice and conventions. One statelu attempted to have the 
principle of intergenerational equity applied in the context of nuclear activities, but such 
atternpt before the ICJ was unsuccessfbl because the petition was dismissed. This has 
prompted Judge Weeremantry in his Dissenting Opinion in the Requesr for an 
Examination case to assert that whiIe there is no judicial precedent applying the principle 
of intergenerational equity, it is a rapidly developing principle of contemporary 
environmental Iaw. Judge Weeremantry deemed it imperative that the ICJ should speak 
for the unborn by applying the principle of intergenerational equity.lz3 Aside fiom this 
case and non-binding instruments, there are no other exarnples of the application of 
intergenerational equity. 
The following strategies have been proposed to imp lement intergenerational 
equity : 
(1) representation of States not ody of present but also of hture 
generations; 
(2) designation of ombudsman or commissioners for protecting the 
interests of fiiture generations; 
(3) monitoring systems for cultural and natural resources; 
(4) conservation assessrnent giving particdar attention to long-term 
consequences; 
't'fiid. 
1 2 2 ~ e w  Zealand cited the principle of intergenerational equity in the Request for an  
Examination case but the ICJ dismissed its petition, supra note 113. 
'231bid. at 341. 
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(5) measures to ensure use of renewable resources and ecological systems on a 
sustainable bais; 
(6) cornmitnient to scientific and technical research to advance the 
purposes set out above; and 
(7) programmes of education and leaming at al1 social levels and age 
groups, especially the young generations. '24 
Although admittedly with an anthropocentric bent, inter- and intra- generational 
equities reflect a non-anthropocentric slant as they do not only cal1 for the representation 
of present and future generations but also for the protection of the environment. To 
ensure that the present and future generations are provided for, the protection of the 
environment is essential. 
3. Participatory processes 
The non-anthropocentnc legal regime is best implemented when the public and al1 
those affected by a certain activity are allowed to participate in the legal processes aimed 
to protect them and the environment. At the heart of the notion of participatory processes 
is the abandonment of domination-based ethics and philosophy, denounced by 
ecofeminists and social ecologists as the main cause of environmental degradation. 
The Rio Declaration reflects a non-anthropocentric bent by declaring that 
"environmental issues are best handled with the participation of al1 concerned citizens, at 
the relevant l e ~ e 1 . " ' ~ ~  The notion of a participatory process rests on the axiom that there 
is a beneficid cause-effect relationship among three factors: information access, 
- pp - -  
124fiid. E. Weiss, International Environmental Law and Policy at 103. 
12s~rinciple 10, Rio Declaration, supra note 99. 
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stakeholder awareness and improved environmental  condition^.'^^ Fundamental to an 
effective public participatory process is access to information. In a public participatory 
scheme, everyone is a user and at the same time, provider of infornation.'" Access to 
information and knowledge empowers both the decision-maker and the stakeholder in 
deciding on activities and issues that have impact on the environment. 
Paragraph 23.2 of Chapter 23 of Agenda 21 (Strengthening the Role of Major 
Groups) identifies the need of individuals, groups, and organizations to participate in 
environmental impact assesment procedures and other processes, particularly on projects 
and activities that impact their work and cornm~nities.~~~ Many govemments responded 
and established national councils on sustainable development where representatives fiom 
different sectors sit and participate in policy-making at the national ~evel.'~' However, 
cruciai to the public participatory process is the participation of stakeholders and major 
groups in formal decision-making processes, not just policy-making processes.'30 The 
underlying rationale is that public participation in the decision and or policy-making 
processes promotes and ensures onicial accountability of public officers for their 
actions."' Ultimately, public officiais must be held accountable to the people who are 
12%nited Nations Environmental Programme [hereinafter UNEP], "Access to 
Environmental Information", On line: UNEP Home Page ~&p://www.~~.ordune~ 
access-hm> (Date accessed: 3 0 August 1999). 
I2'paragraph 40.1 Chapter 40 Agenda 2 1, supro note 100. 
12*see also Paragraph 129, Report of Experts Group. supra note 104. 
12'LJbJ Economic and Social Development, "Earth Summit + 5, Five Years M e r  Rio: 
Where Do We Stand? ", On line: UN Economic and Social Development Home Pagec 
://www.un.orp/ecosocdev/~o/sustdev/5vears~ >(Date accessed: 3 0 August 
1999). 
130see On line: United Nations Sustainable Development Home Page 
<htt~://www.un.o > (Date accessed: 30 August 1999). 
l3 'p&agraPh 108 , U.N.G.A. lgth special session, New 
York, 23-27 June 1997. 
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directly affected by their decisions. The participation by the stakeholder balances and 
checks government decisions that Hect their lives. 
B. Protective measures 
Protective measures are classified into two: preventive measures and contingency 
measures. The reason for the classification is to emphasize that these obligations exist 
under two factual conditions: 1) normal condition and 2) emergency situation. Highly 
qualified publicists such as the International Law Commission [hereiaafter ILC] 13' and 
the American Law Institute [hereinafter ALIl 133 opine that these measures are inherent in 
the duties to prevent, reduce and control significant transboundary h m  and the duty to 
cooperate. 
1. Preventive measures during normal conditions 
Preventive measures during normal conditions include the establishment of safety 
standards, the conduct of environmental impact assessment, and prior notification and 
consultation with ail potentially af5ected entities 
I 3 ' ~ c l e  1, Chapter IV, International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out 
of Acts not Prohibited by International Law (Prevention of Transboundary Damage from 
Hazardous Activities), in ILC, Report of the EC on the work of its FzjZieth Session, 20 
April - 12 June 1998, General Ass. OR, 53* Session Supp. No. 10 (A/53/10) (New York, 
United Nations, 1998). [Hereinafter Report of the LLC]. 
133~estatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Introduction to 
Part VI (Law of the Environment), Sections 601-602 and Comments, as reprinted in E.B. 
Weiss, et al, International Environmental Law, Basic Instruments and References, 
(United S tate of America: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1 992) at 195. [Hereinafter 
Restatement (Third).] The Restatement (Third) "represents the opinion of the American 
Law Institute [hereinafter ALI] as to the rules that an impartial tribunal wodd apply if 
charged with deciding a controversy in accordance with international law." Restatement 
(Third) at 3 and 4. The ALI is a group of highly qualified publicists within the meaning 
of Article 38 O of the I.C.J. Statute. 
3 7 
a. International safety standards 
The ALI in the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States cites the establishment of appropnate safety standards as the first level of 
preventive measures required for activities that pose signincant transboundary h m . ' "  
The safety standards are the fïrst level of minimization of the nsks a~%ing fiom operation 
of the hazardous activity. The status of safety standards under international 
environmental law is riot settled. Non-anthropocentric safety regulations provide 
protection measures for both the human population and the non-human population of the 
environment. 
b. Environmental impact assessment 
The significance of conducting an environmental impact assessment [hereinafter 
E I a  for activities with significant transboundary h m  cannot be understated. An EIA 
provides knowledge about the proposed activity, the risks it posed, identifies the 
potentially affected States and natural environrnents, and serves as a bais  for mitigation 
measures to protect humans and the environment. 
The conduct of an EL%, however, is not an international obligation except in some 
treaties, including the UN Convention on the Law of the sea.I3' When States have 
reasonable grounds for believing that planned activities under their jurisdiction or control 
may cause substantial pollution or significant and harmful activïties to the marine 
environment, Article 206 of LOSC provides that, as far as  practicable, States shall assess 
The LOSC does not 
Relations Law of the 
the potential effects of such activities on the marine environment. 
"fiid. Section 601.l(a) and (b). Restatement (ïlird) of the Foreign 
United States. 
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provide a .  enumeratîon of activities for which an EIA is required and leaves it up to 
Contracting States to determine what activities require an EIA. 
The only international instrument that r e m e s  the conduct of an EIA in a 
transboundary context is the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a 
Transboundary Context (Espoo   on vent ion)."^ The Espoo Convention enurnerates the 
activities that require an EIA. If a proposed activiv is not one of the activities 
enumerated, Article 2.5 of the Espoo Convention allows the Contracting Parties the 
discretion to subject certain activities with transboundary impact to the EIA process, in 
accordance with criteria set in Appendix m. The criteria include: size of the proposed 
activities; location - whether it will be located close to or near areas with special 
environmental sensitivity or importance, or near human population; effects - whether the 
proposed activity will have complex and potentially adverse effects on the human and 
physical environment- 
According to the UNEP Guidelines of 1987 on "Goals and Principles of 
Environmental Impact Assessment", a proper EIA should provide a description of the 
following: the proposed activity, the potentially af5ected environment, including specific 
information necessary for identifymg and assessing the environmental effects of the 
proposed activity, the practical al te mat ive^.'^^ An assessrnent should then be made as to 
13'~nited Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 10 Decernber 1982, entry into force 
16 November 1994,21 I.L.M. (1982), [hereinafter LOSCl. 
136~onvention  Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, done at 
Espoo, Finland, 25 February 199 1,30 I.L.M. 800 (199 1). 
'37~rinciple 4, UNEP Governing Council Decision, Goals and Principles of 
Environmental Impact Assessment, 17 June 1987, UNEP/GC. 14/17, Annex III, 
UNEP/GC/DEC/14/25. See H. Hohmann, Precautionary Legal Duties and Principles of 
Modern International Environmental Law The Precautionary Principle: International 
Environmental Law Between Exploitation and Protection, (London: Graham & 
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the likely or potential environmental and social impacts of the proposed activity and 
alternatives, including the direct, indirect, cumulative, short-term and long-term effects. 
The measures available to mitigate adverse environmental and social impacts must also 
be identified and assessed. 
The importance of assessment has been recognized in the decisions of arbitral 
and judicial tribunais. In the Traii Smelter case, the tribunal noted that the study 
undertaken by weI1-established and known scientists in the case "was the most thorough 
[one] ever made of any area subject to atmospheric pollution by industriai ~moke.""~ 
Judge Weeramantry, in his Dissenting Opinion in the Request for an Examination case, 
also opines that the curent state of international environmental law requires the 
undertaking of an assessment in activities that pose a magnitude of risks to the 
en~ironment. '~~ Many non-binding instruments mandate the conduct of ELA for activities 
that pose significant transboundary this phenornenon manifests an emerging 
acceptance of such practice in international environmental Law. 
c. Prior notification and consultation 
When activities within the jurïsdiction and control of States pose harm to other 
States, customary international law mandates that States provide timely and relevant 
- - - - - - - 
Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1994) at 187. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry, 
Request for an Examination, supra note 114. 
13*~rail Smeiter case, U N  R.I.A.A. Vol. 3, p. 1965 at 1973-74. See also Commentary to 
Article 12, Report of the LC, supra note 132 at 44. 
13'~equest for an Examination supra note 114 at 345. 
140 Report of the ILC, supra note 132. Report of the Experts Group, supra note 104 at 357. 
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information to potentidly afEected sates.14' The duty to notifjr and consult is contained 
in P ~ c i p l e  19 of the Rio Dechration mandates that 
States shall provide pnor and timely notification and relevant 
information to potentially afEected States on activities that may have a 
significant adverse transboundary environmental effect and shall cunsult 
with those States at an early stage and in good faith. 
The notion of timely and relevant notification to affected States is reiterated in 
Article 15 of the General Principles Conceming Natural Resources and Environmental 
~nterferences'" [hereinafler General Principles]. Article 16 of the General Principles 
requires States to give timely notice regardhg activities within their control or 
jurisdiction to potentially affected States. Based upon the information provided, Article 
17 of the General Principles provides that consultations in good faith rnay be camed out 
between the State that may be affected by a transboundary interference and the States 
under whose jurisdiction such a transboundary interference originates or may onginate in 
connection with activities carrîed on or contemplated t h e r e i ~ ~ . ' ~ ~  The potentially affected 
State has the obligation to request that a consultation be conducted. 
The status of the duty of pnor notification and consultation under customary 
international law is well-established but the particulars of this duty are not definite.'" 
Who is the potentidy affected State? The different binding environmental uisn~ments 
L 4 1 ~ u c  ~anowc ase, (France v .Spain) 24 I.L.R. 10 1 (1 957). 
142~rticle 15 of the General Principles: "States shall provide the other States concemed 
upon their request and in a timely manner with al1 relevant and reasonably available data 
conceming a transboundary natural resource, including the uses made of such a resource 
and transboundary interference with them, or concerning a transboundq environmental 
interference. Report of the Experts Group, supra note 104. 
143~ id .  at 358. 
144 G. Handl, "Internationalization of Hazard Management in Recipient Countries: 
Accident Preparedness and Response", in G. Handl and R E. Lutz (eds.), Tmnsferrirzg 
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providing for a prior notification and consultation system does not include States that 
legally have nothing to do with the proposed a c t i ~ i t y ' ~ ~  Thus, potential exposure to the 
risks of the proposed activity appears not to be a su£ficient requirement that would entitie 
prior notification and consultation fiom and with proponent State. 
A non-anthropocentric legal fÏ-amework, however, wotdd expand the notion of 
potentially affected States to include even those not officially part of the transaction that 
is the source of the risks. The main condition shoutd be the whether an entity is exposed 
to the risks fiom an activity witbin the control or jurisdiction of another. 
2. Contingency measures and hazard management during 
emergeacies 
The value of contingency plans in the context of hazardous activities that pose 
signi ficant transboundary r isks has been proven. Contingency measures in anticipation of 
emergency situations include the following: notification, contingency plans, and 
assistance in the clean-up and restoration activi ties. The non-anthropocentric 
contingency plan includes measures for both the safety o f  humans and the safety of the 
environment. 
Hazardous Technologies and Substances The International Legal Challenge, (London: 
Graham & Trotman, 1989) at 215 - 116. 
'4S~asel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste 
and their Disposal, 22 March 1989, Cm 984; 28 I.L.M. 657, entry into force 5 May 
1992. mereinafter Basel Convention]; ?lie Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel 
Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Wmte Management, 5 September 1997, 
IAEA Doc. GC/LNE;/82 -GC(41)m\SF/12,RWSC/DC/Sr.5; I.L.M. 36 (1 997) 1433, 
Bereinafter Joint Convention]. 
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a. Notification 
The obligation to notia of impending dangers to other States was affirmed by the 
ICJ in the Corfu Channel case.146 The duty to notie, according to the ICJ is based on 
"elementq considerations of humanity."'" Information regarding the emergency must 
be tirnely and relevant in order to assist affected States in conducting self-help mesures 
of mitigation and reduction. The S tate of origin, under whose jurisdiction and control the 
activity causing hann belongs, must also inform the afTected States of the rneasures it has 
undertaken to mitigate and control the significant transboundary harm. In the context of 
the marine environment, the LOSC requires Contracting Parties under Article 198 to 
notie States deemed likely to be affected of an imminent danger or damage by pollution. 
The duty to notm in case of emergencies or pollution £kom vessels rests with the FIag 
State. When danger is already imminent, the non-anthropocentric legal regime requires 
that al1 potentially af5ected States, not just parties to the contract or transaction, be 
notified. 
b. Contingency plans 
Contingency plans are very important because they provide guidelines to those 
involved in combating the emergency as well as the victim or affected entity. The duty to 
prepare contingency plans is articulated in the maritime context under Article 199 of the 
LOSC. States in the area affected, in cooperation with international competent 
organizations, are obiigated to put in place contingency plans in case of emergencies in 
'46~or jÙ Channel case, I.C.J. Reports (1949) 1. 
471bid. 
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their marine environ ment^.'^^ This meam that the duty to put in place plans to manage 
an emergency within maritime zones rests with coastal States. The non-anthropocenîric 
contingency plan includes measures for the safety of humans and non-humans. 
C. Liability and Compensation 
While the principal feature of a non-anthropocentric international environmental 
legal framework rests on its preventive aspect, a liability and compensation system 
remains an important feature. Preventive measures do not guarantee the non-occurrence 
of significant transbomdary ham. Under international environmental law, the operation 
of hazardous activities is prima facie legitimate, a correspondhg liability and 
compensation scheme is deemed a necessary cornponent. 
In a non-anthropocentric liability regime, the hamis prohibited and compensated 
must include environmental harms. Damage to the environment must be considered 
separate fiom harm to property and people. This non-anthropocentric feature implies the 
inclusion of costs of cleaning up the contaminated areas even without damage to property 
or people as weU as costs to restore the damaged site to its previous condition. Full 
restoration, of course, is not possible and has even been called a myth and a lie by some 
non-anthropocentric ethicists and philosophers. 
VI. Conclusion 
The primary point emphasized in this Chapter is that in the greening of a legal 
regime, the underlying ethical and philosophical notions of the legal system must f is t  be 
appraised. The question must be asked whether such ethics and philosophy are the same 
148~rticle 199 of LOSC. supra note 135. 
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ethics and philosophy that caused or contributed to the problem in the fkst place. In the 
context of environmental dilemmas, one must pause and reflect on the ethical and 
phiIosophica1 basis that allowed environmental degradation and species depletion and 
extinction. Ofien, the greening of the law does not involve the appraisal of the 
underlying ethics and philosophy that contributed to the problem. The result is that the 
law responds to the symptoms, not the cause. 
In the mode1 non-anthropocentrïc legal fkamework, it is not necessaiy to overhaul 
the legal system and institute entirely new provisions and measures. Some of the existing 
principles and measures can be applied as long as there is a conscious recognition of how 
non-anthropocentric ethics and philosophy may have a bearing on these principles and 
rneasures. 
The ethical and philosophical approach to greening international law is 
undertaken with the recognition that they cannot be translated word for word into policies 
or actions or laws. Nevertheless, it has been earlier asserted that ethics and philosophy do 
serve a very important role in the legal system. They c m  guide and influence the 
direction of the legal system. The next chapters will elaborate on how ethics and 
philosophy influenced and developed the legal regime goveming the maritime camage of 
radioactive materials and how non-anthropocentric ethics and philosophy rnay influence 
the path of transformation. 
Chapter 3 
Nature and scope of the problem of the maritime 
carriage of radioactive materiais 
1. Introduction 
The nature of radioactive material as well as the risks attendant to the mode of 
transport explain why the maritime transport of radioactive matenais is regulated under 
the Iaw. This Chapter will present the issues surrounding the controversial shipments of 
plutonium between France and Japan and how and why potentially affected Coastal 
States and non-govemmental entities react in opposition and with trepidation about these 
shipments. How valid are the concems expressed by Coastal States? The foliowing 
subjects of the succeeding sections of the Chapter will contribute to the assessrnent of 
the validity of the coucem. expressed by Coastai States and non-govemment 
organizations about the nuclear fuel cycle, radioactivity and its effects on humans and the 
marine environment, the di fferent categories of radioactive materials, trends of nuclear 
energy generation, and the risks attendant to the maritime carriages such as accidents and 
acts of violence. The discussion of these topics show that, indeed, there is validity to the 
concems expressed by other Coastal States and non-governmental entities regardkg the 
shipments of radioactive materials passing through their maritime zones. 
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II. The controversial shipments of plutonium, MOX fuel and vitrified high- 
level wastes 
According to the International Atomic Energy Agency bereinafter IAEA], more 
than 10 million packages of radioactive materials are transported every year.149 These 
shipments have been relatively safe.'" Despite the fact that transport of radioactive 
materials is a regular occurrence, shipments of spent nuclear fuel (plutonium), recycled or 
reprocessed nuclear fuel, (e.g. MOX fuel) and vitrified wastes have generated a big 
dispute in the international community. 
In particular, the shiprnents between France and Japan, two of the world's major 
nuclear energy generating States, have attracted protests fiom other States and noms tate 
actors in the international arena. The k t  controversial maritime carriage of reprocessed 
plutonium between France and Japan was in the Japanese vessel, Akatsuki ~ a r u .  '" 
Accompanied by an escort security vessel, Shikishirna, the Akatsuki Maru left 
Cherbourgh, France in November 1992. Sailing through the Cape of Good Hope, across 
the IndianBouthem Ocean, and North between Australia, New Zealand and South Pacific 
Island States, it arrived in the port of Tokai, Ibaraki Prefecture, Japan, afler 60 days. The 
Akatsuki Maru, a veteran carrier of nuclear materials, was a double-hull ship, with a d -  
- -- 
149 Paragraph 48, United Nations General Assembly [pereînafter U.N.G.A.], Progress 
made towards the sustainable and environmentally sound development, Addendurn, 
Report by the Intemational Atornic Energy Agency, U.N.G.A., 44h session, U.N.G.A. 
Doc. A/44/339/Add. 1 1-E/1989/119/Add. 1 1, 6 October 1989, extract reprinted in the 
United Nations Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, (ed.), Annual Review of 
Oceun Affairs: Law and Policy, Main Documents 1988 Volume KII, (Sarasota, Florida: 
UNIF0 Publishers, 1990) at 199. 
' 'Olbid. 
' 51~nfomation regarding the trip was taken fiom "Plutonium heads for Japan", 26 Marine 
Pollution Bulletin, No.1 (January 1993) at 4. 
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collision device, and fire extinguishers. The 1992 shipments were followed by other 
shipments. 
The first delivery of vitrified wastes Eom France to Japan transpired on 23 
February to 25 Apnl 1995.'" Two other shipments of vitrified wastes followed: 40 
i 
canisters were delivered during the 13 January to 18 March 1997 voyage and 60 canisters 
from 21 January to 13 March 1998.153 Vessels that were particularly designed for 
transport of nuclear materials carried the shipments of vitrified wastes. These vessels 
(Paczj?c Sandpiper, Paczjk Pintail, Paczjfc Teal, and Paczpc Swan) owned b y  the Pacific 
Nuclear Transport lirnited bereinafter PNTL],'" follow one of these three routes on their 
way to Japan: Panama Canal, Cape Hom, Cape of Good Hope. 
'52~itinfied wastes refer to left-over radioactive wastes after plutonium and uranium are 
reprocessed. No m e r  use is foreseen for these wastes, thus they are not recycled but 
are vitrified or incorporated into a very stable glas  mat*. Thereafter, the glass is poured 
into a stainless steel container 1.34 m in height and 0.43 m in diameter, where it is 
allowed to solidify. The weight of this canister is aromd 500 kg. Reprocessed plutonium 
and uranium can still be used as nuclear materials for nuclear reactors. For exarnple, 1 
gram of plutonium is equivalent to 1 ton of oil. COGEMA, "Retum Shipment of vitrified 
residues fkom France to Japan," On line: COGEMA Web site 
/ d o s s i e r s & / d o s s i ~  <&QI ://qn,~w.co~,ema. fi > (Date accessed: 17 August 1999). 
mereinafter Retum Shipment]. 
' 531bid. 
154 Ibid. PNTL ships, owned by British Nuclear Fuel Limited (BWL), COGEMA and the 
Japanese utilities, are 104 rn long and 16 m wide. According to COGEMA, each ship 
carries sufncient amount of fuel to complete a journey without any port-call. In addition, 
each ship is equipped with: a double bottom and double hull structure for rninimising 
darnage and for safety in case of accident, duplicated navigation, communication, 
electrical and cooling systems. A cask cooling system installed each hold; a 
comprehensive fbe fighting system maintained in case of emergency, emergency sources 
of electrical power; satellite navigation and tracking systems. A worldwide emergency 
response system is operated, including a 24-hour standby team and salvage cover. 
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On 21 July 1999, France delivered its first shipment of MOX"' fuel to Japan 
aboard the Pacifc TeaZ and the Pacifc  int ta il. L" These ships sailed to Japan via the 
Cape of Good Hope and the South Pacific Ocean &d reached Japan in the second half of 
September this year. The two vessels were amied to escort each othedn 
Many coastal States, particularly those whose temtorial waters and exclusive 
economic zones are part of the routes taken by these vessels, are apprehensive about the 
nsks posed by these international shipments of nuclear materials and radioactive wastes 
to their peoples and marine environments. Argentina, for instance, posited that the transit 
of radioactive wastes through the waters of the South Atlantic poses "clear ecological 
ris-ks . . . given the particular characteristics inherent in navigation in the southern seas. ri158 
The Muiisters of the Non-Aligned Countries also 
expressed their concem for the unsafe maritime transportation and 
dumping of nuclear wastes as well as for the risks and dangers this 
transportation and dumping presents especially to sea coastal areas and 
fisheries and any other areas, particularly those under state sovereignty 
and jurisdi~tion.'~~ 
1 5 5 ~ ~ ~  fuel is the mixture of recycled plutonium and uranium. On line: COGEMA 
home page ~ h ~ : / / w w w . c o ~ . f r / r e c h e r c h e  ~$lindex.html> (Date accessed: 30 August 
1999). 
' 5 6 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  NEWS, "Departme Of The First Shipment Of Recycled (MOX) Fuel To 
Japan" 22 July 1999, On line: COGEMA Web site <hM>://~ww.co~ema.fr/actualites - - & / 
ex.html> (Date accessed: 17 August 1999). 
' 571bid. 
? h t e  of Peace and Cooperatiorz of the South Atlnntic-Report of the UN Secretary- 
General, 24 October 1995, U.N. Doc.no.:A/50/671, as reprinted in the Netherlands 
Institute for the Law of the Sea, International Organizations and the Law of the Sea, 
Docurnentary Yearbook 1995, Volume 1 1 ,  1995 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1998), at 144-145, citing the statement by the Foreign a s t e r  of Argentina 
at the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the NPT on April-May 1995. 
l5'L5id. . Letter dated 18 May 1995 ~ o m  the Permanent Representative of Indonesia 
addressed to the Secretary General (Communique of Ministerial Meeting of the 
Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Countries, in Bandung, Indonesia, 25-27 April 
1995) U.N. Doc. No.: A/49/920-S/1995/489, 16 June 1995, at 181. 
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The member States of the Pacific Forum echoed the concerns voiced by other 
coastal States about shipments of plutonium and radioactive wastes throughout the region 
during the 26h South Pacinc F o m  at Madang, Papua New Guinea, fiom 13 to 15 
September 1995. 160 
Not only States object to the shiprnents of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive 
wastes across international borders. Many non-govemmental organizations, including 
Greenpeace, International, also oppose the international shipments of auclear materials 
on the growid that they are dangerous. In a report submitted to the International Maritime 
Organization Maritime S afety Committee [hereinafter IMO MSC], Greenpeace aileged 
"that there were enough serious questions regarding the safety of the sea transport of such 
materials to jus- postponement of these shipments, pending results of fkther 
investigation. " ' ' 
- - - - - - - 
I6Olbid. Letter dated 18 September 1995 fÏom the Charge d'affaires a i .  to the Permanent 
Mission of Papua New Guinea to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General 
(Communique of the 26" Pacific Forum, Madang, Papua New Guinea, 3-15 September 
1995), U.N. Doc. A/50/475, 26 September 1995 at 189. The 26" South Pacific Forum 
was attended by Australia, the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, 
Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, the Marshall Islands, 
Samoa, Solomon Islands Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. The Pacific Forum expressed 
concerns about the shipments between France and Japan as early as 1992. In the Letter 
dated 17 August 1992 fiom the Charge d'affaires a i. of the Permanent Mission of 
Solomon Islands to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General 
(Communique of the 23rd South Pacific Fonun, Honiara, Solomon Islands, 8-9 July 
l992), U.N. Doc.:A/47/391,20 August 1992, as reprinted in The Netherlands Institute for 
the Law of the Sea, International Organizations and the L m  of the Sea, Docurnentary 
Yearbook 1992, Volume 8, 1992 (London: Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1994) 
at 67. 
l6 'MO MSC - 64" session, M O  MSC 64/22. 
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The shipments are in pursuance of the reprocessing contracts between 
C O G E M A I F ~ ~ ~ C ~ ' ~ ~  and ten (10) Japanese electric utilities in accordance with the 
cooperation agreements entered by their governments.'63 The reprocessing contracts 
provide for reprocessing of spent fiel fiom the ten Japanese electric utilities into new fuel 
and the conditioning and vitrification of Ieftover wastes. Under the contracts, France 
delivers the reprocessed nuclear materials and the vitrified wastes back to Japan. In the 
coming years, it is expected that the number of shipments of plutonium and mixed fuel 
oxide f?om France to Japan will increa~e. '~~ 
The shipments of spent nuclear fiiel, recycled or reprocessed nuclear fuel and 
vitrified wastes are part of the nuclear cycle of States that adopt the close loop cycle of 
162 COGEMA is a French Company that specializes in the nuclear fiiel cycle. It is active in 
30 countries and is considered the world leader in the entire nuclear fuel cycle. On h e :  
COGEMA Home Page ~~//www.co~ema.fi/comoaitre_~b/ud~ rap~ort-pdf >(Date 
accessed: 10 August 1999)- See also GeneraI Information on Nuclear Power in France, 
On line: Embassy of France Washington D.C. Home Page < http://info-france- 
usa.org&earch.hmt. > (Date accessed: 15 August 1999). 
'631990 Agreement Between France And Japan On Co-Operation In The Peaceful Uses 
Of NucZear Energy, 46 NucIear Law Bulletin bereinafier NLB] (1990) p.86; 1993 
Agreement Between France And hpan On Co-Operation On Radioactive Waste, 54 NLB 
(1994) p. 66. Other examples of agreements are between and among France, the United 
Kingdom and Germany. For example, on 6 June 1989, France and the Federal Republic 
of Germany made a Joint Declaration on Co-Operation Between the Two Counhies in 
the Field of Peacefil Uses of Nuclear Energy. This Declaration covers cooperation in 
reprocessing, production of MOX fbeIs, uranium enrichment, nuclear reactors, 
information relating to nuclear installations, transport of nuclear matenal and cornmunity 
aspects. The two Governments connmi that transport of nuclear materials between them 
would not be impeded. 'ïhey agreed to move towards the harmonization of standards. 
Germany also signed another Joint Declaration on Co-operation in the Peacefil Uses of 
Nuclear Energy with the United Kingdom. This Declaration, signed on 25 July 1989, 
records an intent to increase existing CO-operation in the peacefùl uses of nuclear energy. 
The two governments confirm that they will place no obstacles to the safe transport of 
radioactive matenals. While national transport concepts are to be recognised, the two 
States agee to work towards mutual recognition and technical usability of containers 
ermitted in either of their countries. 44 NLB (1 989) at 60-6 1. 
Ps4Retum Shipment, supra note 152. 
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commercial nuclear energy generation. Closed loop countries like France and Japan 
consider reprocessing very important and economically beneficial. As States of origin 
and destination, they repudiate the alleged inadequacy of safety and security measures of 
the maritime shipments of nuclear materials and radioactive wastes. According to these 
two States, the shipments were undertaken in cornpliance with international safety 
standards and physical protection measures required under the international nuclear legal 
regime. 16* 
The M O  and the M A ,  the two international organizations competent in the field 
of maritime carnage of nuclear materials and radioactive wastes established a Joint 
Working Group bereinafter MG] on the transport of irradiated spent fuel and 
radioactive wastes. The objective of the SWG was to review the regulations governùig the 
maritime transport of spent nuclear fuel, reprocessed fuel and radioactive wastes. After 
review of the regulations and consultation with concerned parties, the JWG fomulated a 
code of practice and declared the sufnciency and adequacy of the regulations and safety 
standards to transport nuclear matenals and radioactive wastes, in particular spent fuel, 
reprocessed fuel and radioactive wastes. The code, f o d l y  called the Code for the Safe 
Carriage of Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, Plutonium, and High-Level Radioactive Wastes in 
Flasks on board Ships [hereinafter INF Code] was adopted in 1993 by the IMO Assembly 
in its 1 gLh session.166 
- -- 
16'c0~~MA, "Reprocessing . . .  and Recycling " On line: COGEMA Web site 
<h~://www.co~ema.fi/ actiwhes ~b / recvcIage/index.html> (Date accessed: 17 August 
1999). 
'%ode for the Safe Cam'age of Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, Plutonium, and High-Level 
Radioactive Wastes in Flasks on board Ships [pereinafter INF Code], adopted by the 
IMO Assembly, 18" Session, KM0 Resolution A.748(18), IMDG Code Supplement, 1994 
Consolidated Edition (MO Sales number: IMO-ZOOE). 
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Despite the adoption of the INF Code, the controversy conceming the 
shipments of nuclear materials and radioactive wastes continues. Environmental activists 
persist in their opposition to the shipments of spent nuclear materials and radioactive 
wastes. Many Coastal States, through the IMO, revive the issue by recommending the 
adoption of more preventive mesures. States of origin and destination rely on the claim 
of su£filcient preventive regdations to ensure the safety of the transport. A resolution of 
the different issues arising fiom the shipment of radioactive materials will likely not 
occur very soon as the two opposing groups continue to stand by their connicting 
opinions and positions. 
III. Nuclear fuel cycle 
The nuclear fùel cycle refers to the concept of a controlled nuclear fission to 
generate e l e ~ t r i c i t ~ . ' ~ ~  There are two types of nuclear fuel cycle: closed fuel cycle and the 
once-through cycle. 
The closed fuel cycle begins with the mining, milling, converting and enriching 
uranium. The next stages of the cycle are fuel fabrication and power generation. The end- 
cycle involves reprocessing, recycling of plutonium and uranium, conditioning and &al 
disposai of w a ~ t e s . ' ~ ~  The once-through cycle follows the same pattern except that spent 
fuel is not reprocessed but is stored for disposal later as waste.16' 
- 
1 6 ' ~ . ~ .  Semenov and N. Oi, "Nuclear fuel cycles: Adjusting to new realities", in the 
M A  Bulletin Vo1.3 (1993), reproduced in United Nations Department of Public 
Information, United Nations and Nuclear Non-Proliferaiion, (New York: United Nations 
Publication, 1995) at 187. 
168fi id. 
' 6 9 ~ i d .  
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The closed fuel cycle is of two types: the thermal reactor cycle and the fast 
breeder reactor cycle. In both types, vent  fuel is reprocessed and uranium and plutonium 
are recycled into new fuel e1ements.l" Compared to the themal reactors, the fast breeder 
reactors generate more fuel than they burn up, hence, the name "breeder."L71 
There are two objectives in reprocessing. The h t  is to recover uranium and 
plutonium so these materials can be used again as energy rnateria~."~ ' o n e  tome of 
reprocessed and recycled fiel provides the same energy as 20,000 tons of oil. In this 
respect, reprocessing results in significant savings in natural r e s o ~ r c e s . " ~ ~ ~  The second 
aim of reprocessing is to "process remaining waste into qualified and safe solid foms 
ready for transport and h a l  disposal."l" There are only a few countries that perform 
reprocessing activities and these include the United ~ i n ~ d o r n l ' ~  and i rance.'^^ The 
United States of Arnerica practices the once-through cycle.177 
The examples given in the introduction illustrate the transport of radioactive 
materiais at the end stage of the nuclear fuel cycle. However, the transport of radioactive 
- -- 
170~lutonium is recycled and later mixed with uranium to make up MOX fiel. Recovering 
and recycling plutonium allow natural uranium resources and subsequent enrichment 
costs to be spared on one hand, and, on the other, to very significantly reduce the 
radiotoxicity of the ultimate residues. Plutonium is the major long-term contributor to the 
radiotoxicity of spent fiels and reprocessing leaves only 0.1% of the initial plutonium in 





I7"I'he United Kingdom has reprocessed over 30,000 rnetric tonnes of uranium for the 
past 30 years. Reprocessed uranium has supplied 70 percent of the U.K.'s uranium hiel 
for its advanced gas reactors. On line: Nuclear Energy Institute <bttp:/www.nuk 
(Date accessed: 21 June 1999). 
reprocessing activities of France, visit the COGEMA Web 
site at < ~ : / / w w u . . c o ~ / > .  
54 
materials occurs at all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. Fresh nucIear materials for use 
in generating energy are aIso regularly transported across international borders. 
W. Radioactivity and its effect~'~~ 
The disintegration of atoms that results in the transfomation of one element into 
another is the process of radioactivity. Elements that undergo the radioactive process are 
called radioactive elements. Radioactive elements are either naturally occurring or 
artificially produced. Uranium, the fuel used in nuclear reactors, is an example of an 
element whose atoms disintegrate naturally. When uranium is used as he l  in nuclear 
reactors, it undergoes complex radioactive processes while releasing power for energy 
production. The wanium fuel is transformed into elements that are highly radioactive 
called radionuclides. One of these radionuclides is plutonium. 
Radioactive elements emit three types of particles: alpha particles, beta particles 
and gamma rays. Alpha particles are sub-atomic particles that are positively charged and 
travel at high speed Alpha particles are so easily blocked that even a thin sheet of paper 
will absorb the radiation fiom them. Any type of packaging will be sufficient. Beta 
particles, on the other hand, are negatively charged and of very small mas. They also 
travel at high speed. They are able to penetrate more than alpha particles but still, a few 
rnillimeters of solid material, as protection, is sufficient to reduce radiation to negligible 
levels. Gamma rays, unlike the k t  two, are not particles but electrornagnetic waves. 
17'see K. S. Shrader-Frechette, Burying Uncertainty: Risk and the Case Against 
Geological Disposal of NucZear Wuste, (Berkely: University of California Press, 1 993). 
'''The discussion in this part is based largely on A.M. Freke, "The Application of 
Radiological Protection Principles to the Transport of Radioactive Materials", IAEA, 
(Proceedings of a Symposium) Stockholm, 18-22 June 1972, Maritime Camiage of 
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Examples of gamma rays are visible light, wireless waves and x-rays. These are highly 
penetrating, hence, a high degree of care must be used in packaging, h m d h g  and 
transporthg this material. 
A special type of radioactive materîal calied fissile materials requires a different 
degree of care. The atomic structure of fissile materials is sucb 
that if a neutron was to coliide with one of its nuclei, then fission 
would take place, the atom would be split. ConsiderabIe heat would be 
generated, fission products would be produced and more neutrons would 
become available to cause more couisions. This could continue as a chai .  
reaction and the fissile material in its environment would be in a criticai 
state. '" 
Some examples of fissile materials are uranium -235 and plutonium -239.1g0 
Packaging for fissile materials must be designed with these distinctive traits.'81 
When atoms disintegrate, they undergo the process of d e ~ a ~ . ' ~ ~  The periods in 
which different radionuclides decay vary depending on the number of radioactive atoms 
and the type of nuclear ~ ~ e c i e s . ' ~ ~  The decay process of radionuclides is expressed in 
ha-life. Half-life refers to the tirne consumed for half of any nuclear matenal to 
decay.lW For example, the ha-life of tritium is 12.3 years. If there are 1000 atoms of 
tritium, there will only be 500 after 12.3 years, afler 24.6 years, there will be 2 5 0 . ~ ~ ~  The 
decay of radionuclides means that the radioactivïty is waning until it becomes harmless. 
Nuclear Materials (Vienna: IAEA, 1973) at 1 5-26. [Hereina fier Symposium 
Proceedings] . 
'"fiid. S .  Williamson, "The Special Problems Involved in the Maritime Carriage of 
FissiIe Matenais", in ~~rnposium ~roceedin~s  at 29. 
' ' O l b  id. 
Lsl~iscussion o  packaging requirements in Chapter 4. 
182 R. L. Murray, Understanding Radioactive Fastes, 4th ed. (Columbus: Battelle Press, 
1994) at 11. 
lg3fiid. at 12. 
' 84~id .  
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Some radionuclides like plutonium, however, have half-lives of thousands of years. 
Plutonium has a haif-life of 24,000 years, thus, its radioactive effects can extend up to 
250,000 years.186 The environmental and human health and safety implications are 
therefore, different for each radionuclide. 
A. Effect on individuals 
When radioactive particles encounter living entities, they rnay interfere with the 
normal functioning of ~ e l l s . ' ~ ~  The effect of such interference may either be 
deterministic or stochastic depending on the dosage, the length of time of exposure, and 
the modes of exposure. Interference resulting in the killing of ceIls is c d e d  
detenninistic. When the tissue cells are altered by radiation, stochastic effects result. 
When the effects of radiation exposure are manifested immediately or within a 
short period of tirne (hours, days, or weeks), there is acute radiation. For instance, 
twenty-eight (28) deaths among 134 personnel and emergency workers are attributable to 
acute radiation sickness during the 1986 Chernobyl accident.''* However, effects may 
also become apparent after a longer period of time, particularly if the same radiation 
dosage is spread out over a long period of time. This effect rnay become manifest in the 
form of cancer and leukemia The radiation exposure caused by the Chemobyl accident 
' "fiid. 
%hader-~rechette, supra note 177 at 1. 
187~iscussion in this portion is based on the 1990 Recommendatiom of the International 
Commission on Radiological Protection, as reprinted in M. ElBaradie, et al, The 
International Law of NucZear Energy Basic Documents Part I; (Dordrecht, Martinus 
Nij ho ff Publishers: 1 993) at 1 59- 169, [Hereinafter Nuclear Energy Basic Documents] ; 
See also A.M. Freke, in Symposium Proceedings, supra note 178 at 15-26. 
' 8 8 ~ ~  Press Release, "International Chernobyl Conference Concludes in Vienna", 17 
Apnl 1996, IAEA PR 96/7, On h e :  IAEA Web site c ~://www.iaea.ore/wordlatom/ 
rnforesource/~ressrelease/~m796.h~ > (Date accessed: 17 August 1999). 
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resulted into a substantial increase of reported cases of thyroid cancer especidly in 
young children.Ig9 At the end of 1995, 800 cases of thyroid cancer were reported in 
children under age of 15.1g0 More cases of thyroid cancer among children exposed to 
radioactivity during the eariy phases of the accident in Chemobyl over the next decades 
were predicted by a group of international experts. '' ' 
Radiation rnay not only inflict damage to the individual exposed, but its effects 
may be carried on to the individual's descendants. Damage on the individual exposed to 
radiation is called somatic damage; damage to h i s h r  descendant is called genetic 
damage. 
B. Mode of exposure to individuals 
The pathways of radioactivity to humans are by air, water or lanbLg2 Exposure 
may be extemal (direct exposure) and intemal (indirect exposure) . Extemal radiation 
exposure may occur directly to people who are within the vicinity or within the critical 
zone of the radiation release. Intemal or indirect exposure starts when radiation released 
in the atmosphere settles on the ground and contaminates the soil, plants and ~ r o ~ s . ' ' ~  
When radiation is released into the water, it may also contaminate the water as well as the 
organisms in the water.Ig4 Consumption of contamioated food and water by humans is 









In transport situations, when a package containing radioactive matenal is 
leaking, radiation exposure may b e  indirect and may occur by any or all of four ways: 
(1) Ingestion or eatimg food or drinking Liquids with contaminated 
hands; 
(2) Inhalation or breaihing contaminated air; 
(3) Injection or when radiation occurs on, or near an area of the skin 
which is pmctured, cut, or abraded; and 
(4) Absorption or direct passage through the unbroken skin. lg6 
C. Effect on the marine environment 
According to the 1990 study by the United Nations Group of Experts on the 
Scientific Aspects of Marine Pollution (GESAMP),~~~ anthropogenic sources of 
radioactivity in the oceans constitute no more than 1 per cent of the total coming from 
natural sources such as volcanic activities in the sea floor. Of the anthropogenic sources 
of radioactivity, dumping and nuclear weapons tests rnainly comprise the artificial 
radioactivity present in the oceans. ' 
Several studies on the eEect of 
weapons testing reveal insigniificant 
artificial radioactivity on the oceans fkom nuclear 
impact on the marine e n ~ o n m e n t . ' ~ ~  The 
1 9 6 ~ . ~ .  Freke, Symposium Proceedings, supra note 178 at 23. 
'97~oint Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Pollution, The State of 
Marine Environment, Reports and Studies G E S M  No. 39 (Nairobi: U.N.E.P., 1990). 
GESAMP is composed of MO, FAO, UNESCO, WMO, WHO, IAEA, UN, and UNEP. 
19*1bid. at 39 and 40. Independent World Commission on the Oceans, The Ocean Our 
Future (UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998) at 3 8. 
1 9 9 ~ h e  most recent study on the  impact of artificial radioactivity in the oceans was 
undertaken on the Mururoa and Fangataufa atolls. The Munvoa and Fangataufa atolls are 
located in French Polynesia, in the middle of the South Pacific Ocean about halfway 
between Austraiia and South America. France had conducted 41 nuclear weapons tests 
and five safety trialsig9 in the atmosphere at the atolls between 1966 and 1974. A total of 
137 underground tests and 10 underground safety trials followed between 1975 and 1996. 
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GESAMP, however, wams that although the total amount of artificial radioactivity in 
the oceans is Iess than natural radioactivity, there rnight stiii be adverse impacts on 
marine organisms and humans. As mentioned earlier, the content and the type of 
radioactivity vary. This variation detemines its potential effect on living entities. 
" [P]adionuclides vary widely in the extent to which they can affect marine organisms and 
man, their total activity is only a very rough guide to ~ s k s . " ~ * ~  For example, the risks 
associated with dumped radioactive wastes are extremely low. Nevertheless, the 
radioactive matter fkom dumped radioactive wastes may affect humans via shellfish 
consumption,zO1 or when long-lived radionuclides escape into the atmosphere and into the 
land, contaminating sources of food and waterFo2 These hdings by GESAMP 
particularly in respect to the effects of artificial radioactivity on marine organisms, 
moreover, should be considered in light of its own admission tbat 
[dloses to, and effects on, marine organisms or marine populations 
are much less weil hown. As in man, effects may be somatic (in the 
individuals exposed) or genetic (in the germ ceIls of the irradiated 
individuals and therefore transmissible to their descendants). While for 
In 1995, the French government requested the M A  to conduct an independent 
assessrnent on the radiological situation at the atolls. Composed of experts £kom different 
institutions and countries, the team of scientists concluded that the "radionuclide 
concentrations on the atoll's surfaces and in the surrounding seas -- with four exceptions - 
- are similar to or below those found elsewhere in the region where no nuclear weapons 
testing took place..& was concluded that no population gxoup is likely to receive a füture 
dose, attributable to the residual materials at the two atolls, exceeding about one percent 
of the background dose received kom natural background radiation." Accordhg to the 
Study team, based on the negative hdings, there was no need for monitoring for 
purposes of radiological protection. A program to measure radioactivity in the 
environment was recornmended for scientific purposes and to assure the public of the 
continuing safety of the atolls eom significant radiological exposure. On line: IAEA 
Web site, LAEA Public Information, "Nuclear Tests in French Polynesia: Could Hazards 
Arise?" <htto://www.iae~.or~/munuoabook.~~ (Date accessed: 26 June 1999). 
2 o o ~ ~ ~ A M P ,  supra note 197 at 40. 
20'fiid. 
202L5id. at 4 1. 
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man the individual is the target of concem, for marine organisms interest is 
primarily in po dation effects çuch as survival, growth and reproductive 
performance. 2 0 P  
Studies have been conducted to determine the health and environmental impact of 
flasks containing nuclear materials in a maritime accidental situation. A study conducted 
by Denmark -Risr National Laboratory (RNL) - Nuclear Fuel concluded that the flasks 
used to transport spent nuclear fuel can withstand severe conditions in an accidental 
situation.'04 The baniers of these flasks are designed to contain radioactivity £?om being 
released into the environment in an accidental condition?" Radiation release may occur 
after a long-temi exposure to seawater and even at this condition, the study found out the 
radiation release is still under the prohibited dosage to individu al^.^^^ The nsks posed to 
non-marine organisms were also found to be very l o ~ . ~ ~ ~  
Japan's Center Research Institute of Electric Power Industry (CIU) - conducted a 
study on environmental and health consequences kom the sinking of vitrified waste in 
shallow and deep waterszo8 The packaging for vitrified wastes have been found to be 
"extremely Should radiation be released f?om the vitrified wastes and exposed to 
the human population, the dosage would still be below the standards allowed for 
2031bid. at 42. For a critique of the 1990 GESAMP shidy on the marine environment, see 
P. Taylor, "The State of the Marine Environment: A Critique of the Work and Role of the 
Joint Group of Experts on Scientific Aspects of M a ~ e  Pollution (GESAMP)", Marine 
Pollution Bulletin, Vol. 26, No.3, pp. 120-127 (1993). 
2 0 4 ~ .  Pedrozo, "Transport of Nuclear Cargoes by Sea", 28 J. Maritime Law and 
Commerce, No. 2 il 1997) p.207, at 2 15. 
"'fi id. 
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individual e ~ ~ o s u r e ? ' ~  Similar conclusions were d v e d  at by France - Institut de 
Protection et de SfietYNucUuire (PSN) - on a study on plutonium and by United States - 
Department of Energy on a study on spent nuclear fiel.2L 
As of the present t h e ,  there has been no major accidental radioactive release into 
the marine environment fiom the maritime carriage of radioactive materials. Thus, there 
is no conclusive data as to the effect of excessive artificiai radioactivity when released 
into the oceans. 
D. Lessons from Chernobyl 
The conclusions about the effects of artificial radioactivity in the marine 
environment should be evaluated in light of the Chemobyl experience. Pnor to 
Chemobyl, the international community had never anticipated the wide geographical 
reach of excessive radiation fiom an accident involving a nuclear facility. The m e r a b l e  
geographical zone with respect to areas surrounding nuclear installations was assumed to 
constitute only "a few tens of kilornetres in distance f?om the nuclear fa~ i l i t~ . "~"  The 
radioactive substance released f?om the Chernobyl accident traveled to Finland and 
Sweden, then to Poland, Czechosiovakia and southern Gemany, and then to the 
~etherlands.~" It later moved to Austria and northem Italy and to France and finally the 
United ~ i n ~ d o m . ~ ~ ~  The weather conditions at the fime of radiation release were 
"fiid. at 216. 
2' vbid. 
212 M A ,  "Response to a Radioactive Materials Release Having Transboundary Impact," 
IAEA Safety Series No. 94, as reprinted in ElBaradie, supra note 187 at 400, [hereinafter 
Response to Transboundary Radiation]. 
2 ' 3 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ,  Liability and Compensation for N u c h  Damage, An International 
Ovewiau, (Paris: OECD, 1994) at 87. 
214fiid. 
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primarily responsible for the quick movement of radioactivity fiom Russia to other 
countries in Europe. 
[P3 ahshowers in certain regions, as the cloud was moving to the 
north and West, provoked the deposition of certain nuclides fiom LO to 100 
tÏmes the rate of deposition of dry particles. NaturaUy, the absolute level 
of the contamination by radioactive rain depended upon the intensity of 
the precipitation and the distribution of the various substances in the 
cloud. The situation was complicated by the fact the cloud passed back 
and forth over Europe during a period of several days, thereby exposing 
the public to radioactivity during a lon er penod than would have been the 
case in the event of a single passage. 21B 
The excessive radiation fiom Chernobyl contaminated the air, water, fauna and 
flora of other European c ~ u n t r i e s . ~ ~ ~  The agricultural industries of victim corntries 
consequently suffered when their produce and livestock were contaminated by 
The accident in Chemobyl provides the following lessons: 
(a) It is difficult to predict where and when the radioactive plume 
will arrive at the borders of a potentially affected State. It is also difficult 
to predict where washout or rainout of the radioactive matenal (in the case 
of an atmosphenc release) will occur and to predict how much will be 
deposited. 
(b) The areas within an affected State which require radiological 
monitoring may amount to a large fiaction (or even au) of its total 
geographic area 
( c ) The organization, technical resources and facilhies required to 
monitor and assess the radiological situation require considerable 
Bexibility, mobility and adaptability since it is not clear beforehand what 
types of land, crops or population centres w i U  be aected. 
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(d) The large areas potentially involved rnay lead to difficulties relating 
to the availability, supily, economics, and trade involving food 
products?18 
The ChemobyI lessons should be considered in determining the radiation nsks 
posed by the maritime carriage of nuclear materials and radioactive wastes to the human 
population of Coastal States and to their marine environments. The nsks posed by 
nuclear activities rnay be of low probability, but when radiation is released, disastrous 
transboundary harm may o ~ c u r . ~ ' ~  As mentioned earlier, h m  from radiation rnay be via 
extemal or internal exposure. The radiation release in the marine environment fiom the 
maritime carriage of nuclear materials and radioactive wastes rnay be both extemal and 
internal. Extemal or direct radiation is more iikely for the officers and crew on the vesse1 
canying the nuclear materials. Interna1 radiation (or indirect radiation) is likely to occur 
to the nearest Coastal States and their marine environments. The Chernobyl experience 
indicates that the vulnerable geographicd zone rnay Vary and "rnay amount to a large 
fiaction (or even dl) of its total geographic 
V. Categories of radioactive materials 
This thesis uses the general terms "radioactive materials", "radioactive 
substances" or "radionuclides." As discussed earlier, there are various types of 
radionuclides with different heakh, environmental and security significance depending on 
the uses and categories of nuclear matenals and radioactive wastes such as physical 
protection, safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste, and maritime safety. 
218~esponse to Transboundary Radiation, supra note 212 at 402. 
219 Aaicle 2(a), ILC Draft Articles, ILC Draft Report, supra note 132 at 12. 
2 2 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ,  supra note 197. 
64 
Further, the radioactive materials covered in this study refer to those used for civilian 
purposes, not rnilitary purposes. 
For physical protection purposes, nuclear materials are categorized to determine 
the type of security measures that m u t  be applied. The basis for concern for the physical 
protection stems fiom the fact that plutonium, highly eariched uranium or uranium -232 
c m  lead to the manufacture of a nuclear explosive d e ~ i c e . ~ ~ '  There are three general 
categories of nuclear materials for purposes of physical protection. As a d e ,  the basis of 
the categorization is the original fissile content of the nuclear material, which thus, 
determines the level of physical protection.u2 
Nuclear material that is in a form no Ionger usable for any nuclear activity is 
considered to have minimai environmental consequences, thus, does not merit physical 
protection measures? An example of this is the vitrified hi&-level radioactive waste 
2211AE~, "Assignment of Nuclear Activities to Physical Protection Categories", N A  
Doc. INFCIRC/225/ReV.3, August 1993, On line: IAEA Web site, <http://umw/iaea.org1 . . -  
w o r i d a t o m / ~ ~ ~ P I 1 / 1 n ~ , >  @ate accessed: 10 July 1999). 
However, experts £kom the nuclear industry assert that weapons-grade plutonium/uranium 
and reactor grade plutonium.hranium are different. "Uranium and plutonium are 
composed of several isotopes, some of which are fissile. To produce an explosive device 
for military purposes requires the percentage of fissile isotopes (U-235 for uranium, Pu- 
239 for plutonium) present in the materiai to be of the order of 93%. The levels reached 
in the nuclear power industry are, however, much lower; less than 5% for uranium and 
between 50 and 60% for plutonium. Plutonium containing high quantities of fissile 
material i.e. Pu-239 in the order of 90-95 %, is known as weapon-grade plutonium. 
Plutonium containing lower concentrations, in the range of 50-60 % is known as reactor- 
grade plutonium. The definitions of the various plutonium grades are expressed as a 
percentage of the isotope hi-240 which is considered as an impurity for weapons 
manufacturers. " On line: COGEMA home page +@x/ /www.co~a .  frlrecherc he-~bl 




that is generated fkom the recychg and reprocessing of spent fuelm2" Because of the 
low fissile content of high-level wastes, they do not ment physical protection 
For purposes of safety management, radioactive materials are c lassified as either 
spent fuel or radioactive waste under the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel 
Management and the Safty of Radioactive Waste ~ a n a ~ e m e n t . ~ ~ ~  The classification 
process is a politicd decision and depends on whether the State adopts the once-through 
cycle or the closed loop cycle. Though radioactive, spent fuel and other radioactive 
elements that can be reprocessed are not considered wastes by corntries adhering to the 
close loop cycle. For once-through cycles States Like the United States, spent fuel is 
considered radioactive waste. 
For purposes of maritime safety, the Convention for the Safeq of Life ut Sea. 1974 
[hereinafter SOLASJ~~' and the Intanational Maritime Dangerous Goods Code 
[herehafter IMDG codelZ8 classi& radioactive materials as dangerous rnatenals, the 
handling, packaging and transport of which must be regulated. This classification is 
inclusive of both fiesh nuclear material and spent nuclear fiel. 
- 
2 2 4 ~  Seitz, "Sustainable development & electricity generation: Comparing impacts of 
waste disposal" 38 IAEA Bull. No. 2 (1996) On line: IAEA Web site -+@x//www.iaea. 
source/bulle nv3 8n2/ha> (Date accessed: 1 7 August 
1999). 
2 2 5 ~ e ~  Shipment, supra note 152. 
226~oint Convention, supra note 145. 
2271nternational Convention for the Safity of Life at Sea, 1 November 1974, entry into 
force 25 May 1980, 1 184 U.N.T.S. 2. pereinafter SOLAS]. 
228~emational Maritime Dangerous Goods Code, Volume IV Class 7, (IMO Sales No. 
200 86.10E) (1 986). Fereinafter IMDG Code]. 
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The MO'S adoption of the INF codeug puts irradiated nuclear material, 
plutonium and hi&-level waste in a distinct category- The INF matenals covered under 
the INF Code are: 
O Irradiated nuclear £ûel - material containing uranium, thorium 
andior plutonium isotopes which has been used to maintain a self- 
sustaining nuclear chah reaction and may be recycled and 
reprocessed; 
Plutonium - the resultant mixture of isotopes of that materiai 
extracted fkom irradiated nuclear fuel fkom reprocessing; 
High-level radioactive wastes - liquid wastes resulting fiom the 
operation of the fïrst stage extraction system or the concentrated 
wastes fiom subsequent extraction stages, in a facility for 
reprocessing irradiated nuclear fuel, or soli& into which such 
liquid wastes have been converted- 
In ehis thesis, the focus is on INF materials because they have generated the most 
controversy. The large-scale international maritime shipments of these materials present 
the most risks to other Coastal States and coastal commmities. 
W. Nuclear energy generation and the transport of nuclear materials - Trends 
At the end of 1998, there were 434 reactors in operation, fi-om 32 countries 
around the globe. There were 151 nuclear power reactors in Western Europe, 70 in 
Eastern Europe, 1 1 8 in North Arnerica, 5 in Latin Arnerica, 1 1 in the Middle East and 
South Asia, 2 in f i c a ,  and 77 in the Far ~ a s t . * ~ '  The six countrïes that have the most 
2291AE~, M A  Annual Report for 1993, IAEA Doc. no.:GC (XXXVm)/2 & Corr.1, July 
and 19 August 1994, excerpts reprinted in Netherlands Institute for the Law of the Sea , 
International Organizations and the Law of the Sea Docurnentary Yearbook 1993 Vol. 9. 
(London: Graham & Trotman/Martinus & Nihjoff, 1993) at 684-94; INF Code, supra 
note 166. 
230KEA, The Annual Report for 1998 On line: lAEA Web site Qttp:// www. iaea-ore/ 
w o r l d a t o m / i ~ r e s o u r ç e / ~ 8 / 9 8 ~ r , d f . h ~ >  (Date accessed: 17 August 
1999) at 4. [Hereinafter 1998 M A  Annual Report]. 
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number of reactors are the United States of Amenca (104 reactors), France (58 
reactors), Japn (53 reactors), the United Kingdom (35 reactors), Russia (29 reactors), 
and Germany (20 rea~tors) .~~'  
W e a r  energy generation is predicted to increase in East and Southeast Asia, 
where new power reactors are built to supply increasing electricity dernand~.*~~ China, 
Japan, and the Republic of Korea are planning to expand nucIear power generation.233 
However, the present financial cnsis in the region slowed the Pace of nuclear power 
expansion.234 
In Europe, nuclear energy generation could remain at its present b e l .  For 
instance, the German government announced in September 1997 that the use of nuclear 
power would be stopped and has issued invitations for t a k  conceming a new energy 
consensus.235 France has also decided to shut down and dismantle the Superphoenix, a 
fast reactor breeder.236 
The increase of nuclear energy generation naturally results in increased amounts 
of INF rnaterials. Since not al1 States undertake thelr own reprocessing or disposal of INF 
materials, the transport of INF materials across international jurisdictions is predicted to 
increase.*" To facilitate the reprocessing, storage a d o r  disposal of INF matenais, 






2 3 6 f i ~  
237 Japan, for example, is a closed fuel cycle State but it does not undertake its own 
reprocessing activities. It entered into a cooperation agreement with France for 
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such CO-operation agreements is to establish a more efficient inter-state system that cam 
administer al1 activities relating to reprocessing and reconditioning, including shipme-mts 
of nuclear materials and radioactive waste. 
VII. Risks  attached to maritime carriage 
The previous sections of this Chapter presented the nsks surroundhg radioactive 
materials. This section will examine the perils attached to maritime transpmrt. 
Considering these two types of penls, one by nature of the material transported, and -the 
other by nature of the mode of transport, a clearer pichve of the risks attached to the 
maritime transport of radioactive materials is presented. 
Despite the leaps and bounds achieved by technology for maritime transport, tzhis 
type of transport continues to be penlous. Maritime accidents continue to occur. The  
MO, citing the figures published by the htitute of London Undekters, reported that 
casualty statistics for ships of 500 gross tons and above in 1992-1996 were caused by -the 
followuig: collision or contact (63), fke or explosion (126), grounding (62), machinery 
(29); weather (187), other (153). 238 LIoyd's Register of Shipping casualty statistics for 
1996 showed a total of 179 losses with the following causes: foundered (83), missing a 2 ) ,  
fire/explosion (22), collision (29), wreckedktranded (3 6), contact ( 1 ), other (6).239 
The Mû FSI Working Group on Casualty Statistics analysed 136 incidents and 
found that human factor played a significant part in many of these incidents whrich 
reprocessing of its spent fuel (extraction of plutonium and uranium) into MOX fuel and  
the conditioning and vitrification of lefi-over wastes. 
2381M0, "World Maritime Day 1997 Optimum maritime safety dernands a focus on 
people" On line: IMO web site ~hf-://www.imo.o~md/md97h~.> (Date accesçed: 
17 July 1999). 
239fiid. 
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include: Iack of training and expenence of pilots, defective or poor communications, 
fidure to comply and appreciate the rules of risk collision under the COLEGS 1972, and 
failure to reduce speed to allow for conditions of weather."' Experts say that as much as 
80% of the maritime accidents have been caused by human enor."' 
Threats and actual acts of piracy and robbery at sea intemi& the security risks 
attached to the carriage of nuclear rnaterials. The total number of incidents of piracy and 
arrned robbery against ships reported to have occurred £?om 1984 to the end of June 1999 
was 1 , 4 8 0 . ~ ~ ~  The areas most affected in 1998 (Le. five incidents reported or more) were 
the Far East, in particular the South China Sea and the Malacca Strait, South Arnerica and 
the Caribbean, the Indian Ocean and West and East ~ f r i c a . ~ ~ ~  
VIII. Conclusion 
This Chapter showed that there are two principal reasons why the maritime 
shipments of radioactive rnaterials produce anxiety upon other Coastal States and non- 
govemmental organizations. The first reason is due to the dangerous nature of the 
material itself. Excessive radiation £tom radioactive materials is hannful to individuals 
and to the marine environment. The second reason is because maritime transportation, per 
2401M0 FSI - 71h session: 22-26 March 1999, On line: M O  Web site ~ ~ / / w w w . i m o .  
i r n o l m e e ~ f s i / 7 / f s i 7 . h ~  gr& > (Date accessed: 10 August 1999). 
24 1 IMO, "Frequently Asked Questions (FAQS) about the IMû", On line: M O  Web site 
~ h t t n : / l w w w . i r n o . o ~  (Date accessed: 30 July 1999). pereinafler IMO 
FAQS] . 
242 IMO MSC, Reports on Acts of Piracy and Anned Robbery Agoinst Ships, IMO 
MSC/Circ.925, 30 June 1999, On line: IMO Web site ~~://u~urw.irno.org! 
circs/msc/pir~v/92S.pdf > (Date accessed: 10 August 1999). The IMO MSC now issues 
a monthIy report on acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships. 
2431bid. 
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se, is perilous. The perils are both man-made and natural. The next Chapter Iays out the 
regime estabfished to regulate the activity and manage the nsks Ïnvolved. 
Chapter 4 
The law of maritime carriage of radioactive materials 
1. Introduction 
The regime goveming the maritime transport of radioactive matenals is composed 
of two different areas in international law: nuclear law and maritime safety law. Nuclear 
law governs the non-modal aspects of the transport. Non-modal aspects include the 
radiation protection and requirements for safe packaging. Maritime safety law governs 
the modal aspects of transportation such as requirements for the seaworthiness of vessels 
and rules for safe navigation of vessels. The two regimes also mandate prhr notice and 
consultation requirements, contingency measures and a liability systern. 
The purpose of this Chapter is to assess the legal regime governing the maritime 
shipments of radioactive materials and determine its underlying ethics and philosophy. 
The hdings will then be used to formulate strategies for reforms that will be taken up in 
the next Chapter. 
Before the legal regime governing the maritime transport of radioactive materials 
is discussed, it is important to introduce the nature of the two areas of international law 
that constitute the regime: nuclear law and maritime safety law. 
The development of nuclear law followed largely the attributes of nuclear energy. 
From the earlier years of its development and use, nuclear energy has demonstrated two 
attributes. It is both destructive and advantageous. These two characteristics of nuclear 
energy are the underlying bases of the fiindamental principles of the law of nuclear 
energy: non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the right of al1 States to peaceful and 
7 1 
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beneficial uses of nuclear energy. These two principles are contained in the Trenty on 
the Non-Proliferution of Nudeor Weapons [hereinafter NPTJ.~" While Contracîing 
 tat tes^^^ have the nght to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, they also have the 
responsibility to ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons on the ground that the 
spread of nuclear weapons undermines international peace and security and increases the 
potential for nuclear war. 246 Commercial and civilian shipments of nuclear materials and 
radioactive wastes conducted within the non-proliferation and peacefûl uses fkamework 
of international nucIear law are allowed under international law. 
Maritime safety laws also developed because of the inherent perilous conditions 
of the sea as well as the collective experiences of the shipping industry involving 
disasters and collisions. The first version of the S O U S ,  for example, came out in 19 14 
244~reaty on the Non-Prolifration of NucIear Weapons, 1 July 1968, entry into force 5 
March 1970, 729 U.N.T.S. 161. wereinafter NPTJ. 
2 4 S ~ i d .  The APT divides the international commUIilty into nuclear weapons states (NWS) 
and non-nuclear weapons States ( I W W S ) .  The nuclear weapons states are restricted to 
only five couutries: China, France, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
In accordance with Article IX (3) of the NPT, a nuclear -weapon state is one which had 
manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear device prior to 1 January 
1967. All other Contracthg States are non-nuclear weapons States. There is also a class 
of states called "threshold states." These are non-nuclear states that have nevertheless 
acquired the capability to develop nuclear-weapon programmes. They include hdia, 
Israel and Pakistan. South A£îica was able to assemble nuclear devices but had already 
come under the umbreila of the NPT and subsequently dismantled them. 
2461bid. Under Article 1 of the NPT, each nuclear-weapon State Party undertakes not to 
transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices 
or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any 
way assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or 
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or contro 1 over 
such weapons or explosive devices. Article II, on the other hand, mandates each non- 
nuclear weapons State to undertake not to receive the transfer from any transferor 
whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, directly or indirectly; 
not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons 
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following the Tiîanic disaster in 1912.2~' It was not until after the IMO was established 
that the SOLAS fint entered into force in 1965. Another example is the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil that was adopted in 1954.~~' 
However, it was not until the 1967 serious oil spill of more than 120,000 tons off the 
Coast of the United Kingdom by the tanker Torrey Canyon that the treaty took off and 
became effective.249 Maritime safety laws have been developed to manage the periis of 
the sea - both naturai and manmade, ensuring and maintainhg the viability of the 
international shipping industry. 
The history of these two areas of law influenced the development and focus of the 
regime goveming the maritime carriage of radioactive materials. Protecting and 
advancing the interests of the nuclear industry and the shipping industry are the principal 
objectives of the legal regime regulating the maritime carriage of radioactive materials. 
The regime goveming the maritime carriage of radioactive rnaterials regulates the 
following areas: radiation protection, safety packaging, seaworthùiess of vessels, pnor 
notification and consultation, contingency and emergency mesures, and civil liability 
scheme. The main focus of the legal regime is to protect and ensure the safety of the 
radioactive material and safety of life at sea Marine environmental protection as well as 
protection of the interests of the Costal States are attended to only after harm occurs - in 
the liability scheme and in a limited manner, in the emergency measures. 
or other nuclear devices. See also V. Lamm, The Utilization of Nuclear Energy and 
International Law, (Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1984). 
2471M~, YMO: the hrst fifty years", On line: 1.0 Web site ~ & p : l / w w v . i m o . o r ~ / ~  
50ann/history3 .h&p (Date accessed: 15 July 1999). 
2 4 8 ~ i d .  
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II. The international organizations responsible for the legal regime governing 
the maritime carriage of radioactive materials 
The two international organizations responsible for the establishment and 
development and the facilitation of the legal regime are the IAEA and the MO. Both are 
part of the United Nations family. 
A. IAEA 
The IAEA was created by h e  of the Statute of the International Atornic Energy 
Agency bereinafter U A  Statute] on 23 October 1956. 250 A year later, the M A  Statute 
came into force on 29 M y  1957,"' fomally authorking the IAEA to undertake its 
mandate. The fhdamental objectives of the IAEA reiterate the twin-principles of 
international nuclear law: 
a) To accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health, 
and prosperity throughout the world; and 
b) To ensure so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or 
under its supe~s ion  or control is not used in such a way as to M e r  any 
military puipose.2S2 
With these objectives, the iAEA is authorized under its Statute to undertake the 
following activities: 
a) research and develop the practical application of atomic energy for 
peacefiil uses; 




250~tatute of the International Atornic - Energy Agency (As Amended up to 28 
Decemberl989), entry into force 29 July 1957, as reprinted in EIBaradie, supra note 187 
at 3. pereinafter M A  Statu4 . 
25'lbid. Article M(I.E of the M A  Statute provides for the requkements of entry into 
force. 
252fiid. Article 11 of the M A  Statute. 
foster exchange of information on the peaceful uses of atomic energy 
as well as training of scientists; 
establish and adrninister safeguards to ensure that materials, facilities 
and Uiforrnation are not used or diverted for military purposes; 
establish standards of safety for protection of health and minimization 
of danger to 1Lfe and property, including such standards for labour 
conditions; 
acquire an facility and materials in carrying out its authorized 
functions. J 
The policy-making organs of the IAEA are the Generai Conference and the Board 
of Governors. The General Conference consists of al1 member states that meet in regular 
annual sessions.*" Article V.E of the L4EA Statute grants to the Generai Conférence the 
power to discuss as weil as make any recomrnendations to the lAEA or the Board of 
Governors, on any question or matter within the scope of the Statute or relating to the 
powers and organs of the IAEA. The Board of Govemors is composed of a selected 
number of states, based on their atomic energy production and geographical 
representation.255 The Board of Govemon has the authority to cany out the functions of 
the Agency as provided by the L4EA  tat tu te? 
As of 14 September 1998, the IAEA had 128 member  tat tes."' The major 
nuclear power generatuig States are members of the IAEA. 
The M A  is the recognized competent international authorky in nuclear 
activities. It works with govemments and other international organizations pertaining to 
2S3fiid. Article III of the M A  Statute; See Bimie and Boyle supra note 97 at 262. 
2541bid. Article V of the L4EA Statute. 
25s~id .  Article V1.A of the M A  Statute. 
256~id. Arficle VI.F of the LAEA Statute. 
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the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It is not a regulato~y body, thus, it has no power to 
enforce its recommendatory standards on any of nuclear activities of its member 
 tat tes? As its mandate suggests, its role is to facilitate and ensure the peacefbl uses of 
nuclear energy. 
B. IMO 
The O ,  forrnerly called the Inter-govemment Maritime Consultative 
Organization W C 0 1  was established in Geneva in 1948 through a  onv vent ion.^^^ The 
Convention, however, did not enter into force until 1 9 5 9 . ~ ~ ~  The M O  held its £ k t  
meeting in January 1 959. 26' 
The IMO's main responsibility is to facilitate 
cooperation among govemments in the field of govemmental 
regdation and practices relating to technical matters of al1 kinds affecting 
shipping engaged in international trade; to encourage and facilitate the 
general adoption of the highest practicable standards in matters concerning 
maritime safety, eefnciency of navigation and the prevention and control of 
marine pollution f?om ships.262 
The IMO carries out its responsibilities through an ~ s s e m b l ~ : ~ ~  a o u n c i l ~ ~ ~  and 
five main Committees: the Maritime Safety Cornmittee bereinafter IMO MSC], the 
Z 5 7 ~ A ,  "Membership of the IAEA" On h e :  IAEA Web site; QQ://www.iaea.or~ / 
worldatom/elance/profile/ d e r . w >  (Date accessed: 5 July 1999). 
258~irnie and Boyle, supra note 97 at 354. 
259~onvention on the International Maritime Organization, 6 March 1948, entry into 
force 17 March 1958, IMO Doc, 023.82.08E; U.N.T.S. vol. 289, p.3. The IMO was then 
known as the Inter-Govermentai Maritime Consultative Organization. An amendment 
which changed the name of M C 0  to MO, became effective on 22 May 1982. 
ereinafter LMO Convention]. 
SS;fIbid. 
2611M~ FAQS, supra note 241. 
262~rticlel, IïMO Convention, supra note 259. 
2 6 3 ~ h e  M O  Assembly is composed of al1 Member States and meets once every two years 
in regular sessions. 
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Marine Environment Protection Committee [hereinafter IMO MEPC], Legal 
Committee, Technicd Co-operation Committee, and a Facilitation Committee. The two 
most important and most influential committees in the M O  are the M O  MSC and the 
IMO MEPC. These two committees derive their inauence and stature from their 
composition and the range and scope of their responsibilities. Both Committees are 
composed of ail Member States. The M O  MSC's nine (9) sub-~ommit tees~~~ deal with 
any matter within the scope of the IMO concernulg 
aids to navigation, constniction and equipment of vessels manning 
fkom a safety standpoint, rules for the prevention of collisions, handling of 
dangerous cargoes, maritime safety procedures and requirements, 
hydrographîc information, log-books and navigational records, marine 
casualty investigation, salvage and rescue, and any other matters directly 
ai3ecting maritime ~ a f e t y * ~ ~  
The IMO MEPC, on the other hand, has the responsibility to consider any matter within 
the scope of the IMO respecting the prevention and control of pollution fiom ships?' 
Although there are now 57 Member States to the MO, representing 98.59% of 
the world shipping tonnage,268 the IMO has limitations. It is not a .  executive body, and 
thus does not enforce any of the Conventions or regulations it develops. Its main role is to 
facilitate the negotiation of Conventions whose objectives are to ensure maritime 
264The IMO Council is composed of 40 member States elected by the Assembly for two- 
year tem. The Council is the executive organ of the MO.  
2651bid. The sub-committees are: Bulk Liquids and Gases (BLG), Carriage of Dangerous 
Goods, Solid Cargoes and Containers (DSC), Fire Protection (FP), Radiocommunications 
and Search and Rescue (COMSAR), Safety of Navigation (NAV), Ship Design and 
Equipment (DE), Stability and Load Lines and Fishing Vessels Safety (SLF), Standards 
of Training and Watchkeeping (STW), and Flag State Implementation (FSI). 
26%M~,  "IMO Structure", On line: IMO Web site m:/www. b o  .or&rno/&ructurr htm> 
(Date accessed: 10 August 1999). 
2671bid. 
2 6 8 ~ s  of 1 May 1999, On line: M O  web site ~~://www.imo.o~imo/convent/ 
s u m w >  (Date accessed: 3 June 1999). 
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~afety .~~'  International legislative work, however, is now focused on amendments, 
revision, and effective implementation since there now exists a significant number of 
agreements for maritime safety and prevention of pollution fiom 
IMO acts as the depositary and secretariat to several international Conventions. 
There are three general areas covered by these Conventions: maritime safety; marine 
environmental protection; and responsibility and Iiability arising from shipping 
activities."' The Contracting States to these Conventions are primarily responsible for 
implementing their obligations through their national laws. The IMO assists the 
Contracting Govemments to implement theu obligations through the committees and in 
particular, through the M O  FSL Some of the recent achievements of the IMO FSI are 
approval of a draft Code for the Investigation of Marine Casualties and ~ncidents,~'~ and
approval of a Flag State performance self-assessrnent f ~ r m . ~ ~ ~  
C. Collaboration efforts of the KEA and the IMO 
The IAEA and the IMO work together by virtue of a cooperation agreement. A 
year after the IAEA came up with the nrst version of the Safety Transport Regulation, it 
entered into a Cooperation Agreement with the IMO on 10 April 1 9 6 2 . ~ ~ ~  The 
p p  
269 Article 15u) of the M O  Convention, supra note 259. E. C. Henry, The Carriage of 
Dangerous Goodr by Sea The Role of the International Maritime Organization in 
International Legislarion, (New York: St .  Martin's Press, 1985), at 40. 
270 IMO FAQS, supra note 24 1 .  
2 7 1 ~ i d .  at 6 1. 
2 7 2 ~ ~ ~  FSI -sth session: 13-17 Januaryy 1997, On line: IMO Web s i t e  htt~://www.imo. 
ordmeetin~/fsi /~fsi3 .htm > (Date accessed: 10 August 1999). 
27'-ÏM0 FSI - 6* session:22-26 June 1998, On lhe: IMO Web site c hbp://www.imo.or/ 
~ / f s i / 6 / f S i o . h t m . > ;  IMO FSI - 7b session: 22-26 March 1999, On line: IMO Web 
site ~ ~ t t ~ : l l ~ \ ~ ~ ~ i ~ . 0 r ~ / f ~ i l 7 / f ~ i . h t m  > (Date accessed: 10 August 1999). 
274 Cooperation Agreement between L4E4 and uKO, 10 April 1962, IAEA INFCIRCI 
20lAdd. 1. 
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Cooperation Agreement provides for CO-operation and consultation between the two 
organizations in the attainment of their objectives, particularly concernuig matters of 
common i n t e r e ~ t . ~ ~ ~  It ais0 calls for reciprocal representation and participation without 
vote in meetings and work sessions of each ~ r ~ a n i z a t i o n ? ~ ~  Fuaher, the two 
organizations agreed to exchange information and documents and mdertake scientific 
and technical CO-operation activities."' 
The principal output of the collaboration between the IAEA and the M O  is the 
incorporation of the Safety Transport Regdations in the lMDG Code of the IMO. 
Another major output of their collaboration is the INF Code adopted by the M O  in 1993. 
Other organizations that also work with the IAEA and the IMO in establishing 
safety standards include the International Commission on Radiological Protection 
Fereinafter ICRP], the World He& Organization Pereinafter the WHO], the 
International Labour Organisation [hereinafter the IL01 and the GESAMP. 
III. The legal regime goveniing the international maritime transport of 
radioactive materials 
The legal regime for the international maritime trançpoa of radioactive matenals 
has seven (7) major areas: radiation protection, safety packaging requirernents, maritime 
safety requirements, safety navigation rules, pnor notification and consultation 
requirements, contingency and emergency measures, and liability system. 
2 7 5 ~ ~ ~ ~ ,  "The texts of the Agencies Relationship Agreements with Specialized 
Agencies," IAEA INFCIRC/20, On line: IAEA Web site <- 
worldatom~infcircs/inELO.~~ (Date accessed: 17 August 1999). 
276md. 
277fiid. 
A. Radiation protection 
The fundamental objective underlyhg the safe transport regulations is radiation 
protection. Requirements of al1 safety aspects of the transport of nuclear materials are 
designed to ensure protection fiom and containment of excessive or harmfül radiation 
exposure. 
1. Recommendatory documents for radiation safety 
a) From the International Commission on RadioIogicaI Protection 
Since radiation naturally occurs, the concept of permissible radiation levels 
without the attendant risks and injuries associated with excessive doses is an accepted 
practice in the international community. The international body tasked to set the 
permissïble levels of radiation exposure is the ICRP, a recommendatory group of experts 
According to the ICRP, safe radiation exposure must be in accordance with the 
fo Uowing princip les: 
a) no practice resulting in human exposure to radiation shall be 
authorized unless its introduction produces a positive net benefit, 
taking also into account the resulting radiation detriment (justification 
of the practice); 
b) al1 exposures should be kept as low as reasonable achievable 
(ALARA), economic and social factors being taken into account 
(optimization of radiation protection); 
278~he ICRP is a non-governmental organization of international experts. The members 
of ICRP are chosen primarily for their expertise regardless of citizenship. The mandate of 
the ICRP is to "provide advice on radiation protection, including specific 
recommendations and guidelines on the degrees of exposure to ionising radiation that will 
have deleterious effects." OECDMA, supra note 213 at 89. 
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c) the dose to individuals fkom all practices (except those specifically 
excluded) should not exceed the applicable dose limits (individual 
dose limitation) .27g 
These three principles are results of scientific tests over the years. In 1959, the 
scientific understanding about radiation exposure was that no bodily injury would occur 
even from lifelong exposure as  long as radiation exposure was within the safe l i m i t ~ ? ~ ~  
However, in 1977, based on the accumulating evidence of long-term harm and the 
relation of increased risk of cancer to the accumulated radiation does, the ICRP 
recommended that safe dose limits must be combined with the requirernent that radiation 
must be as low as reasonably a~hievable.~~' 
There are two groups of people protected fiom hannfiiI artificial radiation 
exposure: 
1) workers in any nuclear related activity such as transport of nuclear material; 
and 
2) the general public. 
Radiation exposure levels are different for workers in the nuclear industry and the 
general public. The permissible level for nuclear industry workers is generally 5 rems per 
year, with some qualifications and conditions. An individual fiom the general public is 
allowed one-tenth of the annual permissible rems of a w ~ r k e r ' s . ~ ~ ~  The reason for the 
- -- . - . - . .
27g~lBaradie, supra note 187 at 157. 
2801AE~, "International Radiation and Waste Safety Standards," On line: IAEA Web site 




difference is the availability of regular medical supe~s ion ,  mmnitoring and other 
safety seMces provided to nuclear industry worker~.'~~ 
The environment, per se, is not guaranteed separate protection fiorn excessive 
doses of artificial radioactivity. The ICRP and the IAEA postdate "that controlled 
deliberate releases of radionuclides into the environment that are  adequate for the 
protection of man will also ensure an adequate level of protection for the 
en~ironment."~" There is no scientific certainty that radiatiom protection for the 
individual is appropriate for the protection of the environment m d  its organisms. As 
observed in the 1990 GESAMP Study on the State of the Marine Environment, "[dloses 
to, and effects on, marine organisms or marine populations are much less well l r n~wn . "~*~  
b) From the IAEA in collaboration with lother international 
organizations 
In an effort to harmonise radiation safety standards, the IAEA, the WHO, the 
ILO, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/Nuclear Energy 
Agency [hereinafler OECD/NEA] collaborated and published the latest International 
Basic Safty Standards for Radiation Protection (Radiation S . t y  Standardr) in 1 994.286 
The new standards contain more cornprehensive and specific prmtection measures for 




285 GESAMP,  supra note 197 at 42. 
2 8 6 ~ ~ ~ A ,  "Radiation Safety, Excerpt £kom the IAEA Annual Report for 1994," On line: 
IAEA Web site < h û p : / / w w w . i a e a . o r g / w o r I d a t o m / i r i f o r e s o u ~ 4 l O . ~  > 
(Date accessed: 17 August 1999). 
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conditions.287 Prïor to the new Radiation Sa& Standardr, the recommendatory 
measures for accidental and chronic conditions were contained in separate documents.288 
Based on the Radiation Safety Standards, Section II (205) of the Safe Transport 
Regzdations provides that transport workers may receive the maximum dose level of 5 
mSv (500 mrem) per year, while the general public may receive a dose level of not more 
than 1 mSv (100 mrem) per year. Despite the higher ailowable radiation exposure to 
transport workers, this dosage is within the limits allowed under the Radiation Safety 
Standards and under the standards of the ICRP. 
2. Binding document for radiation safety 
The Convention Concerning the Protection of Workers Against Ionising 
Radiations [hereinafter Convention No. 1 1 5 1 ~ ~ ~  protects workers fiom exposure to 
ionising radiations in the course of their w~rk.~'O Article 5 of the Convention mandates 
the Contracting States to take every effort to restrict the exposure of workers to ionising 
radiation to the Zowest practicable levd and any uecessary exposure shall be avoided 
by al1 parties concemed. Different maximum pennissible doses of ionising radiation are 
- - - - 
2871bid. 
2 8 8 ~ h e  previous IAEA recommendatory document that provided guidelines in emergency 
or accidental situations was the Protection ftom Radiation Sources Not Under ConhoZ: 
Accidents. IAEA, Protection from Radiation Sources Not Under ConhoZr Accidents, 
IAEA Pre-publication document of Safety Series No. 72 Rev. 1, December 1992, 
r rinted in EiBaradie, supra note 187 at 438. 
2'Convention (No. I 1.S) Concernîng the Protection of Workers fiom Ionking Radiations, 
adopted by the General Conference of the IL0 at its 44h session, Geneva, 22 June 1960, 
entry into force, 17 June 1963, 42 U.N.T.S. 1962. For non-signatory States, the IL0 has 
also corne up with a Code of Practice on Radiation Protection of Workers (Ionising 
Radiation) at its 231'' Session in November 1985. This is a non-binding document but it 
serves to provide guidelines to States in their national legislation on radiation protection 
for workers. 
2901bid. Article 2.1, Convention No. 115. 
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allowed for various categories of workers2" and appropriate levels of radiation doses 
are permissible for non-workers who may be in the vicinity of the workplace, either 
passing or remaining therehzg2 
Since Convention No. 115 is a treaty of general nature, its implementation 
depends on the Contracting Parties following up with national laws or regulations or 
codes of practice or other appropriate rnean~.~'~ Within the radiation limits 
recommended under the Radiation Safety Standards, Contracting Parties have the 
discretion to determine the level and types of protection measures accorded to the 
workers from radiation e ~ ~ o s u r e ? ~  
In light of the higher radiation dosage allowed to workers, Convention No. I I  5 
mandates that workers must be adequately instructed before and during such employment 
in the precaution to be taken for the protection of their health and ~afe ty .~~ '  Further, 
r n ~ n i t o r i n ~ ~ ~ ~  medical e ~ a r n i n a t i o n ~ ~ ~  as well as emergency actions shall also be 
undertaken by Contracthg States should there be exposure to radiation.298 
However, though multilateral, Convention No. 115 o d y  has a iimited influence. 
Since its entry into force in 1962, only six (6) States have becorne Contrachg Parties. 
2911bid. Article 6, Convention No. 11.5. 
292fiid. Article 8,  Convention No.115. Contracting Parties are also required to place 
appropriate wamings to indicate presence of hazards f?om ionising radiation under 
Article 9.1. 
29316id. Article 1, Convention No. I I L  
294 Ibid. Article 3.1 of Convention No. 115, however, requires that such discretion must be 
exercised "In Light of knowledge available at the tirne." 
2951bid. Article 9.2, Convention No. 115. 
2961bid. Article 1 1 ,  Convention No. 115. 
2971bid. Article 12, Convention No. I I5. 
2981bid. Article 13, Convention No. 11.5. 
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They are Ghana, Iraq, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northem Ireland. 
B. Safety packaging requirements 
1. Status of IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive 
Materials 
There are no binding international instruments relating to packaging of nuclear 
matenals. The Regukztions for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material 1985 Edition 
Dereinafter S'fi Transport ~ e ~ u f a t i o n s ] ~ ~ ~  is a recommendatory document establishing 
packaging standards and requirements300 but serve as the basis of most national 
regulations for the safe transport of nuclear ~naterials.'~' 
The IAEA first came out with the Safe Transport Regulations in 196 1. Since then, 
these regulations have been continuously amended to incorporate new technology and 
new practices. Revisions were done in 1985 and subsequent amenciments were passed in 
2991AE~,  Regdatiom for the Safi Transpori of Radioactive Material 1985 Edition (As 
Arnended 1990) (Viema: IAEA, 1 990) [Hereinafter Safe Transport Regulations] . 
3001bid. See the Foreword to the Safety Standards Series No. ST-1. "The Regulations 
generally use the form 'shall' in making statements about requirements, duties and 
obligations. Use of the form 'should' is restricted to statements that are a desired option. 
Use of the f o m  'may' is lirnited to statements that are pursuant to an option provided . . by 
the Regulations." On line: IAEA Web site <b~://-.iaea.o@worI~m/ publications/ 
newreleas . h W >  (Date accessed: 17 August 1999). Return Shipment, 
su ra note 151. 
"&aragraph 51.2, LREQ Report to the UTV General Assembly, Forty-fourth Session, 6 
October 1989. U.N.G.A. Doc.:A/44/339/Add. 1 1 -El L989/ Add. 11. According to the 
IAEA Secretariat, 88% of 65 IAEA Member States that responded to a recent survey 
reported that they have legally binding regulations. applicable to the international 
transport of radioactive matenals. The IAEA Regulations serve as bases for these 
national regulations. IAEA Secretariat, "Report on Legally Binding and Non-Binding 
International Instruments and Regulations Conceming the Safe Transport of Radioactive 
Materials and their Implementation", 16 April 1998, IAEA GOV/1998/17, at 49. 
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1 9 9 0 . ~ ~ ~  The latest version of the Safi Transport Regdations series was approved by 
the MA'S Board of Govemors in September 1996 and published as Safety Standards 
Series No. ST-1 .303 However, the 1985 Safe Transport Regulations are still valid pending 
entry into force of the Sajëty Standards Series No. ST-I in the year 200 1 The LAEA is 
assisting the International Civil Aviation Organization, the IMO and the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council Coxnmittee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous 
Goods in their revisions to implement requirements for the safe transport of radioactive 
material based on the Safety Standards Series No. ST-1. Alf these organizations have 
planned for a uniforni date of entry into force by 1 January 2001.'~~ 
2. .Purpose and coverage 
The Safe Transport Regulatims are for establishing standards of safety to ensure 
"acceptable level of control of radiation hazards to persons, proper@, and the 
envir~nment"'~~ during transport, whether in normal or accidental conditions.307 Safety 
requirements are established in "the design, fabrication and maintenance of packaging, 
'02safe Transport Regulations, supra note 299. 
'03~afety Standards Series No. ST-1, supra note 300. The following are some of the 
major changes introduced in the Safety Standards Series No. ST-1: 1 )  incorporation of the 
basic safety standards for protection against ionising radiationpSS]; 2) new definition of 
radioactive material based on the BSS; 3) introduction of new package type C for air 
shipments of plutonium; 3) specific provisions for uranium hexafluonde because its 
physical and chernical toxicity safety are different than other radioactive rnaterials; and 4) 
new UN numbers to provide information about the radioactive materials which are not 
shown in the markings. There were no fundamental changes, such as the express 
articulation of precautionary principle and uitergenerational equity in the new 
regulations. B. Dodd and J. Mairs for the IAEA, "Training Manual Supplement in the 
Changes in the 1996 Edition of the IAEA Transport Safety Regulations", (Viema: M A ,  
21-25 April 1997). 
304fiid. 
305f 998 M A  Annual Report, supra note 230. 
3061MD~ Code, supra note 228. 
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and the preparation, consigning, handling, carriage, storage in transit and receipt at the 
final destination of packages. fi308 
Under the Safe Transport Regulations, transport includes al1 operaiions and 
conditions present in the caxriage of radioactive material other than that which is an 
integral part of the means or modes of transport.30g From the perspective of the nuclear 
legal regime, safe packaging is the most important consideration in the transport of 
radioactive materials. The Safe Transport Regulations thus apply to any mode of 
transport, whether on land, water, or in the air. The Safe Transport Regulations senes, 
however, do provide for additional requirements that are peculiar to a particular mode of 
transport, such as by vessels, by rail and by road, by air, and by p ~ s t . ~ ' ~  
3. Requirements for d e  packaging 
Under the Safe Transport Regulations, four basic objectives must be met to 
achieve quality in the design, manufacture, testing, documentation, use, maintenance and 
inspection of al1 packages, includuig in-transit storage ope ration^."^ 
(a) Effective containment of radioactive material; 
(b) Effective control of radiation emitted fiom the package; 
(c) A subcritical condition for any fissile materiai; and; 
(d) Adequate dissipation of any heat generated within the package. 
307~ection 1 (103) of the Safi Transport Regulations. supra note 299. 
308md. 
30glbid. Section 1 (102). 
310 M A ,  Advisos> Material for the L4EA Replations for the Safe Transport of 
Radioactive Matenals (1985 Edition) Third Edition (as Amended 1990), (LAEA, Vienna: 
1 990) at 44-46. [Hereinaiter Advisory Material]. 
section II (209) of the Safe Transport Regulations, supra note 299 at 15. 
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The test formula used in the selection of package materials is that which "will 
not yield under the range of loads expected in normal handling, yet should yieid under 
severe overloads without aEecting the safety of the ~ ~ s t e r n . " ~ ~ ~  Thus, in determining the 
appropriateness of the packaging of nuclear shipment, two types of assessments are 
conducted. The first is on the material to be shipped and the second is on the package to 
be used. Actual tests are not required on the radioactive material for reasons of safety. 
Dernonstration compliance procedures on packages are conducted in assessing their 
appropriateness and soundness. The means of assessing the appropriateness of packaging 
is through demonstration or full-scale tests on sampie packages. Compliance does not 
necessarily mean that full-scale tests are conducted on d l  packages used in the actual 
~ h i ~ m e n t ? ' ~  Full scale, simulation tests are conducted on packages representative of the 
relevant physical characteristics of actual packages.)14 
Cost is a legitirnate factor in determining the safety of the package rnateria~.~'~ 
However, the Safe Tramport Regulntions recommend that cost should not compromise 
the effectiveness of features that are necessary for compliance of other safety 
requirements. l6 
The factors that must be taken into consideration in determining whether 
packaging of nuclear materials comply with the standards set by lAEA are as follows: 
-- -- 
3121bid. Paragraph A-506.1 at 5 1. 
3L31bid. Paragraph A-601 -2 at 75. 
314fiid. Paragraph A-601.3 at 75. 
'''fiid. Paragraph A-508.2 at 52. "Mesures to comply ... need not ùivolve undue or 
unreasonable expense. For example, the choice of materials and methods of construction 
for any given packaging should be guided by commonly accepted good engineering 
practice for that type of packaging ... and need not invoke extravagantly expensive 
measures." 
I6lbid. Paragrap h A-508.1. 
Appropriate and sound packages are ~ s e d ; ~ ' ~  
The activity of radioactive material in each package does not 
exceed the regulatory activity limit for that material and that 
package type; 
The radiation levels extemal to, and the contamination levels on, 
surfaces of packages do not exceed the appropriate ~ i m i t s ; ~ ' ~  
Packages are properly marked319 and labelled320 and transport 
documents are ~om~le t ed ; '~ '  
The number of packages containing radioactive materials in a 
conveyance is withùi regulatory limit~;'*~ 
Packages of radioactive material are stowed in conveyances and 
are stored at a safe distance fiom persons and photosensitive 
rnateriai~?~ 
Transport and lifting devices which have been tested are used in 
loading, conveying, and unloading packages of radioactive 
material; and 
Packages of radioactive material are properly secured for transport. 
"71bid. A certificate of approval is issued by the competent regulatory body to certim that 
the design of an individual package meets regulatory requirements, Section IV. 
318~uring transit, one of the control measures adopted is inspection by a qualified person 
in assessing the integrity of the package and check for any leakage and other radiological 
implications, M A  Advisory, supra no te 3 10 at 28. 
31glbid. at 35. Markings on packages containing nuclear materials must be in bold print, 
of sufficient size, durable quality ink and sensible location. 
3201bid. at 37. The radionuclides present in the package must be labelled in order that 
radioactivity can be propedy identified. 
3211bid. at 38. The consigner has the responsibility of ensuring that al1 transport 
documents are in order. 
3 2 2 ~ h e  Safi Trnnsport Regdations, supra note 299, allow a surface radiation level 
exceeding 200 mRem/h oniy under additional requirements if shipped in a regular cargo 
vessel. Hence, the number of packages may be restricted to a maximum of "200 mRh, or 
about 100 times the dose permitted for workers in the nuclear energy field" is the general 
allowab le radiation dosage for nuclear shipments in regular cargo ships. 
323~egregation is important to enforce radiation protection measures. Segregation 
measures has two main aspects: distance between packages and distance of the entire 
shipment of nuclear materials fkom the workers assigned to it, IAEA Advisov, supra note 
310 at 39. 
4. Statistics regarding effectiveness of packaging of radioactive materials 
The IAEA has not been able to assess the sufficiency of its packaging 
requirements on a worldwide scale. In 1980, the IAEA Standing Advisory Group on the 
Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials (SAGSTRAM)'~~ attempted to conduct an 
empincal assessrnent on the adequacy of the safety requirements for the safe transport of 
nuclear mate rial^.^" The data collection was a failure. The data supplied by States were 
either incomplete or insufficient, and were thus inacc~ra te?~~  To this date, the IAEA has 
324 The SAGSTRAM is now the Transport Safkty Standards Advisory Cornmittee 
(TRANSSAC). The Transport Safety Standards Advisory Cornmittee (TRANSSAC) is a 
standing body of senior regdatory officiais with technical expertise in safety in the 
transport of radioactive materials TRANSSAC provides advice to the Secretariat on the 
overali transport safety programme and has the primary role in the development and 
revision of the Agency's transport safety standards. 
The functions of TRANSSAC are: 
to recommend the terms of reference of al1 documents in the Agency's programme 
for safety standards for radioactive materials transport and supporting programme 
and of the groups Ïnvolved in the development and revision of those documents in 
order to promote coherence and consistency among the documents and between 
them and the other Agency Safety Series documents; 
to agree on the texts both of Requirements to be submitted to the Board of 
Govemors for approval and of Guides to be issued under the responsibility of the 
Director General and to make recommendations to the ACSS, in accordance with 
the Agency's safety standards preparation and review process; 
to provide advice and guidance on a continuous progamme for reviewing and 
revising the Agency's safety standards for radioactive materials transport and 
supporting documents; 
to provide advice and guidance on safety standards for radioactive materials 
transport, relevant regulatory issues, and activities for supporting the worldwide 
application of the transport safety standards; 
to identiQ and advise on any necessary activities in support of the transport safety 
programme. 
3 2 5 ~ . ~ .   oie and I.D. McClure, "Estimated Annual Worldwide S hipments of Radioactive 
Material" (Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Materials, PATRAM '8 6 
Symposium), Davos, 16-20 June 1986, Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive 
Materials, Proceedings of a Symposium, Vol. 1 (Viema: IAEA, 1987) at 459. 
326L5id at 461 to 468. 
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been unable to coLlect data on the worldwide volume of trafnc of ail types of 
radioactive matenals. 327 Individual nuc lear energy generahg countries, however, such 
as Canada, report a safe record in the transportation of nuclear materials for the year 
1997.)~~ 
France, Germany and Switzerland reported problems of radioactive leakage 
during transport of nuclear materials within their territones in 1998. The transport of 
spent nuclear fuel in these three States was suspended pending inspections. The 
investigation concluded that for a number of years a high percentage of the flasks and 
wagons arriving fiom the reprocessing plant at La Hague had radioactivity levels that 
exceeded that specified in the IAEA's Safe Transport Replations and the national 
regdations of the corntries c ~ n c e r n e d . ~ ~ ~  France resumed transport of vent fuel in July 
1 998 following implementation of safety rneas~ues."~ But Gemany and Switzerland had 
not resumed transport at the end of 1998.~~'  
C. Maritime safety requirements 
Safety of cargo and safety of life are the principal objectives of maritime safety 
regime. The carriage of dangerous goods is therefore regulated by the maritime safety 
legal regime because the nature and charactenstics of the cargo on board affect the over- 
al1 safety of the carriage. This section will discuss the requirements for seaworthiness of 
3 27 Email communication with Maria Theresa Brittinger of the Radiation Safety Division 
of the IAEA, dated 13 July 1999. 
328 Canada AECB, Annual Report for 1998, On line: AECB Web site <Mtp://aecd.cab 
(Date accessed: 15 July 1999). 




vcessels, the classification of radioactive materials, and the parhcular safety 
requirements for the seaworthiness of vessels carrying irradiated nuclear materials. 
1. Ensuring seaworthy vessels 
A vesse1 is seaworthy when it is "fit for the service for which it is i~~tended."'~~ 
Vader SOUS, Contracting States have the obligation to ensure that a ship is seaworthy to 
ensure safety of life at sea and securïty of cargo on board. Under the LOSC, 
seaworthiness is a positive obligation of States as a consequence of their rights and 
obligations concerning protection measures against marine Seaworthiness of 
vessels is achieved by providing for adequate standards for the construction of ships,334 
fixe-safety rneas~res,)~' and life-saving appliances.336 
Flag States are the entities principally obliged to ensure the seaworthiness of 
vessels through investigations and surveys of vessels mder their national regisûy. At the 
end of investigation and survey, the Flag States issue the documents c e r t i w g  the 
seaworthiness of vesse1~~~' and "guarantees the completeness and efficiency of the 
inspection and ~ u r v e ~ . " ~ ~ ~  In 1988, a unined system of sweys and certification with two 
otther Conventions, the International Convention on Load Lines, 1966 and hdXWOL 
3 3 ' 2 ~ r t i ~ l e  1 SOLAS, supra note 227. 
3 3 ' 3 ~ r t i ~ l e  219 LOSC, supra note 135. 
3 3-4 Chapter II-1, Annex of SOLAS, supra note 227. 
33-S~id.  Chapter 11-2, Annex of SOLAS. 
'%id. Chapter III, AMex of SOLAS. 
33'71bid. Regulation 6 Part B, Chapter 1 of the Annex of SOLAS. 
33i8Zbid. Regulation 6 Part B Chapter 2 of the Annex of SOLAS. 
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73/78'39 was established to facilitate easier cornpliance by owners of vessels. The 
unified system is set to enter into force on 3 February 2000.'~~ 
Port States under Article 219 of the LOSC also have the authority to determine the 
seaworthiness of vessels visiting their ports or off-shore ternilnals. The main purpose for 
authorizing port States is to prevent marine pollution. Port States may prevent the vessel 
fiom sailing or may permit the vessel to proceed only to the nearest appropriate repair 
yard and, upon removal of the causes of the violation, shall permit the vessel to continue 
its voyage i~nmediate l~.~~ '  Coastal States whose temtorial waters rnay be used by vessels 
carrying nuclear materials and radioactive waste do not have the authority to determine 
the seaworttiiness of the vessel, unless the vessel anchors or stops at ports or off-shore 
terminal within their jurisdiction or control. 
2. Classification of radioactive materials for maritime transport 
The IMO estimates that more than 50% of packaged goods transported by sea are 
dangerous, hazardous or toxic substances nom the human safety point of view and 
harmful to the marine environment.'" One of these dangerous substances is radioactive 
material. Maritime safety law regulates the carnage of dangerous substances because it 
affects safety of Life at sea, safety of the cargo, and safety of the carriage as a whole. 
3 3 9 ~ h e  1988 Protocol to SOLAS, adopted 11 November 1988, entry into force 11 
November 1988. 
3400n line: IMO Web sit* ~: / /www.iaea.or~/convent /e i fdates .~  > (Date accessed: 
10 August 1999). 
341 fiid. 
342 IMO, "Mû and dangerous .. goods . at sea," January 1996, On line: MO'S website 
~hhtto: / /www. imo.or~/ focus /asc~~/~ . tx~  - (Date accessed: 17 July 1999). MO,  "The 
Safe Transport of Dangerous, Hazardous or Harmfil Cargoes by Se%'' IMO Information 
Paper, Y3737, May 1988, extract reprinted in UNIFO, Annual Review of Ocean Affuirs: 
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Chapter W of the SOLAS prohibits the camiage of any dangerous materials 
except in accordance with the lawa3" Radioactive materials are dangerous for purposes of 
maritime shipment because of possible emission of radiation that poses danger to the 
human healt l~. '~~ SOLAS does not provide for detailed requirernents in the carriage of 
dangerous goods. What it establishes are standards and general principles in the 
following areas: packing (Regulation 3), marking and labelling megulation 4), 
documents (Regulation 9, and stowage requirernents (Regulation 6).)" 
The details regarding the regdation of dangerous goods are contained in the 
IMDG MA'S Safi Transport of Regtrlatiom are integrated in the IMDG Code 
in the section on radioactive matenals to guide "ship-owners and to those handling 
packages in ports and on board ships without necessarily consulting the LAEA 
~e~u la t ions . "~~ '  Although the IMDG Code itself is not a binding document, practically 
98% of the world tonnage observes its standards because it is a complementary document 
to the SOLAS. 348 
Radioactive materials are classified as Class 7 materials in the IMDG Code. Any 
rnatenal with a specific activity greater than 0.0002 microcurie per gramme is declared 
radioactive material and will be regulated under Class 7 regulations. Radioactive 
Law and PoZicy, Main Documents 1988 V o h e  ID, (Florida: UNlFO Publishers, Inc., 
1990) at 1159. 
'"~here are nine categories of dangerous goods under Regulation 2 Chapter W SOLAS, 
supra note 217. Radioactive substances are classined as Class 7 in Regulation 2 of 
Chapter ViI of SOUS, supra note 227. 
344 Section 1.2.1, Class 7 of the IMDG Code, at 7005, supra note 228. 
345~hapter W of the SOLAS, supra note 227. 
"'IMDG Code, supra note 228. 
3471bid. Section 1.1.2 Class 7, IMDG Code, at 7005. 
348 IMO, "The Safe Transport of Dangerous, Hazardous or Hannful Cargoes by Sea," 
supra note 342. 
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materials with lower specific activity will be exempt under Class 7 regulations but may 
still be subjected to regulations under another clasç of dangerous goods.349 
The IMDG Code, which undergoes revisions and up-dates every two years,350 
provides for packaging standards, contamination, stowage and segregation requirements, 
labelling and marking, and proper documentation. Packaging is designed to achieve the 
following objectives: retain the materid, serve as a shield to reduce radiation to an 
acceptable level, prevent criticality and promote heat dispersion.3s' In addition to the 
requirements of packaging under Class 7 reguiations, fissile matenals must be packed 
and shipped in a manner that criticality will be avoided under any foreseeable 
circumstances. 
Proper documentation is required for the shipment of radioactive materials. The 
particulars of the radioactive materials must be declared in the transport document3" and 
the certificates of approval of al1 competent authorities must accompany the shipment. 
Certincates of approval are needed particularly in the package design.3s3 Prior to thefirst 
shipment of any package that requires approval by a competent authority, copies of al1 
certificates of approval of the packaging must be subrnitted to the competent authority of 
each country tbrough or into which the nuclear material is to be carried.)" 
349~ection 1.2.2 Class 7, IMDG Code at 7005, supra note 228. 
3500n line: IMO Web site c h t t p : / / w n v _ , i n i o . o ~ ~  (Date accessed: 10 July 
1999). The section on radioactive materials in the IMDG Code is being revised because 
of the 1996 Safety Regdations S P I .  The date of entry into force is on January 200 1. On 
Iine: IAEA Web site <http://www.iae > (Date accessed: 30 July 1999). 
3S1~ection 1.3.1 Class 7 IMDG Code %O6, supra note 228. 
352fiid. Section 9.1.1 Class 7 IMDG Code at 7028. 
3531bid. Section 9.3.1 Class 7 IMDG Code at 7029. 
354fiid. Section 9.5 Class 7 IMDG Code at 7030. 
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3. Seaworthiness of vessels carrying irradiated nuclear materials, spent fuel 
and high-Ievel radioactive wastes 
The international furor over the international shipments of plutonium compelled 
the LAEA to establish the JWG to undertake a scientifïcally and technically based 
assessrnent of sea transportation of radioactive mate rial^.^'^ The JWG constituted of the 
M A ,  the IMO, and the United Nations Environment Programme [hereinafter UNEP]. 
The M G  held sessions in Vienna fiom 26-30 Apnl 1993 which was attended and 
participated by representatives fkom 28 countnes, the UNEP, IMO, M A ,  and the 
Commission of the European Communities, as weli as observers fkom Greenpeace 
After gathering data and hearing testirnonies fkom various sectors concemed in 
the maritime shipment of radioactive materials, particularly spent and recycled nuclear 
fuel, the JWG concluded that 
(a)ll availabfe information demonstrates very low levels of 
radiological risk and environmental consequences fiom the marine 
transport of radioactive material ..At was the unanimous condusion of 
Member States that there was no information or data . . .that would cast 
doubt on the adequacy of IAEA ~egulations.~~' 
Nevertheless, the JWG deemed it necessary to draft the INF The INF 
Code is the first integrated code of practice regarding modal and non-modal requirernents 
for the safe maritime caniage of INF rnaterial~.'~~ It sets standards for the design and 
3 55 Joint IAEA/IMO Working Group on the Safe Camiage of Irradiated Nuclear Fuel by 




3581NF Codey supra note 166. 
3591bid. Oceam PoliCy News, Volume XI, Number 1 - March 1994; <hîip:ll 
www.clark.net/ p u b / d i p l o n & ~ g ~ 0 3 9 4 . h ~ 9 ~  (Date accessed: 13 July 1999). 
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construction of ships carrying the following radioactive rnaterials: irradiated nuclear 
fuel, plutonium, and high-level radioactive  ast tes.^^' Al1 ships, new and existing, 
regardless of size, including cargo ships of less than 500 tons tonnage, engaged in the 
carriage of irradiated nuclear fuel, plutonium and high-level radioactive wastes in flask 
are covered by this The I N F  Code also prescnbes mies and standards on the 
following areas: damage stability, f i e  protection, temperature control of cargo spaces, 
structural considerations, cargo securing arrangements, eIectrical supplies, radiological 
protection equipment and management, training and shipboard emergency planning.362 
INF materials are classified into three - INF 1, N F  2, and iNF 3. The 
classification depends on the total radioactive quantity of the INF material carried on 
board a vessel. INF 1 and INF 2 cargoes may be carried on board passenger ships in 
accordance with Chapter 1, part A, regulation 2(f) of SOL AS.'^^ As for INF 3, there is no 
restriction on the aggregate radioactive quantity, thus, it rnay only be carried in cargo 
vessels with specific technical requirements under the u ode.^" 
The INF Code has been criticized for not providing a comprehensive set of 
measures that can regulate the carriage by sea of INF materials. Considering that the 
JWG was constituted of several organizations, a more comprehensive code could have 
3601bid. Paragraph 2 INF Code defines the following materials: irradiated nuclear fuel 
material refers to material containing uranium, thorium andor plutonium isotopes which 
has been used to maintain a self-sustaining nuclear chah reaction; plutonium is the 
resultant mixture of isotopes of that material extracted fkom irradiated nuclear fuel fkom 
reprocessing; and high-level radioactive wastes are liquid wastes resulting fiom the 
operation of the first stage extraction system or the concentrated wastes fiom subsequent 
extraction stages, in a facility for reprocessing irradiated nuclear fuel, or solids into which 
such liquid wastes have been converted, supra note 166. 
3611bid. Paragraphs 1 and 2, INF Code. 
362fiid. Table 1 and paragraphs 7 to 25 of the INF Code. 
3631bid. Paragraph 3 and Table 2 of the INF Code. 
1 
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been drafted and adopted. The INF Code, in its original version, did not establish new 
standards and requirements and in fact re ferred to the existing applicable regulations of 
the M A  and MO: IAEA's Safe Transport Regulations, the IMDG Code for class 7 
materials and SOLAS, as amended, for ships regulated under this Convention. Nor was 
there any provision for environmental impact assessrnent procedures prior to any 
international shipment. As well, lacking in the INF Code was a procedure wherein all 
potentiaily aEected entities, other than the States of origin and destination, can participate 
in the decision-making processes such as prior notice and consultation. 
Since its adoption in 1993, however, various cornmittees of the MO, with the 
participation of the IAEA, have subjected the INF Code to several reviews in accordance 
with M O  Resolution A.748(18). Part B of this Resolution mandates the M O  MSC and 
the IMO MEPC, in consultation with the IAEA to: 
a) keep the INF Code under regular review and to amend it, as necessary, 
and; 
b) consider, as a matter of high prionty, relevant aspects of the transport 
of irradiated nuclear £bel and other nuclear matenal which are 
complementary to the INF Code, taking into account the 
recommendations of the Joint IAEA/iMO/LTNEP Working Group and 
the objectives of Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 of the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and DeveIopment (UXCED). 
For example, during its 41'' meeting, the M O  MEPC discussed a proposd that 
there should be a specific requirernent in the INF Code for a shore-based emergency 
response plan, but agreed there was no such need at this tirne. There are already 
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requirements under SOLAS, in the International Safety Management Code, for a 
shipo-er or operator to establish emergency response 365 
The M O  MEPC also discussed the issue of prior notification for ships carrying 
substances covered by the INF Code. Some delegations supported the idea of prior 
notification, while others expressed concern that it may lead to some coastal states 
vetoing the passage of INF cargoes or interference by terrorists. No agreement was 
reached regarding the issue other than it should remain on the agenda for fiirther 
discussion.366 
Positive developments resulted fiom the reviews of the INF Code. The IMO in 
Resolution A.853(20) decided to adopt the guidelines for developing shipboard 
emergency plans for ships carrying materials subject to the INF The purpose of 
the guidelines is to assist shipswners involved with INF materials in preparing 
cornprehensive Shipboard Emergency Plans and providing information to authonties 
involved in case of incidents. The shipboard emergency should include the following: 
procedure to be followed in reporting an incident involving INF Code 
materials; 
List of authorities or persons to be contacted in the event of an incident; 
description of action to be taken immediately to prevent, reduce or control 
the release of INF Code materials; and 
3651M0 MEPC - 41st session: 30 March - 3 Apnl 1998 On line: M O  Web site 
~htt~://www.imo.org&no/meeti~/mepc/41 d l  .hm> (1 O June 1999). 
' 66&d. 
367~mendments o the Code for the Safe Carriage of Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, Plutonium 
and High-Level Radioactive Wastes in Flasks on Board Ships and Adoption of 
Guidelines for Developing Shipboard Emergency Plans for Ships Carrying Materials 
Subject to the INF Code, IMO Resolution A.853(20), On line: M O  Web site 
~ h t t ~ : / / w w w . i r n o . o ~ b 1 ~ / 8  53 854.h.Qp (Date accessed: 15 July 1999). 
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procedures and points of contact on the ship for CO-ordùiating section with 
local and national authorities. 
The INF Code amendment also covers notification of an incident hvolving INF 
Code materials. The amendments mandate that the reporthg requirements for incidents 
involving dangerous goods, as covered by SOLAS Regdation W 7 - 1 ,  should apply both 
to the loss or likely loss of IMF Code cargo overboard and to any incident involving 
release or probable release of INF Code material. A report should also be made in the 
event of damage, failure or breakdown of a ship carrying INF Code materials. 
The most encouraging development is the move to make the INF Code mandatory 
through the SOLAS. The draft amendments to SOLAS Chapter VI1 to make the INF Code 
mandatory are under review in the MSC and the MEPC. The concept of pnor 
notification to Coastal States is not included in the proposed mandatory INF 
D, Safety in Navigation 
Harmonized d e s  on navigation are extrernely important for international shipping 
because they reduce collisions. In recent years, navigation rules have also been utilized to 
protect the marine environment. 
Safety in navigation are provided under various conventions: SOLAS and the 
Convention on the htemational Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea [hereinafier 
COLREG] .370 
3681M0 EPC - 41st session, supra note 365. 
369md. 
370~onvention on the International Regdations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 20 
October 1972, entry into force 15 July 1977, U.K.T.S. 77 (1977). 
The rules on safety of navigation under S O U S  apply to all ships and ail types of 
voyages, international or d o r n e ~ t i c . ~ ~ ~  Safe navigation involves rules on danger 
messages,372 meteoroIogicai ser~ices,"~ ice patrol services,374 routeing provisions,375 
distress ~ i ~ n a l s , ' ~ ~  signalling lamps,gn navigational equipments,378 and aids to 
navigation.379 
The May 1994 Amendments of SOLAS 1974,'~~ added regulation 8-1 which 
mandates the use of standard ship reporting systems in areas covered by the ship 
reporting system. To date, there are five mandatory ship reportïng systems in operation: 
off Ushant (at the western entrance to the English Channel), in the Torres Strait region 
and the Inner Route of the Great Barrier Reef (Australia), in the Great Bett Trafic Area, 
in the Strait of Gibraltar, and off Finisterre S pain).^^' 
States in favor of the international shipments of radioactive materials assert that 
the mandatory ship reporting system satisfies the requirement of iriformation to Coastal 
 tat tes.^^^ The ship reporting system requires that reports be made about the basic 
371~egulation 1 Chapter V of Annex, SOLAS. supra note 227. 
3721bid. Regulations 2 and 3 of Chapter V, Amex of SOLAS. 
3731bid. Regulation 4 Chapter V, Annex of SOUS. 
3741bid. Regulations 5,6 and 7 Chapter V, Annex of SOLAS. 
37Slbid. Regulation 8,  Chapter V, A ~ e x  of SOLAS. 
3761bid. Regulations 9 and 10, Chapter V, Annex of SOLAS. 
377~id .  Regulation 11, Chapter V, h e x  of SOLAS. 
378~bid. Regulation 12, Chapter V, Amex of SOLAS. 
379~id.  Regulation 14, Chapter V, Annex of SOLAS. 
38%ay 1994 Amendments to SOLAS, supra note 227. 
"'MO, " Safety of Navigation" On h e :  IMO Web site ~:/ /www.imo.or~focus/  
safhav/safcontLh~ > and c h ~ : / / w w w . ~ o O o r ~ f o c u s /  safimv/smv7.htni> @ate 
accessed: 27 July 1999). pereînafier Safety of Navigation]. 
3821bid. . 
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information conceming the ship such as its name, its position and other information 
affecting navigation and marine po11ution.383 
2. COLREGS 
The COLREGS is the latest amendment of previous conventions deafling with 
collisions at COLREGs is applicable to aii vessels of contracting States traversing 
the high seas and in all waters connected with them provided they are navZgable by 
seagoing v e s ~ e l s . ~ ~ ~  There are no tonnage requirements in the COLREGs. Any vessel of 
a Contracthg State that carries nuclear materials and radioactive wastes muçt cornply 
with the provisions in the COLREGs. 
The COLREGs lays down ales on the conduct of any vessel in any condition of 
visibility?" its proper ~ ~ e e c i , ' ~ ~  when the risk of collision e ~ i s t s ; ~ ~  and actions to avoid 
collision.'89 The most relevant provision of the COLREGS is Rule 10 that establishes the 
t r a c  scheme. Under Rule 10 vessels must use the appropriate t r a c  lane in t h e  general 
direction of traffic flow for that lane, keeping clear nom the traffic separatian line or 
zone. Crossing traffic lanes is to be avoided whenever practicable. When unarvoidable, 
crossing trafnc lanes is required to be accomplished at right angles towards t k e  general 
traffic flow. 
" fiid. 
384~arlier Conventions that adopted d e s  for preventing collisions at sea hclude the 1889 
International Maritime Conference and the1929 SOLAS Confernce. On line: IMO Web 
site ~ h t t p : l / w w w ~ o .  rdfoc-nav3.w > (Date accessed: 27 July 1999). 
38S~art A Rule 1 (a), COLREGs, supra note 370. 
386fiid. Part B Section 1, COLREGs. 
387~id .  Rule 6, COLREGs. 
3881bid. Rule 7 ,  COLREGs. 
38916id. Rule 8 ,  COLREGs. 
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Complementary to the M c  separation system is the vessel traffic service 
[hereinafter VTS]. The VTS has been adopted by the IMO MSC as a new regulation, 8-2 
to Chapter V (Safety of Navigation) of S O U S  1974.~~ The aim of the VTS is to improve 
the efficiency and safety of vessel traffic with services such as simple information 
services to position of other t r a c  or meteorological hazard wamings and extensive 
management of traffic within a port or ~ a t e n v a ~ ? ~ '  The vessel trafnc s e ~ c e  provides 
the following advantages: 
(1) Identification and monitoring of vessels; 
(2) S trategic planning of vessel movements; 
(3) Provision of navigational information and assistance; and 
(4) Assistance in the prevention of pollution and coordination response to 
pollution incidents?92 
The reduction of collisions in recent years has been attributed to the traffic 
scheme. From 0.40% in 1991, the figure decreased to 0.13% of the total worid tonnage in 
1 9 9 6 . ~ ~ ~  Over 100 routeing schemes have already been established and cornpliance of 
these schemes is mandatory for vessels of Contracting Parties to the COLREGS.~~~ 
Commercial s hips carrying nuclear mat erials and radioactive waste that are registered 
3go~endmen t ,  adopted in Iune 1997, entry into force 1 July 1999. 
39'~afety of Navigation, supra note 38 1. 
392~aragraph 201, Oceons and Law of the Sea Report of the Secretmy-Generd, 5 October 
1998, Fifty-third session, Agenda item 38(a), U.N.G.A. Doc.: N53/456; On line: UN 
Web site <IiftD://www.un.orelsearw (Date accessed: 28 July 1999). [Hereinafter 1998 
Law of the Sea Report of the Secretary-General] . 
3931M~, f l M O ~  5orn anniversary: a record of success," On line: IMO Web site . . 
~ h t t ~ : / / u r u r ~ . i ~ . o r ~ / 5 0 a ~ t 3  .hm> (Date accessed: 10 July 1999). 
394LGd. 
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with a State party to the COLREGs, and to the ~ 0 . s ; ~ ~  are obligated to comply with 
MO-approved traffic schemes established by Coastal States. 
Trafltic schemes have also been utilized to protect particularly sensitive marine 
areas that would otherwise be used as regular sea lanes. IMO traffic scherne guidelines396 
allow States to designate a particularly sensitive sea area mereinafter PSSA] following on 
a number of criteria, including: ecological criteria, such as unique or rare ecosystem, 
diversity of the ecosystem, or vulnerability to degradation by natural events or human 
activities; social, cultural and economic criteria, such as significance of the area for 
recreation or touriçm; and scientific and educational critena, such as biological research 
or historical value3" One of the consequences if an area is declared a PSSA is the 
adoption of specific measures to control the activities in that area including "routeing 
measures; strict application of MARPOL discharge and equipment requirements for 
ships, such as oïl tankers; and installation of vesse1 traffic services (VTS)."~'~ TO date, 
there are only two designated PSSAs: the Great Barrier Reef, in Australia and the 
S abana-Camaguey ArchipeIago in The latter PSSA was designated in S eptember 
1997.400 The existing PSSA guidelines have been cnticized as too cumber~ome.~~' This 
rnay account for the paucity of nominated or declared PSSA' s .~~~  In response, the IMO 
- 
395~egulation 8 Chapter V of the SOLAS on Safety of Navigation also provides for ship 
routeing schemes that rnay be followed by Contracting Parties, supra note 227. 
'961M0 MEPC Resolution A.720(17). 







MEPC in its 4lSt Session on 30 March to Apnl 1998 agreed to review guidelines on 
designating a PSSA. 
Whether a PSSA can be declared for purposes of preventing potential radioactive 
contamination fiom the maritime carriage of nuclear materials and radioactive wastes 
remains to be seen. The M O  MEPC and the M O  Sub-cornmittee on Safety on 
Navigation [hereinafter M O  NAV considered this issue in 1996.~" Delegates present in 
those meetings decided that the issue should be decided on a case by case bais. 
Nevertheless, this is one of the options that coastal States may consider in order to protect 
their environment, paaicularly sensitive areas, fiom possible radioactive contamination. 
E. Measures against acts threatening the safety and security of carriage of 
radioactive materials at sea 
Both the nuclear legal regime and the maritime safety legal regime have 
conventions to manage and suppress acts that threaten the safety and security of the 
carriage of radioactive matenal. Securïv of the radioactive material while on transport is 
very important and is intimately woven to the safety aspect of the regime. Any act of 
violence or crime against the matenal is Likely to increase the nsks of radiation exposure, 
make maritime navigation unsafe and ultirnately, lower the commercial viability and 
pro fitability of shipping. 
The nuclear legd regime provides for the physical protection measures in the 
international carriage of radio active materials in two agreements: s afeguards 
agreement(s); and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, if the 
transfer involves Contracting Parties. The maritime safety legal regime has the 
4031M0 NAV 42m.7/Add.2 (18 July 1996) and IMO MEPC 38AW.9 (9 July 1996). 
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Convention for the Suppression of Uninlnwfirl Acts Against the Safety of Manlime 
Navigation as weli as some recommendatory guideluies to manage acts of violence at sea 
that threaten the safety of navigation. 
1. The safeguards system - as it applies to transport of nuclear 
materials 
The safeguards system was established to ensure that the implementation of the 
peacefbl uses of nuclear energy is not compromised by proliferation risks? Since its 
primary objective is to secure the nuclear material in al1 stages of the nuclear cycle, the 
safeguards system also govem the transport of nuclear materials. 
The safeguards system is administered under the auspices of the IAEA in 
accordance with its mandate "accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to 
peace, health and prosperity throughout the world" provided the same is not used to 
further any military pqose.40s Particular safeguards agreements between States and the 
IAEA derive their status and a~thority Eom several Conventions whose main objective is 
the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: Treaty for the f rohibition of Nuclear Weapons 
in Latin Amenka and the Carribean [hereinafter ~uteitolco ~ r e a t y ] , ~ ' ~  the Afncan 
Nuclear Weapon Free T m t y  [hereinafter Pelindaba ~ r e a t y ] , ~ ~ '  and the NPT. 
4 0 4 ~ ~ t  see Bimie and Boyle supra note 97 at 262-3. 
40s~rticle II of the L4EA Statute, supra note 250. 
406~reatyfor the Prohibition of Nudear Weapons in Latin Arnerica and the Carïbbean, 
[hereinafter ï7ateZtolco Treaty], adoptedl4 February 1967, entry into force 22 April 1968, 
634 U.N.T.S. , No. 9068. On 3 July 1990, the word "Caribbean" was officially added to 
the name of the treaty in resolution 267 (E-V), in conformity with Article 7 of the Treaty. 
407~fncan NucZear Wenpon Free Treaty [hereuiafter Pelindaba Treaty], adopted 11 April 
1996, M A  INFCIRC/S 12. 
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The M A  £kt established the safeguards system in 1 9 6 1 . ~ ~ ~  Since then, the 
safeguards system has been reviewed and revised The latest revision was done in 1968.~'~ 
There are three measures that may be established in a safeguards 
1) Mateeal accountancy. States account for the whereabouts of the fissionable 
material under their control in a report submitted to the IAEA. 
(A)H source of fissionable rnaterial in al1 peaceful nuclear activities 
within the temtory of the contaacting State, under its jurisdiction or camed 
our under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that 
such rnaterial is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
devices4" 
are subjected to the safeguards system. In particular, 
- those supplied under a project agreement; 
- or those submitted to safeguards under a safeguards agreement, 
unilaterally, bilaterally, or multilaterally; 
- or those produced, processed, or used in a principal nuclear facility 
under a safeguards agreement or a projects agreement; 
- or those materials produced in or by the use of safeguarded nuclear 
materials; 
- or those substituted for safeguarded nuclear materiap2 
are subject of the measures implemented under the safeguards system. 
408 IAEA, nie Agency 's Safeguardr System (1 96 l), IAEA INFCW26. 
409 IAEA, The Agency's Safeguard System (1961, as Extended in 1964), IAEA 
INFCIRC/26 and Add. 1; The Agency's Safeguard Systern (1965), IAEA INFCIRC166; 
The Agency's Safegtrurd S'stem (1965, as Provisionally Extended in 1966), IAEA 
INFCIRC/66/ReV. 1; The Agency !s Safeguard Systern (1 965, as Provisionally Extended in 
1 966 and 1968); IAEA INFCIRC/66/Rev.2. Wereinafter IAEA Safeguards S ystem] . 
4'01bid- M A ,  "International Safeguards and the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy", On 
line: IAEA Web site ~ ~ : / / w w w . i a e a . o r ~ w o r l d a t q m / i n f o r e s o u r c d f a  
pards.&m,P (Date accessed: 17 August 1999). 
l i fiid. Part 1.2, Structure and content of agreements between the LAEA and States 
parties, as required in connection with the M T ,  IAEA INFCIRCI153 (Corr), 1970. 
4121bid. 
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2) Containment and surveiZZance techniques. Nuclear energy generating 
States are obligated to install containment and surveillance rneasures, such as film and tv 
cameras in a nuclear installation, and security seals on any nuclear material. 4L3 
3) Inspection or venpcation by M A  inspectors. Inspection and verification 
aliows the IAEA to con£irm the reports submitted by States as well as check and veri@ 
the inte- and sufficiency of containment and surveillance rneasures in the nuclear 
f a ~ i l i t i e s . ~ ~ ~  
The safeguards system, however, allows exemp ted nuclear matenal that otherwise 
would have been subjected to the system. Nuclear exempt materials include those 
materials which may not at any time exceed 1 kilogram in total of special fissionable 
material, which may consist of one or more of the following: plutonium, uranium with an 
enrichment of 0.2 (20%) and above; uranium with an enrichment below 0.2% (20 %) and 
above that of natural uranium; 10 metric tons in total of natural uranium and depleted 
uranium with a .  enrichment above 0.0005 (-5%); 20 metric tons of depleted uranium 
with an enrichment of 0.005 (5%) or below; and 20 metrïc tons of thorium.415 The low 
radioactive content and enrichment percentage of the exempt nuclear materials render 
them insignificant for purposes of production of nuclear devices or explosives.416 
As of 31 December 1998, 222 safeguards agreements were in force with 138 
States; 126 of these were in accordance with the NPT?~ Seven of the nine States p w  to 




416~etum Shipment, supra note 152. 
4171998 I M A  Annual Report, supra note 230. 
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Bangkok] and ai l  11 of the signatories to the South Paczfic Nuciear Free Zone Treaty 
[hereinafter Rarotonga ~ r e a v ] ~ ' ~  have çafeguards agreements in pursuance of their 
obligations under the Thirty-one of the thirty-two Contrachg Parties to the 
Treaty of ï7ateZdco also have safeguards agreements with the  I A E A ~ ~ O  that are either 
simultaneously in pursuance of the APT or are compatible with the NPT." ' 
The LAEA safeguards system does not gant  any executive power to the IAEA to 
physically prevent the diversion of nuclear material. The IAEA acts only as "an 
inspection, detection and alarm me~hanism.""~ Its limited mandate is M e r  constricted 
with its organizational and financiai c~ns t r a in t s .~~  When there is any possible diversion of 
nuclear materials, the Director General reports it to the IAEA Board of Governors, who 
will then report it to the General Assembly of the United Nations and to the Security 
~ o u n c i l . ~ ~ ~  The Security Council is the only UN body with executive power to impose 
sanctions upon any State that illegally diverts nuclear materiils for purposes other than 
peace~ .42s  
The safeguards system has generally been successful M accounting for declared 
nuclear matenals. There have been only a few cases of possible diversions, and no 
known record of diversion during trmportation of radioactive materials. The most 
- - -  
418 South Pacifc Nuclear Free Zone Treaîy, 6 August 1985, entry into force 11 December 
1986, IAEA INFCXRC/331. 
' 9fiid. 
4201bid. 
42 1 Ibid. Annex to the 1998 ?AEA Annual Report, supra note 23 0. 
4 2 2 L A E ~ ,  The LAEA 's Safeguards System, Ready for the 21' Cenfu?y, On line: IAEA Web 
site c http:l/www.iaea.ore/ w o r l d a t o d i n f i x o t h e r ~ a r d  I I  s2/intro.ha> (Date 




senous was the 1991 discovery of a clandestine nuclear program in Iraq, party to the 
NPT. 426 The IAEA conducted verification and other safeguard measures. On 23  February 
1998, Iraq entered into a Mernorandun of Understanding with the United Nations in 
order to facilitate the verification activities of the United Nations Special Commission 
pereinafler UNCOM] and the IAEA into sites described by Iraq as 'sensitiver. 427 On 3 1 
October 1998, however, Iraq ceased to cooperate with the UNCOM and IAEA, reducing 
M e r  any guarantee that Iraq complies with its obligations under the N ~ T . ~ ' ~  
The Iraqi incident resulted in the revision and strengthening of the safeguards 
system. The revised safeguards system is designed to keep track of both declared and 
undeclared nuclear materials and activities of States. The revised safeguards system 
grants more access to the IAEA on nuclear activities of States. To implement the new 
system, the IAEA has invited States to sign an Additional Protocol to their existing 
safeguards agreements that would increase its powers in the safeguarding of nuclear 
rnaterials. As of 31 December 1998, the IAEA Board of Governors was successful in 
concluding Additional protocols with 38 States. Of these 38, five (5) Additional Protocols 
had already entered into force and one (1) is being i ~ n ~ l e m e n t e d . ~ ~ ~  
'2S~rticles 24.1 and 25, Charter of the United Nations, entry into force 24 October 1954, 
1 U.N.T.S. xvi. 
426 Safeguards System for the 2lSt Century, supra note 422. 
4271 998 M A  Annual Report, supra note 230. 
4281bid. 
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2. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materiais 
The safeguards agreement system under the NPT fiamework was for the purpose 
of safeguarding these nuclear materials fkom their owner-govements or other 
govemments that may be tempted to divert these materials for proliferation purposes.430 
The possibility of diversion of nuclear materials by civilian elements has become a major 
~ o n c e r n . ~ ~ '  In response to the increasing risks facing civilian diversion of nuclear 
matenals, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was a d ~ ~ t e d . " ~  
It was opened for signature on 3 March 1980 and entered into force on 8 February 
1987."~ As of 1 Apnl1999,64 States had become parties.434 
The Convention on Physical Protection was conceived under the NPT 
f r a m e w ~ r k ~ ~ ~  and confïrms the right of al1 States to develop and apply nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes and their legitimate hterests in the potential benefits to be denved 
fÎom the peaceful application of nuclear energy. It establishes the fiamework fÎom which 
the international community can facilitate the safe use, storage and tramfer of nuclear 
429LAE~ Press Release, " Implementation of IAEA Safeguards in l998", 17 June 1999, 
IAEA PR 9916, On line: IAEA Web site ~http:llwww.iaea~~r~IworIdatorn/inforesource/ 
ressrelease/ 0 6 9 9 . w >  (Date accessed: 30 June 1999). 
"G. Bunn lqRysical Protection of Nuclear Mate~als, S trengthening Global Noms," On 
line: IAEA Web site ~~~://www.iaea.o~worIdatom/inforesourcehul~eti~ull394l 
bunn.html> (Date accessed: 15 July 1999). 
4311998 L4EA Annual Report, supra note 230. 
432T7ie Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, adopted May 1980, 
entry into force, 8 February 1987, IAEA INFCIRC/274/Rev. 1. pereinafier Convention 
on Physical Protection]. 
433~ddendurn to the Convention on the Physical Protection, October 1995, IAEA 
INFCIRC/2741 Rev. ll Add.5. 
434 IAEA, "Staîus of the Convention on the PhysicaZ Protection of Nuclear Material," On 
line: IAEA Web site ~ h t T p : / / w w w . i a e a . o r ~ / w o r l d a t ~ c e / l e ~  > (Date last 
u dated: 1 Aprif 1999). 
4P5 The Convention on Physicul Protection was a US. initiative in 1974 that was endorsed 
at the 1975 NPT review conference. 
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matenal, as well as recovery and return of stolen nuclear matend. It also provides for 
pend provisions for commission of prohibited acts. 
The security provisions of the Convention on Physical Protection are instituted 
fkom the moment a nuclear material departs fiom a facility of the shipper in the State of 
ongin and ends with the arriva1 at a facility of the receiver within the State of ultimate 
de~tination?~~ This means that the even if nuciear material has not left the nuclear 
facility, Contracting States are aiready obligated to provide security measures for nuclear 
materials bound for international transport. 
The nuclear material covered under this Convention are plutonium except that 
with isotopic concentration exceeding 80% in plutonium-23 8; u~anium-23 ; uranium 
enriched in the isotope 235 or 233; uranium containing the mixture of isotopes as  
occumng in nature other than in the form of ore or ore-residue; and any matenal 
containing one or more of the foregoing."' These nuclear materials may be used to 
manufacture nuclear weapons or explosives. 
Under this Convention, a State Party shall take appropriate steps within the 
framework of its national law and consistent with international law to ensure as far as 
practicable that, during international nuclear transport, nuclear matenal within its 
temtory, or on board a ship or aircraft under its jurisdiction insofar as such ship or 
aircraft is engaged in the transport to or fkom that State, is protected at the levels 
descnbed in Annex 1 of the  onv vent ion."^ The levels of physical protection of nuclear 
436 Article 1, Convention on Physical Protection, supra note 432. 
4371bid. Article l(a), Convention on Physical Protection. 
43 8 Ibid. Article 3, Convention on the Physical Protection. 
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matenal depend on its form and ~ e i ~ h t - ~ ~ '  Again, protection measures under this 
Convention necessarily include radiation containment rneas~res.~~~ 
In particular, the State of origin and the Receiving State are not allowed to permit 
the international transport of nuclear material udess there is an assurance of its physical 
protection.441 The transit by land or inland waterways or in airports or seaports in States 
not parties to the Convention is not allowed unless the Transit State receives assurance 
for the physical protection of the nuclear material while in transit.M2 The sending and 
receiving States are thus responsible for identimg and informing in advance al1 States 
that the nuclear material is expected to transit by land or interna1 waterways, or whose 
airports or seaports it is expected to enter.443 Menever appropriate, State Parties 
concemed shall also exchange information with each other or international organizations 
for the purpose of protecting threatened nuclear material, verifying the integrity of the 
shipping container or recovering unlawfilly taken nuclear material.444 
The exchange of information regarding any international transport of nuclear 
material, however, is shrouded under the vague but usefûl cloak of "confidentiality." 
Article 6 of the Convention provides that State Parties are not required to provide any 
information which they are not permitted to communicate pursuant to their national law 
or which would jeopardize the security of the State concerned or the physical protection 
of nuclear material. 
43 9 Ibid. Annex II: of the Convention on the Physical Protection. 
"O~id.  
44 1 Ibid. Article 4 (1,2, and 3), Convention on the Physical Protection. 
"2fiid. 
? b i d .  Article 4 ( 5 )  Convention on the Physical Protection 
'fid. Article 5 (2) Convention on the PhysicaZ Protection. 
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Moreover, in addition to sending assurances of physical protection, the State 
Parties involved in the international transport of nuclear material have the responsibility 
of coordinating recovery and response operations in the event of any unauthorized 
removal, use or alteration of nuclear material or in the event of credible threat thereo£? 
Other State Parties, in accordance with their national law, are required to provide co- 
operation and assistance to the maximum feasible extent in the recovery and protection of 
such material to any State that so requestf6 
The Convention on PhysicaC Protection considers the intentional commission of 
the following acts as punishable under the national law of State Parties. These are: 
An act without lawful authorïty which constitutes the receipt, 
possession, use, transfer, alteration, disposal or dispersal of nuclear 
matenal and which causes or iikely to cause death or injury to any 
person or substantial damage to property; or the attempt to commit 
the above act; 
A thefi or robbery of nuclear material; or the attempt to commit the 
above acts; 
An embezzlement or &audulent obtaining of nuclear material; or the 
attempt to commit the above act; 
An act constituting a demand for nuclear material by threat or use of 
force or by any other form of intimidation; 
A threat to use nuclear material to cause death or serious injury to 
any person or substantial property damage; 
A threat to commit a threat or robbery in order to compel a natural or 
legal person, international organization or State to do or to refrain 
fiom doing any act; 
Or an act which constitutes the participation in any of the acts 
described a b o ~ e . ~ ~  
'fiid. Article 5 (1) Convention on the Physical Protection 
a61bid. Article 5 (2) Convention on the Physical Protection 
447 .fiid. Article 7 Convention on the Physical Protection. 
3. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawfirf Acts Aguinsr 
the S u f a  of Maritime Navigation 
Threats and actual acts of piracy and robbery, as mentioned in Chapter 3, 
intemi@ the security risks attached to the carriage of nuclear materials. Radioactive 
matenals have high commercial, political, and rnilitary value. Fears that a vesse1 carrying 
nuclear materials is a floating magnet attracting terronsts and other criminal elements 
(pirates and robbers) is not a far-fetched cIaim. 
It was upon the urging of the UN General Assembly, in UNGA Resolution 40/61 
of 9 December 1985, that the IMO studied violence at sea in the context of safety in 
navigation. The M O  Assembly came up with "Measures to prevent unlawful acts that 
threaten the safety of ships and the security of their passengers and crews.""* The IMO 
MSC subsequently prepared detailed guidelines intended to assist States when reviewing 
and where necessary strengthening port and on-board security r n e a ~ u r e s . ~ ~ ~  
Not satisfied with recommendatory mesures that the M O  prepared, the 
Governments of Austria, Egypt, and Italy proposed and presented a draft Convention 
during the 1987 57" session of the IMO Council. The draft Convention was to provide 
for a comprehensive fiamework to suppress unlawfiil acts committed against the safety of 
maritime navigation."' The IMO organized an international Conference for the adoption 
of the draft. On 10 March 1988, the Convention for the Suppression of Udawful Acts 
Against the Safeîy of Maritime Navigation [hereinafter IMO Unlawfil Acts Convention] 
4481h4~ resolution A.584(14). 
449 Law of the Sea Report of the Secretary-General, U.N.G.A. 4lSt Session, 28 October 
1986, U.N.G.A. Doc.: A/41/742. Please refer to IMO Document MSCKirc.443, 26 
September 1986. 
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was adopted in Rome and it entered into force on 1 March 1992.~" To date, it has 41 
Contracthg States which represent 43.71% of the world shipping tonnage.4s2 
The main purpose of th is  Convention is to ensure that appropriate action, either 
extradition or prosecution, 4" are undertaken against persons cornmithg the following 
a ~ t s ~ * ~  under Article 3 : 
(a) seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any 
other form of intimidation; 
(b) performs an act of violence against a person on board a ship that is 
likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; 
(c) destroys a ship or causes damage to a ship or to its cargo which is 
likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; 
(d) places or causes to be placed on a ship, by any means whatsoever, a 
device or substance which is likely to destroy that ship, or cause 
damage to that ship or its cargo which endangers or is Likely to 
endanger the safe navigation of that ship; 
(e) destroys or senously damages maritime navigational facilities or 
seriously interferes with their operation, if any such act is likely to 
endanger the safe navigation of a ship; 
(f) cornmunicates information which is known to be false, thereby 
endangering the safe navigation of a ship; 
(g) injures or kills any person, in connection with the commission or the 
attempted commission of any of the offenses set forth above. 
450~aw of the Sea Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. G.A. 42nd Session, 8 November 
1987, U.N.G.A. Doc.:A42/688, at 8 1. mereinafier 1987 Law of the Sea Report]. 
451 Convention for the Suppression of UnlawfuZ Acts Against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation, done in Rome, March 1 O, 1988, entry into force 1 March 1992, 27 I.L.M. 
66 8 (1 98 8). [Hereina fier IMO UnZawfil Acts Convention.]. 
4521M~, "Summary of Status of Conventions", On h e :  M O  Web site <http://www.imo. 
org/convent/s~~~llllary~html> (Last date updated: 30 June 1999). 
4 5 3 ~ r t i ~ l e  10 IMO Unlawfùl Acts Convention, supra note 45 1. 
4S4~id.  The atternpt to commit, as well as to abet in any of the acts penalized are likewise 
punishable under Article 3(.2). IMO UnZawfùl Acts Convention. 
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The 12MO UnIawficl Acts Convention does not provide for protection or security 
rneasure in the vuinerable areas. The Contracting States are obligated to either extradite 
or punish the offender within their territory or control. 
Alarmed with the continuhg threats and dangers posed by robbery and piracy at 
sea, the M O  came up with two circulars in 1993 to assist States and ship-owners in 
responding to acts of piracy and robbery. The first circular is the 'Recommendations to 
Govemments for combatting piracy and armed robbery against shîps."" This circular 
anaiyzes the types of attacks encountered by ships in dinerent parts of the world and 
suggests possible counter-measures that could be employed by Rescue Co-ordination 
Centres and security forces. The second circular is 'Guidance to shipowners and ship 
operators, shipmasters and crews on preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed 
robbery against s l ~ i ~ s . ~ ' ~  This circular contains advice on measures that could be taken 
onboard to prevent attacks or, when they occur, to minimye the danger to the crew and 
ship. 
F. Prior n ~ ~ c a t i o n  and consultation 
Under international law, States have the right to be informed and consulted when 
hazardous wastes and substances are moved to their temtones or jurisdictions for 
disposa1 or storage purposes. The nuclear legal regirne had to develop its own set of rules 
regarding the transboundary movement of radioactive wastes because radioactive wastes 
were expressly excluded £kom the coverage of the 1989 Busel Convention on the Control 
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of Transboundary Movernents of Harardour Waste and their ~ i s ~ o s a l . ~ ~ ~  Article 1.3 
of the Basel Convention states: "wastes which, as a result of being radioactive, are subject 
to other international control systems, including international instruments, applying 
specifically to radioactive materials, are excluded fiom the scope of this Convention." 
Two instruments contain rules on pnor notification and consultation on the 
movement of radioactive wastes: the Code of Practice on the International 
Transboundary Movement of Radioactive waste4'' and the Joint  onv vent ion .459 
The Code of Practice, a recommendatory document, applies to al1 international 
transboundary movements of radioactive w a ~ t e s . ~ ~ ~  The sovereign right of every State to 
prohibit the movement of radioactive waste into, from or through its temtory is aflkned 
in the Code of ~ r a c t i c e . ~ ~ ~  Any international transboundary movement of radioactive 
wastes must thus, be undertaken with the prior notification and consent of the sending, 
receiving and transit States, in accordance with their respective law and reg~da t ions .~~~ 
457~asel Convention, supra note 145, 
4 5 8 ~ o d e  of Practice on the International Transboundary Movernent of Radioactive Waste, 
1 3 November 1990, M A  INFCIRC/3 86. (Hereinafter Code of Practice] . 
459~oinr Convention, supra no te 145. 
" O f i i d .  
461fiid. Article m.3. 
4 6 2 ~ ~ l e  lU.5 Code of Practice, supra note 458. Moreover, States involved in the 
international transboundary movement of radioactive waste are also mandated under the 
Code of Practice to take appropriate steps necessary, including the adoption of laws and 
regulations, to ensure that the international transboundary movement of radioactive waste 
is carried out in accordance with the Code Practice (Article III.9); to take appropnate 
steps to introduce into its national laws and regulations relevant provisions as necessary 
for liability, compensation or other remedies for damage that could arise fiom the 
international transboundary movement of radioactive waste (Article m.8); to establish 
the administrative and technical capacity and regulatory structure to manage and dispose 
of such waste in a manner consistent with international safety standards (Articles m.4 
and m.7, first sentence); to CO-operate at the bilateral, regional and international levels 
for the purpose of preventing any international transboundary movement of radioactive 
waste that is not in conformity with the Code of Practice (Article III. 1 1); and to take the 
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The rules conceming the transboundary movement of radioactive wastes in the 
Joint Convention are based on the IAEA Code of ~ r a c t i c e , ~ ~  and thus reflect the prior 
notification and consultation rule of the recommendatory instrument. Pnor notification 
and consultation involves only the Sending, Transit and Destination  tat tes?^ The 
Coastal States, whose only link to these international transfers is the use of their maritime 
zones by vessels carrying radioactive wastes, are excluded from the systern of prior 
notification and consultation. The main reason why Coastal States are excluded is the 
- 
appropriate steps necessary to permit readmission into its territory of any radioactive 
waste previously transferred £kom its temtory when the transfer of radioactive waste 
cannot be completed (Article m. 10). 
4 6 3 ~ .  Tonhauser and 0. Jankowitsch, "The Joint Convention of the Safety of Spent Fuel 
Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management", 60 NLB 9 (1997) at 
17. 
'@~rticle 27.1 of the Joint Convention, supra note 145, reads as follows: 
Each Contracting Party involved in transboundary movement shall take the 
appropriate steps to ensure that such movement is undertaken in a rnanner consistent with 
the provisions of this Convention and relevant binding international instruments. 
In so doing: 
a Contracting Party which is a State of origin shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure that transboundary movement is authorized and takes place 
only with the prior notification and consent of the State of destination; 
transboundary movement îhrough States of transit shall be subject to those 
international obligations which are relevant to the particular modes of 
transport utiiized; 
a Contracting Party which is a State of destination shall consent to a 
trmsboundary movement only if it has the administrative and technical 
capacity, as well as the regulatory structure, needed to manage the spent 
fuel or radioactive waste in a manner consistent with this Convention; 
a Contracting Party which as a State of ongin shaii authorize a 
transboundary movement only if it can satism itself in accordance with the 
consent of the State of destination that the requirements of subparagraph 
(iii) are met prior to transboundary movement; 
a Contracting Party which as a State of origin shall take the appropriate 
steps to re-entry into its temtory, if a transboundary movement is not or 
cannot be completed in confonnity with this Article, unless an alternative 
safe arrangement can be made. 
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navigational fi-eedom of foreign vessels under customary international law, which is 
affirmed under Article 27(3)(I) of the Joint t on vent ion.^^^ 
The right of innocent passage and the fkeedom of navigation are established under 
customary international law and codified in the LOSC. The only reqriirement that LOSC 
imposed upon foreign vessels in the passage through territorial waters is contained in 
Article 23. Vessels carrying nuclear matenals and radioactive waste are required to carry 
documents and observe specid precautionary rneasures established by international 
agreements while exercising their nght of innocent passage. Vessels that are carrying 
nuclear materials and radioactive waste passing 'through the EEZ are bound to observe 
the marine environmental protection measures of the Coastal  tat te.^^^ AS long as the 
passage of the vesse1 does not violate the marine protection regulations, it may pass 
through the EEZ beyond the regdatory reach of the Coastal State. 
In addition, Article 21 1 of the LOSC, requires that the laws and regulations of the 
Coastal States to protect their marine environments must not hamper innocent passage of 
foreign vessels. T'us, as long as passage of the foreign vessels carrying nuclear materiais 
are within the requirements of the LOSC, pnor notification to and consultation with 
Coastal States are not sanctioned under international law. 
As of 11 August 1999, the Joint Convention had 39 signatory States and 11 
Contracting Parties. Of the seven (7) major nuclear power generating States, only 
4651bid. Article 27(3 )0  of the Joint Convention reads: "Nothhg in this Convention 
prejudices or affects (I) the exercise, by ships and aircraft of ali States, of maritime, river 
and air navigation rights and keedoms, as provided for in international law." 
466~id. Article 56 (2), LOSC, supra note 135. 
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Germany had ratified it on 13 October 1 9 9 8 . ~ ~ ~  Japan did not sign nor ratifjr the Joint 
convention .468 
G. Contingency and emergency measures 
1. Communications system 
Chapter IV of SOLAS mandates a radio-based communications system. Since 
1970, however, M O  worked to institute a satellite-based system of co~~~munications in 
anticipation of the congestion in radio trafic. The 1988 (GmSS)  Amendments to 
S O L A ~ ~ ~  as well as the Convention on the International Maritime Satellite Organization. 
1976470 accommodated new technology to improve communications to assist vessels in 
distress, improve the efficiency and management of ships, maritime public 
correspondence services and radiodetermination ~a~abi l i t i es .~~ '  The GMDSS system 
requires every ship to carry equipment designed to improve its chances of rescue 
following an accident. These equipments include satellite emergency position indicating 
radio beacons and search and rescue transporders for the location of the ship or survival 
 raft.^^^ 
4 6 7 ~ ~ ,  "Status of Signatones of Multilateral Instruments Opened for Signature on 29 
September 1997," On line: LAEA Web site < &@://www.iaea.or.at/ worldatoml u~dated 
status-htd > (Date last updated: 1 1 August 1999). 
468i6id. 
4691988 (GMDSS) Amendments to SOLAS, entry into force 1 Febniary 1999, supra note 
227. 
470~onvention on the International Maritime Satellite Organization. 19 76, adopted 3 
September 1976, entry into force 16 JuIy 1979. 
47 1 IMO, "Maritime Safety", On line: IMO Web site c ~ : / / w w w , l m a , ~ o / c o n v e n t /  
safetyhn > (Date accessed: 1 October 1998). 
2. During radiological emergencies 
The international nuclear regïme provides for binding obligations to the 
environment when an excessive accidental radiological release has occurred. Radiation or 
nuclear accident refers to an event which leads or could lead to abnormal exposure 
Foilowing the catastrophic consequences of the Chemobyl meltdown in 1986, two 
Conventions were drafted and adopted to respond to nuclear emergencies. The h t  is the 
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident [hereinafter Convention on Earb 
~ o t i f l c a t i o n ] . ~ ~ ~  The second is the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear 
Accident or Radiological Ernergency bereina fier Convention on ~ssistance]. 47s 
The Convention on Early Notzjication applies in the event of any accident 
involving facilities or activities of a State Party or of peaons or legal entities under its 
jurisdiction or control, fiom which a release of radioactive materials occur or is likely to 
occw and which has resulted or may result in an international transboundary release that 
could be of radiological safety significance for another  tat te.^^^ One of the activities 
govemed by the Convention on Early Notification is the transport and storage of nuclear 
- 
4721M0, "Action dates" On line: M O  Web site < http://www.imo.o&convent/ei fdates, 
hm > (Date accessed: 17 August 1999). 
473 IAEA Safety Series No. 76, Radiation Protection Glossary, 1986, as reprinted in 
ElBaradie, supra note 186 at 174, 198 and 200. 
474 Convention on Eart'y Notzj?cation of a Nuclear Accident, adopted 24-26 September 
1986, entered into force, 27 October 1986, IAEA INFCIRC/335. As of 1 April 1999, 
there were 84 state parties and 70 signatory parties. The top six nuclear energy producing 
counûies have either signed or ratified the Convention. mereinafter Convention on Early 
Notzj?cation.] 
475 Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or RadioZogicaZ 
Emergenq, adopted 26 September 1986, entered into force 26 Febmary 1987, IAEA 
INFCIRC/3 3 6. pereinafter Convention on Assistance.] 
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fuels and radioactive wastes under Article 2.2(d). Its provisions are thus applicable to 
the maritime carriage of nuclear or radioactive material by regular cargo vessels. 
Notification. In the event of a nuclear accident, the State Party that has jurisdiction 
or conîrol of the event or activity in question has the responsibility to noti& and inform 
the IAEA and the affected State, which may not necessarily be a State  art^."^ In case 
of nuclear accidents with radiological significance determined as minimum, the State 
Party having jurisdiction or control owr it has the discretion of notifjkg the affected 
 tat tes.^^^ The responsible State must provide information on the following: the nature of 
the nuclear accident, the time of its occurrence and its exact location where 
appropriate.47g The obligation to notie and inform starts as soon as the radiological event 
occurs in the State. The Convention on Early Notz.cation used the ternis " forthwith" and 
"promptly."480 Nevertheless, this right to information is Limited and dependent on the 
S tate that has control andior jurisdiction of the source of excessive radiation. It is up to 
the State that has control andior juridiction of the nuclear activity to determine when the 
radiological event becomes significant for another State. 
Consultation. In addition to its duty of notification and information, the 
responsible State Party also has an additional duty, as far as reasonably practicabfe, to 
respond promptly to a request for consultations by the aEected State Party for the purpose 
of minimizing the radiological ~onse~uences."' 
476~rticle 1.1, Convention of Early Notification. supra note 474. 
477 Ibid. Article 2 (a) and (b), Convention on Early NohFcation. 
478 fiid. Article 3, Convention on Early Notification. 
479 Ibid. Article 2, Convention on Early Notification. 
48 'fiid. Article 2, Convention on Early Notification. 
48'lbid. Article 6,  Convention on Earb Noh9cation. 
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The Convention on Assistance also applies when a radiological emergency or 
nuclear accident occurs. Since the objective of the Convention on Assistance is to 
rninunize the consequences of radioactive releases as  weU as to protect life, property and 
environment fiom radioiogical releasesPS2 State Parties are obliged to cooperate between 
and among themselves and with the IAEA to facilitate prompt assistance in the event of a 
nuclear accident or radiological emergency?83 In the event of a nuclear accident or 
radiological emergency, whether or not it originates in the affected State Party's temtory, 
assistance cm be provided by any State Party, directly or through the mediation of the 
I A E A . ~ ~ ~  
Assistance to an affected State Party is not automatic. The Convention on 
Assistance stipulates that a State Party request for assistance, whether or not the accident 
or emergency originates within its temtory, jurisdiction or control? State Parties 
providing assistance, within the lunits of their capabilities, must identify and noti& the 
IAEA of the equipment and materials that could be made available to the afEected State 
~ a . r l y . 4 ~ ~  
Assistance is not available to a State not Party to the Convention. Coastal States 
who may be vulnerable to potential radiation ~ o m  vessels with radioactive materials 
passing through their maritime zones have to be parties to this Convention before they 
may request for assistance. 
482~rticle 1, Convention on Assistance, supra note 475. 
3831bid. 
4841bid. Article 2.1 of the Convention on Assistance. 
485fi id. 
4861bid. Article 2.4 of the Convention on Assistance. 
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In b o t .  Conventions, the M A  plays a significant role in the facilitation of 
notification and a~sistance.~" Article 4 of the Convention on Early Nof~cation mandates 
the IAEA to inform State Parties, Mernber States, other States which are or may be 
physically affected and relevant international organizations when it receives a notification 
regarding a radiological emergency. The IAEA is also responsible under M c l e  4 of this 
Convention, to promptiy provide any State Party, Member State, or relevant organization, 
information relevant to minimiPng the radiological con~e~uences.~~* 
Under Article 5 of the Convention on Assistance, the functions of the IAEA, when 
so requested by a State Party or a Member State, include collection and dissemination of 
information regarding experts, equipment and materials and methodo logies, techniques 
and available resuits of research that may be of value to the radiologicai emergency.48g 
The Convention on Eariy Notzijkation is open to States without nuclear energy 
generation programs or a~tivities.~" As of 1 April1999, there were 84 State Parties to the 
4871987 Law of the Sea Report, supra note 450. 
488~rticle 2(b) of the Convention on Early Not~cation. supra note 474. 
4891bid. Article 5 of the Convention on Assistance, s u p  note 475, fûrther mandates the 
IAEA, when requested by a State Party or a Member State, to assist in (1) preparing both 
emergency plans in the case of nuclear accidents and radiological emergencies and the 
appropriate legislation; (2) developing appropriate training programmes for personnel to 
deal with nuclear accidents and radiological emergencies; (3) transmitting requests for 
assistance and relevant information in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological 
emergencies; (4) developing appropriate radiation monitoring programmes, procedures 
and standards; (5) conducting investigations into the feasibility of establishing 
appropriate radiation monitoring systems. Kn addition, the IAEA must also make 
available to a State Party or to a Member State requesting assistance in the event of a 
nuclear accident or radiological emergency appropriate resources allocated for the 
purpose of conducting an initial assessrnent of the accident or emergency, offer its offices 
to the Member State or Contracting Party requesting assistance, and establish and 
maintain liaison with relevant international organizations for the purposes of obtaining 
and exchanging relevant information and data, and make a List of such organizations 
available to State Parties, Mernber States, and the aforementioned organizations. 
4901bid. See Article 8 of the Convention on Early Not@cation. 
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Convention that included the major nuclear energy generating  tat tes.^^' The 
Convention on Assistance, on the ûther hand, has seventy-nine (79) States Parties as of 1 
April 1 999.492 
3. Salvage 
One of the major concems of States protesting the regular shipments of nuclear 
materials and radioactive wastes i s  the alleged weak and overly-commercial nature of the 
salvage regime. The 1989 International Salvage  onv vent ion^^^ was adopted to strengthen 
the salvage regime and to integrate environmental considerations The new Salvage 
Convention has two purposes: to encourage salvage measures and to protect the marine 
environment fiom the consequences of accidents. The Convention intends to achieve the 
two purposes by providing an incentive for salvors to taise measures to protect the 
environment, even if those measmes may have no useful result. The Convention in 
Article 14(2) awards a special compensation of up to 30% of the expenses incurred by the 
salvor by the owner if the salvor has prevented or minimised damage to the environment. 
The competent tribunal may increase the incentive by up to 100% if it is the fair and just 
scheme. The salvor is also subjected to a negative incentive if by its negligence, it fails to 
minimise environmental damage. The salvor may be deprived of the whole or part of its 
special compensation.494 
49 1 IAEA, "Status of the Conventimz on Early Norification of a NucIeur Accident," On 
line: M A  Web site c ~ : / / w w w . i a e &  worldato ce/legd/cenna. h N  > (Date 
last updated: 1 April 1999). 
4 9 2 ~ ~ ~ ~ ,  "Status of the Conventibn on Assistance," On line: IAEA Web site c ~ Q L  
//www ' w > (Date last updated: 1 Apnl 1999). 
>8 Apadoptedll989, entry into force 14 
July 1996, M O  Leg/Conf.7/27,2 May 1989. 
4941bid. Article 14(5) Salvage Convention. 
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Coastal States may initiate remedial measures with respect to pollution or 
threat thereof from a maritime casualty notwithstanding salvage activity by another. 
Article 9 of the Salvage Convention provides: 
Nothing in this Convention shall affect the right of the coastal 
State concemed to take measures in accordance with generally recognised 
p ~ c i p l e s  of international Iaw to protect its coastline or related interests 
from pollution or the threat of pollution following upon a maritime 
casualty or acts relating to such a casualty which may reasonably be 
expected to result in major harmful consequences, including the nght of 
the coastal state to give directions in relation to salvage operations. 
AS of 1 May 1999, the Salvage Convention has 45 Contracting States, 
representing only 26.82 of the world tonnage.'gs The insignificant number of Contracting 
Parties to this Convention is one of the reasons why Coastal States are apprehensive 
about the maritime shipment of nuclear materials and radioactive wastes. 
H. Liabiiity and accountabiiity 
The international liability conventions for damages arising h m  nuclear h m  are 
a l  civil liability conventions. These Conventions are: The OECD Convention on Third 
Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (Paris  onv vent ion);"^ the Brussels 
Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention of 2gh J '  1960 on Third Party 
Liability in the Field of Nuclear ~ n e r g y ; ~ ' ~  the Convention on Civil Liability for N'lear 
Damage (Tienna the Joint Protocol Relating tu the Application of the 
4 9 S I M ~ ,  Summary of Statu ofConventionr as of l May 1989, supra note 452. 
496~onvention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, 29 July 1960, 
entry into force 1 April 1968, [hereinafter Paris Convention], 956 U.N.T.S. 251. 
497 BnrrseZs Convention Supplernentav to the Paris Convention of t gh  July 1960 on Third 
Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy. 3 1 January 1963, entry into force 4 
December 1974,1041 U.N.T.S. 358. 
498~onvention Civil Liability for Nuclem Darnage mereinafter Vienna Convention], 29 
May 1963, entry into force 12 November 1977, 1063 U.N.T.S. 256. 
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Vienna Convention and the Paris   on vent ion;^'' the Convention ReZating to Civil 
Liability in the Field of Maritime Carnage of N d e a r  ~ateria1;~" and Convention on the 
Liability of Operators of Nuclear ~hips.~" 
The basic features of the civil liability Conventions for nuclear h m  are: 
a exclusive liability channeled exclusively to the operator of 
the nuclear installation invohed; 
a absolute or strict liability; 
a Mtations on the amount of liability; 
a compulsory hancial sec-; and 
a judgments enforceable in any of the States parties. 'O2  
The Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Cambge of 
Nuclear Material is the liability regime applicable to the maritime caniage of nuclear 
material. The IAEA, the OECD/NEA and the M O  sponsored this Prior to 
the Civil LiabiliLy for ManTZtime C a m e  of Nuclear Material, there was a lot of 
confusion as to which Iiability regime would apply for any harm arising from the 
maritime carriage of nuclear matenal? 040th the operator of the nuclear installation 
fiom which the nuclear material came fkom and the owner of the vesse1 carrying the 
nucbar material could have been made liable under separate liability regimes. The 
499~oint Protocol ReZating to the Application o f  the Viennn Convention and the Paris 
Convention, 21 September 1988, entry into force 27 Apnl1992; 42 NLB 56 (1988). 
5oo~onvention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Camage of Nuclear 
Material, adopted December 1971, entry into force 15 July 1975, IAEA INFCIRC/SOO. 
Sol~onvention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, 25 May 1962, not yet in 
force, 57 A.J.I.L. 268 (1 963). 
5 0 2 0 ~ ~ ~ / N E ~ ,  supra note 2 13 at 2 1-27. 
'03fiid, at 60. 
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operator of the nuclear installation might be held liable under the Paris and Vienna 
Conventions. The owner of the vesse1 could also be held liable if its Flag State is a Party 
to any of the maritime civil liability regimes. The international organizations decided to 
channel the liability to the operator of the nuclear installation. Thus, under Article 1 of 
the Civil Liability for Maritime Camiage of Nuclear Material, any person who might be 
held liable for nuclear darnage in the course of maritime carriage by virtue an 
international convention or a national law, is exonerated if the operator of a nuclear 
installation is liable for such damage under either the Parr's or the Vienna Conventions. 
Thus, the Civil Liability for Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material did not establish a 
new civil liability regime. It merely clarified the entity liable in case of nuclear damage 
ansing fiom the maritime carriage of nuclear materials. 
The civil liability conventions for nuclear harm have been criticized on several 
groundç.s05 However, since Liability for nuclear haxm is not the focal point of this study, 
5041bid. at 59. 
505~he  accident in Chernobyl resulted in an extensive damage to property and injury to 
persons as well as contamination of the soil, water and air in many countries in Europe. 
The damages, including costs for preventive, mitigating, and remedial measures ran into 
billions of dollars. The civil liability conventions, in particular the Vienna and the Paris 
Conventions were found to be inadequate. Some of the weaknesses of the two 
Conventions are: "insufficient coverage geographically, insufficient compensation, 
restrictive definition of nuclear damage, overly brief t h e  limits for the subrnission of 
claims, difficulties in the proof of causation and of damage, excessive exonerations and 
lack of provision for compensation if an exoneration applies, lack of priorities in the 
distribution of compensation, lack of harmonization between the two conventions and 
among the parties of each convention, military facilities are not expressly included, the 
difficulty and expense of private lawsuits conducted by individual victims, inability of 
municipal courts to deal with possibly thousands of claimaots, as well as with complex 
scientific and technical evidence, and the lack of recognition of State responsibility for 
activities within a State's jurisdiction or control, and the corresponding incentive for 
States to ensure that theu nuclear facilities are as safe as possible." Ibid. at 105 to 106. 
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only the issues relevant to the concems of Coastai States and the separate protection of 
the marine environment will be discussed. 
One of the drawbacks of the civil liability conventions in the context of maritime 
camiage of nuclear materials and radioactive wastes is their non-applicability for damages 
suffered in the territory of non-contracting States. Under the Paris Convention, 
Contracting States may extend the benefits of the convention to non-member states.'06 
But the extension of benefits to non-contrachg States is discretionary, not ~ b l i ~ a t o r ~ . ~ ~ ~  
The geographical membership of both the Vienna and the Pa* Conventions is 
limited. Many Coastal States, potential victims to nsks of excessive radiation fiom the 
maritime shipments of nuclear matenals and radioactive wastes are not m e m b e r ~ ~ ~ *  and 
thus do not merit any benefit fiom these conventions. Another problem is the fact that 
some States heavily engaged in international shipments of INF materials and radioactive 
wastes, like Japan, are not members of these conventions.509 
The definition of nuclear damage under these conventions is too narrow and does 
not include damage to environment. They also exclude preventive, mitigating, and clean- 
up costs. Both the Paris  onv vent ion^'^ and the Vienna  onv vent ion^" lunit the term 
5 0 6 ~ c l e  3 Paris Convention, supra note 496. 
5071bid. 
'08The Parties to the Vienna Convention are: Argentins, Armenia, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Cameroon, Chile, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Macedonia, Mexico, Niger, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, 
Trinidad and Tobago, and Yugoslavia. The Parties to the Paris Convention are: Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Gerrnany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. 
509 Injured parties, however, may file claims against Japan under its Law No. 147 of 17 
June 1961 on Compensation for Nuclear Damage as amended on 31 March 1989. Claims 
must be filed in Japan. This places an undue burden on v i c h  parties who are froom 
another country. OECD/NEA, supra note 213 at 70. 
S'oArticle 3 of the Paris Convention, supra note 496. 
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"nuclear damage" to loss of life, or any personal injury, or loss or damage to property. 
Damage to the marine environment and marine organisms are clearly not covered in these 
conventions. 
In 1997, the IAEA convened a Diplomatic Conference at KEA Headquarters in 
Viema, 8-12 September 1997 to respond to the gaps and weabesses of the liabiIity 
regime for nuclear h m ,  particularly the Vienna v on vent ion.'^^ The gaps and 
wealaiesses of the liability regime for nuclear hami had been revealed following the 
Chemobyl ac~ident.~" The M A  worked for seven (7) years to study the liability regime 
and recommend revisions before the Diplomatic Conference was convened in 1997."~ 
Representatives from over 80 statess'' attended and adopted a Protocol to amend the 
51 'Arncle 1 (k) of the Vienna Convention, supra note 498. 
21AEA, "Diplornatic Conference on Nuclear Liability concludes", 12 Sep tember 1997, 
IAEA PR 9712 1, On line: IAEA Web site ~http://www.iaea.org/worldatoin/inforesource/ 
ressrelease/prn2 197.html> (Date accessed: 3 0 July 1999). 
' 31bid. 
514fiid. \ 
515The Governments of the following States were represented at the Conference: Algeria, 
Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, 
Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Islarnic Republic of, Iraq, Irelad, 
Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Korea, Republic of, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, 
Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Afnca, Spain, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, The fonner Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United 
Kingdom of Great Bntain and Northem Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Viet 
Nam and Yemen. 
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1963 Vienna Convention on C i d  Liability for Nucleur ~ a r n a ~ e " ~  and aiso adopted 
the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear ~amage.'" 
These two instruments address major concerns that may favor al1 potentially 
affected Coastal States and the marine environments. The Protocol gants jurisdiction to 
Coastal States over actions for nuclear damage arising fkom transports passing through 
their maritime zones, incl uding the exclusive economic zones. The geographical scope of 
the Vienna Convention has also been expanded by the Protocof, now benefiting even 
non-Contracting States. A Contracthg State rnay exclude f?om the application of this 
Convention damages suffered in a non-Contracting State only when the latter has a 
nuclear installation and does not accord equivalent and reciprocal benefits."' The above 
proviso ensures that a non-Contracthg State that has nucIear activities does benefit fiom 
the Convention. 
The Protocol has expanded the definition of nuclear damage to include 
environmental damage. Aside korn loss of personal life and loss of or damage to 
property, nuclear damage now also includes: economic loss arising fiom loss or damage 
to Life or property, costs to repair the environment, economic loss due to significant 
impairment of environment, and costs of preventive measures. 519 
'%enna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage of 21 May 1963 as amended 
by the Protocof of 12 September 1997 [hereinafter 1997 Protocol tu rhe Vienna 
Convention], IAEA GOV/INFl822/Add. 1 -GC(4 l)fiNF/13/Add. 1. 
517 Convention on Sïïppiementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, On line: IAEA 
Web site ~http:www.iaea.org/worldatom/update/annex2. htmb (Date accessed: 1 0 
October 1999). [hereinafter Convention on Supplementary Compensation]. 
'Article 1 A 199 7 Protocol to the Viennn Convention, supra note 5 16. 
S'glbid. Aaicle 1 (k) of the 1997 Protocol io the Vienna Convention. 
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The Convention on Supplementary Compensation is designed mainly to 
supplement the Vienna Convention should the fimds prove insuf'fïcient to compensate for 
the damages. The supplernentary fûnd will constitute mainly of contributions fi-om States 
Parties with nuclear installations. The basis of contribution would be the installed nuclear 
capacity, for those States with nuclear Article N 1 (b) of the Convention 
of Supplementary Compensation provides that States on the minimum United Nations 
rate of assessrnent with no nuclear reactors shall not be required to make contributions. 
As of 6 September 1999, out of the more than 80 States that attended the 
Conference and signed the Final Act for the two instruments, only two States had ratified 
them - Romania and ~o rocco .~* '  The two Contracting States - Romania and Morocco - 
are not major nuclear energy generating States, nor are they engaged in transporting 
across international boudaries Iarge volumes of radioactive materials. 
While it may indeed be too soon to tell whether these two instruments will live to 
their promise of refoms, one cannot help but cast doubts. It took seven (7) years before 
these two Conventions were adopted. The draft instruments of both Conventions 
underwent intense consultations and negotiations in the international c~rnmunity?~~ One
would thïnk that consensus was already achieved because of the length of time it took to 
prepare the Conventions. The slow ratification process, however, belies a sense of 
unanimity and willingness to start the refoms on the part of the international community, 
particular the nuclear energy generating States. 
5 2 0 ~ c l e  N 1 (a) Convention on Supplementmy Compensation, supra note 51 7 .  
S 2 ' ~ n  Iine: IAEA Web site ~hgp://www.iaea.ord~0r1dat0mjuDdates/stat~~.h~~ (Date 
1st updated: 6 September 1999). 
TV. Analysis of the legal regime 
The two worldviews appear to be reflected in the legal regime governing the 
maritime carnage of radioactive materials, with non-anthropocentrism gainirig ground. 
The recent developrnents, particularly in the civil liability scheme and the Salvage 
Convention, now include both the concems and interests of the Coastal States and the 
marine environment. 
Anthropocentrism, however, remains the dominant ethics and philosophy. The 
primacy accorded to the right of States to undertake nuclear activities for peacefil and 
beneficial purposes despite the hi& risks to radiation exposure reflects an obvious bias in 
favor of economic priorities and interests. The commercial shipping interests promoted 
and maintained in the maritime safety regime have been a pedect complement to the 
economic and development interests of the nuclear legal regirne. The assumption 
underlying the legal regime is that the benefits outweigh the costs and risks involved in 
the activity. This is a misleadhg and an unjust assumption because the entities that bear 
the risks do not enjoy the benefits. Only the States involved in the shipments benefit f?om 
the activity. Coastal States, whose maritime zones may be used by vessels carrying 
radioactive materials, are the ones exposed to the risks of the c d a g e .  Spent fuel, 
reprocessed fuel such as MOX fuel and hi& level radioactive wastes, unless they are 
vitrified wastes fiom reprocessed plutonium or uranium, still possess harmfil 
radioactivity. When a maritime accident occurs and radiation is released nom the 
n 2 0 ~ ~ ~ / ~ ~ A ,  supra note 2 13 at 1 1 to 12. 
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radioactive materids, Coastal States may be in a highly vulnerable position because of 
their proximity to the source of radiation. 
However, the legai regime does not contain participatory processes wherein al1 
potentialiy aec ted  entities may have a voice. There are no processes such as 
environmental impact assessment and prior notification and consultation wherein al1 
potentially affected entities, States and non-States, may participate before any decision is 
made regarding a shipment The so-called environmental impact assessrnent studies 
undertaken by various national research centers do not comply with the guidelines set by 
UNEP. Rather, these studies are research and experimental studies that did not even 
provide and formulate mitigating measures. 
There is also a lack of participatory processes in the contingency plans and 
emergency measures. Again, the affected State becomes involved by way of receiving 
information, only when the danger is already imminent. The legal regime does not 
permit potentially affected Coastai States, to participate in the emergency system. 
The primacy of the nght of States to undertake nuclear activities for peacefbl 
purposes has a serious implication for the Coastal States, particularly developing States. 
The authoritative survey of the IAEA regarding radiation protection capabilities of 
developing countnes concluded that developing States 
simply lack the necessary infi.asû-ucture to implement a radiation 
protection policy based on international standards ... They lack the basic 
legislation and supporting regulations, as well as effective national 
authorities, qualified manpower, and necessary equipment.523 
523 G. Handl, "Intemationalization of Hazard Management in Recipient Countries: 
Accident Preparedness and Response", supra note 144. Handl quoted Rosen, Adequate 
Radiation Protection: A Lingering Problern, 29 IAEA Bulletin 34, at 34-5 (1987), at 107. 
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The legal regime left out one very important aspect, which is ;to ensure the 
capability of ail potentially affected States to respond to the risks when rthey occur. The 
legal regime does not empower al1 potentiatly affected entities but rathier renders them 
helpless in the face of potential risks created by other States. For example, the victim 
States under the Convention on Notification are supposed to determine for themselves 
whether a radio logical emergency exists. The prob lem, again, is that deweloping Coastal 
States do not have the capacity to determine a radiologicai emergency at all. 
The vulnerability of Coastal States against the potential widespread and excessive 
radiation is intensified because of lack of prior information and consultaation about these 
shipments. The Code of Practice nor the Joint Convention nor any of thet maritime safety 
laws contain any provision for prior notification and consultation with States other than 
between and among States of origin, destination or transit. The rationale Es that to provide 
information would be to grant veto powers on Coastal States, in wiolation of the 
customary and conventional navigational fieedorns. 
States engaged in the shipment of radioactive materials suggestaed that the VTS 
and the cornunication systems in the maritime safety regime are sufficient and 
substantially respond to the requirement of information demanded by Co~astal States. The 
communication systems set-up in the maritime safety regime does not constitute 
information and consultation responsive to the risks posed by the mari-time carriage of 
radioactive matenals. The information that is most proper in this situatioo should not only 
relate to the position of the vessel at any given point. The information given should also 
include the kind and amount of radioactive matenal carried by the vessel passing through 
their maritime zones. This type of information would assist Coastal States in determinhg 
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the level of contingency and emergency measures they might establish to protect them 
Eom the nsks of the carriage. Gunther Handl calls this type of information risk 
communication. Risk communication is 
routine, i.e. non-emergency, flow of information about risks of 
hazardous installations or processes, either fiom industry to government, 
£kom government to the public, or fiom industry to the public. As an 
element of public policy for both mbimkhg consequences of accidents 
and preventin them in the fhst place, their importance can hardly be Q exaggerated? 
Risk information contains information about the hazards involved in the activity as well 
as instructions to the potentially affected communities what to do should an emergency 
occur. The lack of risk information to potentially affected entities was concluded to be a 
significant factor that aggravated the consequences of some of the worst industrial 
accidents in recent years, such as the Sveso accident in ~ t a l ~ . " ~  
The preventive measures remain focused on safety standards and regulations for 
human health and safety. The upcoming Safety Standards Senès No. ST-I still does not 
provide separate protection measures for the environment. The 1990 GESAMP study 
cautions against this approach because this does not take into account the population 
effects such as survival, growth and reproductive performance of marine organisms. Even 
the tests on the packaging conducted by national nuclear research centers cannot be the 
basis for asserting that a separate protection for the non-human members of the biotic 
community exists- Those tests were geared to assess the technical safkty of packaging. 
While studies to test the adequacy of packaging are very important, studies should also be 
138 
conducted to determine the effect of artificial radioactive release to the marine 
environment if and when accidents transpire. 
One would think that the principles of precautionary approach and generational 
equity would be expressly included or at the very least, alluded to in the new Safery 
Standards Series No. ST-I but this is not the case. The new regulations retain the largely 
anthropocentric fkamework of the old regulations. The main concem is to facilitate and 
assist States in their right to undertake nuclear activities for peacefûl and beneficial 
purposes. 
While it can be argued that the very notion of safety standards is preventive, a 
feature essential in the precautionary approach, this does not necessarily point to the 
adoption of a precautionary approach. The essence of the precautionary approach is 
preventive and anticipatory of any risks involved without waiting for scienhfic 
certainty? Measures that are deemed to implement the precautionary approach include 
the use of clean and appropnate processes, environmental impact assessment, and 
research that will be the basis in assessing the long-term effects of the activity and in 
developing the correspondhg legal and policy options?" The legal regime, as mentioned 
earlier, lacks environmental impact assessment procedures. Until now, the GESAMP has 
not been able to undertake research on the long-tem effects of excessive radiation on the 
marine environment and marine organisms. Considering the uncertainty of the risks 
involved in the shipment and the lack of environmental impact assessment procedures, 
States that continue to engage in shipping radioactive mate~als, appear not to employ 
caution within the meaning of precautionary approach. 
5 2 6 ~ .  Freestone and E. Hey, supra note 98 at 12. 
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The legal regime also does not provide a forum for the inclusion of 
generational equities. This is a serious void considering that radioactive materials, 
plutonium, for example, if and when released in harmfûl and excessive quantities, may 
continue its contamination of the environment and of the human population for thousands 
of years. The non-inclusion of generational equities is apparent in the fact that the 
containers allowed under the Safety Standard Series No. ST-I are not required to last as 
long as the radioactive materials in them. Research has revealed that containers for 
radioactive rnaterials last as long as 40 years only, in contrast to the half-üves of many 
radioactive rnaterials, particularly plutonium, amounting to thousands of years. The 
possible explmation for this is perhaps technology to manufacture packaging that may 
last for thousands of years does not yet exist. It is therefore highly probably that 
containers that s in .  in the bottom of the ocean may release excessive and hannful 
radioactivity after the maximum number of years that they are supposed to last. 
The current tegal regime regulating the maritime camiage of radioactive materials 
is what deep ecologists cal1 shallow ecology. Shallow ecology approaches environmental 
problems on a superficial and myopic ~ e v e l ? ~ ~  Shallow ecology will ask the following 
questions: 1) What is the activity? 2) What are the benefits and costs the potential or 
527fiid. at 13. 
S 2 8 ~ .  Naess, supra note 41 at 200. A. Brennan has a similar description of this type of 
decision-making. He calls it shallow analysis in decisionmaking. Shallow analysis 
"purports to be a reasoned statement of objectively sensible enviro~mental priorities." It 
enumerates the environmental issues but it does not provide a comprehensive and 
interconnected account of these issues. He gives as example the pollution problems 
accompanying the use of automobiles. The shallow analysis recommends emissions 
control and car-sharhg. There is no admission that the "manufacture and use of the 
private motor car is a major factor in the depreciation of naîural capital, waste of energy 
and the generation of avoidable pollution." A. Brennan, "Environmental decision- 
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actual harm resulting fiom the activity? 3) What are the possible preventive measures 
that can be put in place? 4) 1s there a liability and compensation scheme to answer for 
the harm caused by the activity? 
The problem of hannfuI radiation exposure is rnanaged by weighing the economic 
benefits against its costs. The nsks are contr011ed principally by establishing permissible 
radiation standards and containment r n e a ~ u r e s . ~ ~ ~  
In this approach, there is no attempt to identie and anticipate the probable results 
of pollution to the Iarger ecosystem and to the social environment, in particular, to 
communities that are vulnerable to the risks posed by the a c t i ~ i t ~ . ~ ~ ~  Only the short-term 
consequences upon property and person are compensated and considered. The long-term 
and non-economic effects are overlooked. 
The shallow ecology regime has a strong belief on compensation and reparation 
as a way of resolving disputes and harms. A non-anthropocentric approach, however, 
reveals that the ideas of reparation and restoration are deceptive. One is deceived into 
beiieving that compensation will restore the parties and the non-human environment to 
the condition before the occurrence of harm. Environmental ethicists cal1 the notion of 
restoration of nature a big lie, a rny-ks3' A degraded environment can never be restored 
to its former condition.532 
The question, is then asked, why is there a seemingly contradictory ethics and 
philosophy present in the legal regime? There is no contradiction. While 
making", in R. J. Berry (ed.), Environmental Dilemmas, Ethics and Decisions, (London: 
Chapman & Hali, 1993) at 9. 
529fiid. 
"%. Zimmerman, "General Introduction", in M. Zirnmerman, supra note 16 at v. 
"'~rennan, supra note 528 at 15. 
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anthropocentrism remains the dominant ethics and philosophy, non-anthropocentric 
ethics and philosophy are attempting to gain ground. The manner of the non- 
anthropocentric greening, however, was never intentional and strategic. There was never 
any conscious discussion in the Iegal regime, either in the nuclear law or in maritime 
safety law, that any changes in them should include the abandonment of anthropocentric 
ethics and philosophy and the adoption of non-anthropocentrism. Any transformation in 
the legal regime that appear non-anthropocentric has been brought about by either a 
catastrophe such as the Chernobyl accident, or intense public pressure, such as the INF 
Code. There was never a fiindamental reassessment of the ethics and philosophy 
underlying the legal reghe. There is thus no corresponding transformation of the entire 
legal regime, except in the liability system and in the Salvage Convention. Unfortunately, 
both of these conventions operate only when harm has already occurred. 
The insularïty of the legal regime within the IMO and the IAEA contributed to its 
anthropocentric bias. It must be remembered that the M O  State membership, currently 
98% of the world tonnage, represents shipping interests, not Coastal States' interests. The 
Contracting States of other conventions of maritime sdety are shipping States, not 
Coastai States. The IAEA is also composed of nuclear energy generating States, not 
potentially affected States. The conventions that the M A  facilitate are ratified and 
implemented by nuclear energy generating States. Both organizations are obviously not 
the most objective venues for forging regdations and Iaws that balance the concerns of 




The legal regime governing the maritime shipments of radioactive materials is 
one of the most advanced and comprehensive. Despite this comprehensiveness, the 
regime lacks significant aspects to make it tmly responsive to the concems of al1 
potentially affected States and the marine environment. The principal factor that 
contributed to this oversight is the anthropocentric bias of ethics and philosophy 
underlying the legal regime. The next challenge, then, is find ways to integrate non- 
anthropocentric ethics and philosophy in the legal regime, and this challenge is the 
subject of the next Chapter. 
Chapter 5 
Theory meets practice: conclusion and proposals 
1. Summary 
Earlier, it was nwted that ethics and philosophy embody the spirit of the legal 
system. The impact mf ethics and philosophy upon particular laws and regulations, 
however, may not necessarily be apparent or clear. Ethicists themselves are skeptical and 
doubtfûl as to how ethics are translated into laws and legal decisions. Locating and being 
conscious of the underlying ethical basis of Iaw, however, is important for two reasons. 
First, it reveals the parameters and limits of law as a means of protecting the environment 
and managing the environmental dilemma. Second, by such revelation, strategies to 
resolve the environmental issues may be formulated on a more realistic basis. 
This thesis has revealed that the limitations of the legal regime governing the 
maritime carriage of radiloactive matends are largely a result of the anthropocentric bias 
of the regime. Anthrop.ocentrism sees nothing wrong in a regime that manages the 
dilemma posed by the snipment to the exclusion of potentially af3ected entities that are 
not part of the officia1 trransaction. As well, the anthropocentric fiamework also permits 
the marginalization of the interests of the marine environment. 
The strategies that must be formulated in order to respond to the shortcomings 
discussed above must be guided by a non-anthropocentnc approach. The next section will 
discuss a strategy for the= non-anthropocentric greening of the legal regime govenùng the 
maritime carriage of radboactive materials. 
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II. Fragmented incrementalism: an approach to the non-anthropocentric 
greening of the legal regime governing maritime carriage of radioactive 
materials 
The underlying ethical and philosophical premise of international law, which is 
anthropocentric, is the main challenge to the non-anthropocentric greening of 
international law. The international Iegal regime that was developed to govern the 
maritime carriage of radioactive materials was iduenced by its anthropocentric bias. A 
related challenge is the determination of the legal standing of the non-human members 
and parts of the biotic community. Can the legai status of non-human members of the 
biotic comunity  be recognized under an anthropocentric law? Should they be accorded 
rights by the legai system? At the very least, non-human species must be accorded a 
separate protection scheme because their interests are separate and different from human 
interests. 
The non-antbropocentric greening of intemationai law is not going to be easy and 
will have to hurdle ethical, philosophical and structural challenges. Non-anthropocentric 
ethics and philosophy "do not require conformity to a set of noms so much as a 
cornmitment to rethinking, reevaluating, and reinventing our approach to collective life at 
the rno st fundamental leve~.""~ Hence, the non-anthropocentric greening has ùnp lications 
not only on the ethical and philosophical premise of the law but aiso on the structural or 
institutional foundations. 
" 3 ~ .  Mickelson, "Garrots, Sticks, or Stepping Stones: Differing Perspectives on 
Cornpliance with International Law" in T. Schoenbaum, J. Nakagawa and L. C. Reif 
(eds .), Trilateral Perspectives on International Legal Issues: From neory into Practice, 
(New York: Transnational PubIishers, 1998) at 47. 
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There are two general paths that the non-anthropocentnc greening may pursue. 
The b t  path is comprehensive or broad and aims to respond to al1 the issues regardhg 
the environment. The second path is fiagrnented incrementalism. 
International taw derives its existence fiom the principle of sovereignty of 
~ t a t e s . 5 ~ ~  Consent of States, in any of the three g e n e d  forms recognized under 
international law as sources: treaty, custom, and general principles of law, is the principal 
factor that makes a d e  legd under international Palmer observes that al1 three 
forms of law are "fiequently cumbersome.. .slow and t i m e - ~ o n s u m i n ~ " ~ ~ ~  principally 
because of the requirement of consent of States. He cited as an example the Convention 
on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineml Resource ~ ~ t i v i t i e s ~ ~ '  that "will not enter into 
force because of the widespread conviction that is provisions do not sufficiently protect 
the Antarctic en~onment."'~* Two M e r  exarnples are the 1997 Protocol to the Vienna 
Convention and the Convention on Supplementary Compensation rnentioned in Chapter 
4. These two Conventions were negotiated soon after the 1986 Chemobyl accident but it 
was not until 1997 that they were finally adopted by the IAEk To date, only two States 
have ratified the two Conventions, none of which are major players in the nuclear and 
shipping industries. As to when these two Conventions will enter into force cannot be 
predicted. Unfortunately, many liability Conventions are vigorously pursued or 
revitalized only when disasters occur. 
5 3 4 ~ g g i n s ,  supra note 1 OS. 
535ibid. 
536 G. Palmer, "New Ways to Make International Environmental Law" (1992), 86 A.J.I.L. 
259 at 271. 
537 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, 2 June 1988, 
27 I.L.M. 860 (1988). 
538~almer, supra note 536 at 272. 
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Sir GeofEey Palmer thus proposes "new ways to make international law for 
the en~ironment."~~~ He recommends a new institution responsible for undertaking nkw 
ways to make international law and for the implementation of the measures necessary to 
protect the e n v i r o ~ i e n t ? ~ ~  By amending the United Nations Charter to inctude a new 
Chapter on the Environment, a new UN organization called the International 
Environment Organization could be estabfished."' This proposed international 
institution542 would have the following principal features: 1) it would be representative of 
- 
"glbid. at 259. 
"%id. at 280. 
54 'fiid. 
"2~almer's new environmental institution would have the following features: 
(1) A General Conference comprising of al1 members, to be called together 
annually and more ofien if the Governing Council so decides. The conference 
shall consist of four representatives fiom each member; two shall be govemment 
delegates and the two others shall represent business and environmental 
organizations, respectively. 
(2) A Governing Council of forty people - twenty representing governments, 
ten representuig business organizations and ten representing environmental 
organizations. 
(3) The ability of the conference to set international environmental regulations 
by a two-thirds rnajority of the votes cast by delegates present. The regulations 
would become binduig without further action. There would also be provision for 
recomrnendations to be made to members. 
(4) A Director-General and staff of the International Environment Office, to 
have explicit international responsibilities for educating people about the global 
environmental problems and what they cm do to help. 
(5) The office to have defined functions for gathering information and 
monitoring compliance, including verification of compliance with the regulations. 
There should be regular reviews of the environmental policies of member states 
and theu compliance with the regulations. 
(6) A thorough preparatory process, in which there are ample notice, thorough 
scientific and technical preparation, and consultation before regulations are made. 
(7) Fomal provision for authoritative and widely representative scientific 
advice and papers to be available to the organization. 
(8) Detailed requirements for nations to report annually on action taken to 
implement agreed regulations. The environment and business representatives 
would be required to report separately £tom govemrnents. 
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States, industries and environmental organizations; and, (2) it would be capacitated to 
enact binding regulations by a two-thirds majority ody, and not necessarily unanimous 
consent, which is the usual rule under international law. 
Palmer realizes that this proposed path is hll of obstacles, the principal structural 
hindrance being the veto of the permanent member States of the Security Council of the 
United ~a t ions . '~~  The permanent members of the Secwity Council have veto powers in 
any amendment to the UN Charter. As weU, intemational politics and the dangers, 
perceived a d o r  actual, of a supra-international powerfiil bureaucracy stand in the way 
of a new international in~titution?~ Powerhil States like the United States of America, 
incidentally one of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, would probably 
not support the creation of a new powerful international ~r~anization."~ 
An alternative strategy should, therefore, be developed and adopted to take these 
challenges into consideration. One concept that is suggested here is fiagmented 
(9) Provision for any mernber to be able to refer such complaints to a 
commission of inquiry for a full report. The commission shall consist of three 
appropriate experts of recognized impartiality and be chaired by a lawyer. The 
commission is to make finclhgs of fact and rule on the steps to be taken to deal 
with the cornplaint and the time by which the steps must be taken. Refisals by 
govemments to accept these hdings are to be referred to the full conference. 
(10) Discretion of the council to refer such complaints to a commission of 
inquiry for a fidl report. The commission shaii consist of three appropnate experts 
of recognized impartiality and be chaired by a lawyer. The commission is to make 
hdings of fact and d e  on the steps taken to deal with rtie cornplaint and the time 
by which steps must be taken. Refusais by govemments to accept these findings 
are to be referred to the fûli conference. 
(11) Authority for the council to recommend measures to the conference to 
secure cornpliance when it is lacking. Ibid. at 28 1. 
5431bid. 
5 * ~ i d .  at 282. 
5451bid. 
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in~rementalism.~~~ This strategy envisions changes at different levels of international 
law - global, regional, sub-regional, bilateral. It is incremental because it acknowledges 
that changes must be gradual, not abrupt. 
This strategy may either become a strategy by defaultS4' or a proactive, strategic 
approach to reforms. Since the comprehensive approach similar to what Palmer has 
suggested is uarealistic, a bgmented incremental approach does appear to be the only 
option. However, this approach can also be proactive, strategic and comprehensive. It can 
be proactive and strategic when it is utilized in a deliberate and organized manner. An 
example of how a proactive and strategic kagmented incrementalism can work is the 
strategy adopted for the reforms on the water sector in the Philippines. The Philippine 
water law is biased in favor of the development aspects. The sustainable use of water is a 
secondary objective. Enacting a comprehensive law for the management and 
development of water resources and establishing one national organization to manage the 
entire water sector were identified as the most critical strategies in reforming the water 
sector. The challenges facing the legislation of a new law, however, are enormous. Thus, 
aside fiom drafting a bill that provides for the integrated and comprehensive management 
of the water sector, the Task Force on Water Resources Development and Management 
[hereinafter Task Force], also pushed for a parallel, fiagmented and incremental reform 
strategy. The Task Force negotiated with many governmental agencies and local 
"6~his  concept was developed by D. VanderZwaag, "Regionalism and Arctic Marine 
Environmental Protection: Drifting between Blurry Boundaries and Hazy Horizons", in 
D. Vidas and W. Osîreng, Order for the Oceans at the T m  of the Century, (The Hague: 
Uuwer Law International, 1999) at 246. 
547~r .  VanderZwaag posits ?hat this strategy is largely by default since comprehensive 
measures to reform international law for environmental protection may be unrealistic, 
discussion dated 2 1 October 1999. 
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govemment units and worked on convincing them to ùistitute changes within their 
areas of jurisdiction even without a new law. Not al1 agencies and local govemments 
were of course, responsive to the changes. However, some agencies were convinced. One 
agency that was convinced to undertake research activities was the Department of 
Environment and Natural Resources [hereinafter  DEN^.'^* NO new funds were allocated 
for research and development for the water sector because this might need legislative 
approval. Rather, what the Secretary of the DENR allowed was the expansion of the 
mandates of some of the existing research activities that were already undertaken to 
include water research, if applicable. For example, the Mining unit of the DENR was 
tapped to conduct groundtruthing or validation of the data previously gathered on water 
resources. The Mining unit was approached because it possesses the necessary facilities 
and expertise to undertake survey and research activities underground. The Minhg unit 
was required to conduct a separate activity but it was required to gather data on water 
along with mining data whenever they undertake regular research and data gathering. 
Other initiatives were started in some Iocal government units and local water districts. 
What keep ali these separate, fragmented initiatives together are the four main objectives 
mentioned earlier. 
The Eagmented incrementalism strategy can remain comprehensive as long as it 
recognizes the connections between and among different issues. Comprehensiveness is 
not abandoned just because there is a recognition that the environmenta1 dilemma can be 
"%formation in this section was gathered when the author worked as part of the legal 
team for the Task Force on Water Resources Development and Management and the 
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Republic of the Philippines, fkom 
1997 to 1998. Additional information may be obtained at On line: United Nations Web 
1 SO 
managed and approached at different levels and in different venues. What will keep 
this strategy of fragmented incrernentalisrn fiom going nowhere is a vision. In the 
greening of international law, the vision is non-anthropocentric ethics and philosûphy. 
Below are some of the proposals for action within the fÎagmented incrernentalism 
approach. These proposals contain both substantive and institutional aspects. The 
appropriate institutional mechanism is very important in carrying out refoms. One of the 
factors that contributed to the Iack of participation of all potentially affected States and 
other entities is what Prof. Elisabeth M. Borgese calls the institutional gap. institutional 
gaps occur when there is no correspondhg institution that manages the problem or even 
when the institution exists, it is outdatedTg 
These proposals are: mandatory application of recomrnendatory codes; 
participation of non-govemmental organizations; collaboration berneen IAEA and MO; 
establishment of regional arrangements; and the internationalization of the nuclear issue. 
A. Mandatory codes 
Tt is true that many environmental instruments are of non-binding nature. The 
legal status, per se, of international environmental instruments may not be crucial in 
ensuring that environmental protection measures are carried out. For example in the case 
of Safe Transport Regulations, recommendatory provisions are adopted by a majority of 
IAEA member States. However, a compulsory instrument is welcome because it 
encourages stability in the regime. The right of States to undertake nuclear activities 
site c b - / / w w w . u n . o r g / e s d ~  1 /&/CO -#fieshw> (Date 
accessed: 3 1 October 1999). 
"'E. Borgese, The Oceanic Circle, Goventing the Seas os a Global Resource, (Tokyo: 
United Nations University Press, 1998) at 132. 
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should be accompanied by a binding obligation to observe safety standards and 
regulations. This corollary obligation reduces the opportunity of unscrupulous as well as 
inexpenenced States to abuse or misuse the right to undertake nuclear and shipping 
activities. The right to undertake nuclear activities is stili upheld but such right must be 
accompanied by a binding obligation. 
The mandatory application of the recommendatory codes and regulations that 
govem the maritime transport of nuclear materials and radioactive wastes is already being 
pursued. The organization that is pursuing the revisions of the INF Code is the IMO. 
Several IMO Cornmittees have reviewed and approved of the proposa1 to make 
mandatory the INF Code. The IMO Sub-Cornmittee on Dangerous Goods, Solid Cargoes 
and Containers @SC) during its 4th session fiom 22-26 February 1999 approved and 
finalized the draft amendrnents to the INF Code for irtclusion in Chapter VI1 of the 
SOUS, with the aim of making it r n a n d a t ~ r ~ . ~ ~ ~  The IMO MSC, reviewed the INF 
Code, during its 6sLh session in May-June 1997 agreed that the INF Code should be made 
rnandato~y.~~~ The review of the INF Code was carrïed out in CO-operation with the 
M A  and the UNE P."^ 
B. Participation of non-governmental organizations 
Participation by non-State actors in the international sphere is an accepted 
practice. In the controversy concerning the shipment of plutonium, Greenpeace 
5501M0 DSC - 4ih session: 22-26 February 1999, On lïne: IMO Web site ~ m : / / w w w .  
imo.orP/meet~/dsc/4/dsc41 .b > (Date accessed: 19 July 1999). 
SSIIMO MSC - 68g session: May 28 to June 6,  1997 On line: IMO Web site 
~~~://www.imo.or~/meeti~/msc/68/inf~ > (Date accessed: 17 August 1999). 
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International was an active participant and this had been possible because it has an 
observer status with ~ 0 . ~ ~ ~  It is suggested that the IAEA gant similar observer status to 
Greenpeace, if it has not already done ~ 0 . ~ ~ ~  As weli, other non-governmental 
organizations that have an interest in the nuclear dilemma should also be allowed to 
participate in the nuclear energy discourse and implementation of safety regulations. The 
meafllllgfid and sustained participation of non-govermental organizations and other 
stakeholders would not be maximized in an unstnictured and adversarial setting. 
C. Collaboration between IAEA and IMO 
The collaboration between IAEA and IMO should go beyond establishing safety 
requkernents for the safe transport of nuclear materials and radioactive wastes. These two 
organizations should facilitate the resolution of issues related to the shiprnents as well as 
lead in the identification of related issues outside of the shipping and nuclear fields. 
In recent years, especially after the Chemobyl accident, the two organizations, 
together with other relevant organizations, have collaborated on emergency response 
measures in case of radiological emergencies. The two organizations work to harmonise 
emergency notification, assistance and response activities. They are assisted by the 
5521M~ MEPC - 4om session: 18-25 September 1997 On line: IMO Web site 
o . o r d m e ~ ç / 4 û / m  c404.hQp (Date accessed: 17 August 
1999). 
5531M0, "List of Non-governmental Organizations in Consultative Status with IMO, On 
line: IMO Web site <&@://mmw.imo.or 
' 
> @ate accessed: 10 June 1999). 
'"The LAEA Web site does not in-f the LAEA invites international 
organizations to participate in their meetings and sessions as observers. The IMO Web 
site on the other hand, enumerates the non-govemental organizations that may sit in the 
various M O  meetings. 
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United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, UNESCO, ILO, UNIDO, UNEP., 
OECDMEA, WMO, WHO, and UNSCEAR.~*~ 
What remains lacking in the collaborative efforts of the LAEA and the IMO is the 
lack of participation of organizations representing the interests of al1 potentially affected 
States and the marine environment The IAEA and the IMO should pay attention to the 
peculiar situation of potentiaily affected Coastal States in the maritime shipments; of 
radioactive materials. The emergency procedures developed by these two organizatiions 
should capacitate not only Flag States, States of origin and destination, but also Coarstal 
States, particularly developing countries. 
D. Regional arrangements 
Regional institutional arrangements may be critical in carrying out environmemtal 
obligations, both preventive and remedial, of the maritime carriage of nuclear materials 
and radioactive wastes. The nature of maritime carriage is that it is an acti* in motPion, 
and may present rislcs to more than one State at a time within the same geographical mea.  
If, for example, the State of origin and the Flag State are required to undercake 
independent and separate EIAs in al1 the maritime zones that the vesse1 may use iru its 
passage, an administrative nightmare may ensue. It is therefore practical and sensible to 
undertake preventive and precautionary rneasures at a regional level. As wd, 
undertaking separate preventive measures at the national level may not only be 
5 5 5 ~ ~ ,  "Ernergency Notification, Assistance, and Response", On line: IAEA Web site 
~ ~ : / / w w w . i a e ~ e / w o r l d ~ m >  (Date last updated: 01 February 1999); M A ,  " T h e  
Convention on Early Notification and Assistance", On line: LAEA Web site c~EQx!! 
w w w . i a e a . o r d n s / r a s a n e t / c o n v e n t i ~ n s / e ~  > (Date last updated: 25 
January 1999). 
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impractical but inappropriate in the context of oceans environment where maritime 
zones are mere artificial boundanes. 
The substantive refonn that a regional arrangement may be able to maximize is 
the expansion and implementation of the meaning of al2 potentially affected States to 
include States that are not officially part of the transaction. The regional arrangement 
envisioned may implement the following measures: environmental impact assessrnent, 
prior notification and consultation, and emergency and contingency measures. Ail these 
rneasures may be taken up on a regional basis, rather than on a national level.. 
It may not be necessary to establish new regional arrangements for the safe and 
secure carriage of nuclear materials and radioactive wastes. There are existing regional 
structures whose mandates may be expanded or modified in order to accommodate the 
safety and security concerns of Coastal States regarding nuclear materials and radioactive 
wastes. Prof. Borgese cites the UNEP Regional Seas ~ r o ~ r a m m e ~ "  as  the most 
appropriate institutional approach to improve ocean govemance at a regional leveLS7 
Although this program starîed out on a rather limited sectoral basis, it has now been 
modified to adopt a comprehensive approach to oceans management. In its Global 
Programme of Action, the UNEP envisions collaboration with other organizations 
in a wider context, encompassing, inter dia, concern for human 
health (WHO), productivity of coastal areas (FAO), loss of biodiversity 
(CBD and others), radiation protection and marine pollution monitoring 
(IAEA), retarded development and poverty (UNDP), shifting democratic 
patterns (UNCHS/Habitat), declining food security (FAO, WFP), global 
5 5 6 ~ h e  UNEP Regional Seas Programme was an outcome of the 1972 Stockholm 
Conference. It now has thuteen regional areas including the Medit erranean, Arabian 
Gulf, Gulf of Guinea, South-East Pacific, Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, Caribbean, Indian 
Ocean and East m c a ,  and South Pacific. P. Sands, supra note 6 at 296-297. 
557 Borgese, Oceanic Circle, supra note 549 at 246. 
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environmental change (IGBP of ICSU), nature conservation (WWF, WCN)."* 
Existïng regional arrangements regulating the transboundary movement of 
hazardous wastes and radioactive wastes may be tapped. niere are regional 
arrangements. An example is the Convention on Ban the Importation into Forum Island 
Countries of Hazardous and Radioactive Wastes and to Control the Transbou~dary 
Movement and Management of Hazardous Wmtes within the South Paczfîc Region 
[hereinaffer Waiguni  onv vent ion]."^ Like the Joint Convention, the Waigani Convention 
excludes Coastd States and other potentially affected entities that are not legally part of 
the shipments f?om the pnor notification and consultation system. However, mandates 
and objectives of regional conventions like the Waigani Conventions might be expanded 
to include al l  potentially affected entities. Building on this existing arrangements may be 
a realistic strategy because the notions of the regional organization and cooperation are 
already accep ted. 
- --- 
5581bid. at 146 to 147. Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment fkom Land-Based Activities, 3 Novernber 1995, U.N. Doc. UNEP (OCA) 
/LBA/IG.2/7. 
559~onvention on Ban the Importation into Forum Island Countries of Hazardous and 
Radioactive Wmtes and to Confrol the Transboundary Movement and Management of 
Hazardous Wastes within the South Paczpc Region [hereinafter Waigani Convention], 
adopted 16 September 1995, not yet in force. Another regional convention where the 
regional prior notification and consultation may be established for shipments of 
radioactive materials is the 1996 Protocd on the Prevention of Pollution of the 
Mediterranean Sea by Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their 
Disposal, 1 October 1996. This Protocol aims to prevent, abate and eliminate pollution in 
the Mediterranean Sea caused by tramboundary movement and disposal of hazardous 
wastes. It employs the system of pnor notification and consultation among States of 
Ongin and States of Destination. Coastal States are excluded in the Protocol's system of 
pnor notification and consultation. It is recommended that the system of prior notification 
and consultation in the Mediterranean Sea region be expanded to include al1 potentially 
affected Coastal States. As reprinted in the International Environment Reporter, March 
1997,35:055 1-0557. 
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E. Internationalization of the nuclear issue 
It was noted that neither the M A  nor the IMO represents the interests and 
concerns of al1 affected States and the marine environment. The issues arising fkom the 
maritime carriage of nuclear materials and radioactive wastes, iike other issues of ocean 
space, are related with other ocean issues. The notion that the problems con£ionting the 
oceans are interrelated and must be considered as a whole is not a new concept.s60 This is 
the view underlying the LOSC as well as Chapter 17 of Agenda 21. Yet, the discussion 
and decisions of many oceans related issues, including the maritime shipments of 
radioactive materials are confhed within narrow legal regimes.561 It is not surprising 
because as argued earlier, the nuclear regime and the maritime regime represent 
principally the interests of the nuclear and shipping industries, not of 0 t h  potentially 
affected States and the marine environment. The discussion of nuclear issues should be 
taken out of its nuclear and maritime limitations and should be elevated to the 
international level. It is at the international level where the interests of al1 potentially 
affected entities and the marine environment may be properly and adequately represented 
and considered. 
The most obvious international body where oceans related issues can and have 
been taken up as a whole 
U.N.G.A.]. The U.N.G.A. has 
is the United Nations General Assembly berehafter 
been conducting annual review and discussion of oceans 
560~ee  Advisory Comrnittee on Protection of the Sea (ACOPS) , "Towards enhanced 
ocean security into the third millennium", Report of the ACOPS/GLOBE Conference 
entitled "Towards enhanced ocean security into the third rnillennium", Stockholm, 3 1 
January - 2 February 1998. 
56 1 Paragraph 46, Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), Oceans and Sens 
Report of the Secretmy-General, CSD 7th session, 19-30 April 1999, U.N. EKN. 
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and law of the sea but this yearly activity has been criticized as inadequate for two 
reasons?' First, it is undertaken in one (1) day only. One suggestion to rectie this 
shortcornhg is the establishment of a standing cornmittee of the whole of the GA that can 
adequately prepare for and follow-up on the annual debate." 
Another cnticism Iodged against the annual debate is the limited participation of 
non-State actors? The establishment of a global forum by the U.N.G.A. wherein even 
non-State entities may participate was recommended in order to deaI with the various 
issues connPnting the oceans in an integrated ~nanner.~~~ An example of this global 
forum is the world oceans observatory suggested by the Independent World Commission 
on the Oceans. The bc t ion  of such a body, composed of al1 relevant stakeholders, 
including civil society, would be to rnonitor ocean governance and act as an "extemal 
watch" on ocean affairs? 
Whatever international body or forum is established, the issues concerning the 
expansion of the term "potentialiy affected entities" and the legal status of the marine 
environment may appropriately be taken up only at the international IeveI. 
Another fonun where the maritime shipment of nuclear materials and radioactive 
wastes issues might be elevated is in a global conference. A global conference on nuclear 
activities and their impact on the environment could provide a venue for national and 
local govemments and non-govemmentai organizations (NGOs) to debate on issues, 
1 7/ 1999/4, On line: United Nations Web site <http://www.un. o d  es;i/sustdev/s& 
99.pdf.> (Date accessed: 30 August 1999). 
5621bîd. Paragraph 47. 
5631bid- 
5 6 4 ~ i ~ .  
56S~id.  
5661bid. Paragraph 49. 
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international standards and guidelines that regulate nuclear activities and collaborate 
on measures and proposals for action?' The curent proposals advocated by different 
groups, including some of the proposals mentioned above may also be taken to this 
global conference. The advantage of a global conference is that it would be open to all 
UN member States, not just LAEA or M O  member States. As well, non-State actors 
outside of the nuclear energy Hidustry might participate in such a conference. The 
signïfïcant transboundary risks posed by nuclear activities justiQ the move of placing the 
debate beyond the nuclear and maritime agenda- 
Organizing a global conference on the nuclear issue is admittedly an unrealistic 
goal at the present tirne. It will be up to non-State entities and States outside of the 
nuclear industry to campaign for a conference of this nature. 
III. Conclusion 
This thesis has examined the controversy concemhg the shipments of radioactive 
materials, particularly, plutonium, MOX and radioactive wastes. The foundation of the 
controversy is the conflict between anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric ethics and 
philosophy. The existing legal regime for the maritime carriage of radioactive materials is 
principally anthropocentric or human-centered. Since anthropocentric ethics and 
philosophy are the same cause for degradation of the environment, the interests and 
concerns of other potentially aec t ed  entities are not meaningfiilly considered in the 
existing legai regime. 
567~nited Nations Department of Public Information, "UN Conferences: What Do They 
Accomplish?", August 1997, UN Doc. DPV1825Rev.4. 
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This thesis asserts that an essential key to institutionaiizing reforms in the legal 
regime is to pursue and apply non-anthropocentric ethics and philosophy. Non- 
anthropocentric ethics and philosophy do not possess nor explain all the -ers to 
environmental problems. However, they serve as compasses, steering the legai reghe 
towards a path of respect and protection for both humans and non-humans, for 
recognition of both the economic and the non-economic. 
Prof. Borgese's nnal words in her book, The Oceanic Circle, aptly summarizes the 
main points of this thesis. 
The emerging ecologicd world view, our new respect for nature 
and the value of all species in biodiversity will lead us to build a social, 
economic, and political order that reflects this world view and its values, 
or maybe we choose this world view because we have realized that no 
other can Save out human universe. The respect we will have for each 
other we will have for dl living things. Respect for life encompasses both. 
Peace and harmony with nature wili enbance peace and harmony among 
the people of the e a r t l ~ . ~ ~ ~  
-- 
" '~or~ese,  Oceanic Circle, supra note 547 at 198. 
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